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Abstract 
There is evidence in the literature which suggests that the 
linguistic analysis of vague language poses problems. In particular, 
some vague expressions create difficulties as to which aspects of 
their meaning should be handled by semantics, and which by pragmatics. 
In this thesis, the-general-phenomenon of vague language is 
investigated through a detailed examination of-two types of vague 
expressions: number approximations (eg about ten), and vague category 
identifiers (eg a film or something). The results of informant tests, 
designed to discover how these vague expressions are understood, show 
that hearers-interpret them as identifying fuzzy sets whose membership 
is defined by (a) the form and content of the vague expression; (b) 
linguistic context and situation of utterance; and. (c) world knowledge. 
Informants exhibit a high degree of agreement in their responses. 
Conversation data (and some written data) froma variety of 
sources are analysed in order to ascertain what are the conversational 
effects arising from the use of vague language, and what interactional 
problems are solved by its use. Intonational characteristics, lexical 
aspects; and idiomaticity are also covered. 
The subsequent theoretical discussion confronts various existing 
proposals for drawing the distinction between semantics and pragmatics 
with these data, and finds no valid ways of establishing the 
distinction. In the concluding chapter an alternative strategy for 
the study of meaning is put forward in programmatic outline. 
iv 
Table 1 
Table 1 
Notational Conventions used in the Transcription 
of Conversation Extracts 
+ attested example 
A: B: stands for different speakers 
(laughs) brackets enclose description of non-linguistic 
communication 
(. ) untimed short pause 
[ indicates speech or vocal noise concurrent with that 
above 
// encloses interjected utterance from a 
different speaker 
ýýý indecipherable speech 
/ marked pitch deviation, upwards/downwards 
if precedes emphatically stressed syllable 
[I enclose transcriber/situational comment 
any prosodic features heard as delineating a 
sense group 
I have used apostrophes in don't, can't, etc, simply because it seems 
unnecessarily upsetting to miss them out. They are, however, omitted, 
where intonation transcription is included, because they would 
interfere with reading the intonation symbols. I have not used 
capital letters at the beginning of turns, but in individual short 
examples I have used them, again because it seems typographicallly 
upsetting not to. 
V 
Table 2 
Conventions used for transcription of Intonation 
onset of tone unit 
ýý 
end of tone unit 
stressed syllable 
heavy stress 
fall 
rise 
rise-fall 
fall-rise 
(. ) untimed pause 
sudden pitch change for beginning of next 
segment 
V1 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Topic 
"Some of the most interesting questions ire raised by the 
study of words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less 
fuzzy" (Lakoff, 1972: 195) 
The general subject of this thesis is vagueness in the use of 
language. There are many ways in which speakers can be vague: they 
can employ "hedges" ( in the sense of Lakoff, 1972) such as virtually 
or it seems that, or they can use agentless passives (Fowler and 
Kress, 1979: 30ff) to give just two examples. What are the linguistic 
and non-linguistic mechanisms which enable speakers to be. vague, and 
which enable hearers to understand them when they are? Why and when 
are speakers vague? These are some of the questions which will be 
discussed. 
The present work contributes to the study of vague language use 
through an investigation of two types of vague expressions. The 
expressions studied in detail are: 
Type A: Number Approximations 
(n and m= members of the set of Real Numbers) 
about n 
approximately n 
(a)round n 
n or so 
norm 
Type B: 'Tag' Approximations 
(X = typically NP or VP) 
X and things like that 
X and things 
X and that 
X or anything like that 
X or anything 
X or something like that 
X or something 
1 
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In Chapter 2a classification of different types of vagueness is 
presented - and other vague expressions are introduced and described 
at various points where they are relevant. 
The pretheoretical notion of vagueness will be refined and 
defined throughout the thesis, but a general working definition would 
be that a vague utterance is one which cannot be assigned an exact (or 
in the case of ambiguity being present, several discrete but exact) 
meaning(s), even with recourse to context. One example to suggest the 
general notion: 
[Context gloss: discussion of academics who publish many articles] 
(1) +B: ... and they repeat themselves each time. You find that 
you get five or six articles and they're really 
very much the same [11.21.2] 
The hearer of (1), even with recourse to all he[l] knows of the 
speaker's knowledge, and likely intentions, to the discourse 
situation, and any other relevant or irrelevant pragmatic factors, 
cannot know from the information provided whether he should take the 
reading of five or six articles to be "exactly five" or "exactly six" 
or exactly any other number or interval of numbers. Importantly, 
however, this apparent vagueness causes no difficulty to the hearer or 
to the progress of the conversation. 
1.2 The Rationale 
"What' then is a reasonable field of endeavour for, 
linguistics? We would claim that the study of meaning is 
vitally important but that meaning must be studied in a new 
light, namely with respect to the actual usage of speakers. " 
[Schank and Wilks, 1974: 312] 
1 Where-there is no antecedent which is clearly marked for gender, he, him and his should be read as referring to people of either sex. 
2 
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Recent linguistic work on "meaning" has tended to broaden its scope in 
the way suggested by Schank and Wilks, in order to look at more 
non-linguistic (pragmatic) aspects of meaning; and the interface 
between semantics and pragmatics especially has received and is 
continuing to receive a good deal of attention (typified for example 
by Wilson, 1975, Wilson and Sperber, 1982; Gazdar, 1979, Levinson, 
1979; Allwood, 1981). 
_ 
The vague expressions investigated here are particularly relevant 
to this area because they seem to be more inherently 'pragmatic' in 
nature than many others, indeed it has been suggested that some of the 
expressions are almost semantically empty and that their 
interpretation has to be handled entirely within pragmatics (Sadock, 
1977). However we evaluate this particular view, what is clear is 
that these expressions can probably not be handled satisfactorily 
except by looking at both semantics and pragmatics. 
There is evidence in the literature to suggest that the 
linguistic analysis of vague expressions poses problems (Lakoff, 1972; 
Sadock, 1977; Wachtel, 1980,1981; Channell, 1980 Fauconnier, 1976, 
Klein, 1980,1982; Danell, 1978). In particular, some vague 
expressions create difficulties as to which aspects of their meaning 
should be handled by semantics and which by pragmatics. Partial 
theoretical analyses have been proposed for a few expressions, but 
remain to be substantiated. There is as yet no major study, of 
linguistic vagueness, and no generally agreed approach to, it. This 
study of vague language is intended to be on the one hand 
theoretically relevant in contributing to the continuing debate on the 
semantics /pragmatics interface, and on the other, descriptively useful 
in making available a body of data concerned with a hitherto 
3 
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1-1 
underinvestigated area. 
Such work as there has been on vague language(see 2.2) has been 
more theoretical than descriptive (these terms are distinguished as 
described in Lyons 1977: 138), in the sense that it uses only limited 
numbers of (often unattested). examples to substantiate particular 
theoretical analyses. The work reported here begins to right the 
imbalance between theoretical and descriptive work by proceeding in 
the opposite direction. It is very largely descriptive, and moves 
towards theoretical analyses through observation of a body of attested 
data of different sorts (see 1.5 Methodology). The expressions 
studied, listed at 1.1, do not exhaustively cover even the narrow 
field to which they belong. They are however seen as representative 
in that the problems they raise for theory are essentially the same as 
those raised by other vague expressions. The decision to study this 
particular set of expressions, and not others, arose from a wish to 
study only expressions which were attested from conversation or 
written data. Random data, even in very large quantities, cannot be 
expected to produce examples of all the phenomena the investigator has 
identified as possibly related. His two choices then (given practical 
limitations on his data collecting resources) are to make use of 
unattested data, or to restrict his investigation. For theoretical 
reasons which will be discussed in greater detail in Section 1.5 the 
second alternative was preferred [2]. 
2 Nevertheless it was necessary, especially in discussing syntactic 
restrictions, to make use of some invented data. In addition, 
examples drawn from the work of other authors are usually unattested, 
or no information on their provenance is given. 
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Although the work discusses only a restricted set of data, its 
firm links with an existing body of theoretical work enable it to 
avoid the methodological pitfall noted by Teeter (1964): 
"If we are willing to restrict our range of enquiry 
sufficiently, we will be able to find some answers easily, 
but they will have little bearing on anything of 
importance. "(: 205) 
He goes on to describe what he sees as the correct relationship 
between generalisation and particularisation, as follows: 
"If we insist on dealing with large questions, our first 
attempts at answers are likely to be mistaken, or untestable 
without a great deal of further work. But our answers to 
questions are only worthy of the name of science when they 
are both significant and testable. Theory divorced from the 
best available knowledge is irrelevant, a castle in the air, 
and by that token of no interest to science. But knowledge 
which "fails to rise to the level of theory is of equal lack 
of interest, an accumulation of unconnected trivia. Science 
lies between these two dangers. " (1964: 205-206) 
According to a conventional model, it will be the task of two 
sets of rules, semantic rules and pragmatic rules, to account for the 
observed meanings of the vague expressions described in this thesis. 
Perhaps however the main point which emerges from trying to see how 
this would be done, is to call into question the semantics/pragmatics 
distinction, for the practical reason that it does not appear to 
elucidate the account. Allwood (1981) has argued coherently on both 
theoretical and practical grounds that the distinction is not helpful. 
He does not however map out an alternative approach which could be 
followed. It cannot be the task of this thesis, whose primary aim is 
descriptive, to develop an entire new theory of meaning. I shall 
therefore' proceed as follows. The theoretical discussion of meaning 
will take place within the semantics/pragmatics approach. The various 
possible ways of drawing the distinction, outlined by Allwood, will 
each be considered, in relation to the data presented herein. This 
will mean that the different analyses will be of interest and 
5 
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accessible to adherents of any of the theoretical positions mentioned, 
as well as, to those who may incline to a more ethnomethodological 
perspective. 
1.3 The Results 
1.3.1 Status of the results 
Given the present lack of an accepted linguistic theory of vagueness, 
plus the lack of a complete and generally agreed psychological theory 
of production/comprehension, it is not possible to give the empirical 
work reported in this thesis the status of "experiments to confirm or 
disconfirm the hypothesis involved" (Wirth, 1975). The work must be 
seen principally as exploratory. Wirth contends that the logical 
relation between theory and observed data is as follows: 
Hg & He --> Psb 
Where Hg is a grammatical hypothesis (with 'grammatical' being 
understood in its broadest sense), He a theory of speech production, 
and Psb a proposition describing some observable aspect of speech 
behaviour. The partial analyses I shall present are Hgs, and the 
observations from data are a series of Psbs, but with no definite and 
widely accepted He available, the Hgs are neither confirmed nor 
disconfirmed by the relevant Psbs, and neither can they be by relevant 
experimental evidence presented by other workers. 
The rationale of the present work has therefore been to seek out 
and systematize a set of Psbs relevant to a particular sub-area of 
linguistic enquiry and to use these to-confront existing approaches to 
meaning in order to see whether they can deal with vague language in 
an acceptable way. 
6 
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In the light of this logic, all the work reported herein must be 
seen only as a contribution to the continuing increase in our 
scientific knowledge of how language behaviour takes place. It 
represents one step into the whole largely uninvestigated area of 
vague language use. 
1.3.2 Psychological Reality 
Clearly the business of engaging in linguistic behaviour- involves a 
variety of cognitive skills, and both the nature of these skills and 
the allocation of different activities to them are as yet not very 
well understood. For the descriptive linguist, a necessary assumption 
is the hypothetical division of cognitive skills into linguistic and 
non-linguistic skills. The linguist's (as opposed to the 
psychologist's) investigation of the linguistic skills usually makes 
the further assumption that linguistic behaviour is the result of the 
existence of a shared system or systems, the necessary elements of 
which can be ascertained by studying linguistic data. The linguist's 
task is construed as making a description of the elements of the 
system(s). The, work presented here offers a description, valid for 
speakers of Standard English (see below), of some elements which must 
be present in the system(s) of English in order to account for vague 
language behaviour. 
To what extent can the theoretical descriptions presented here be 
said to have "psychological reality"? I think it important to make 
this clear since "psychological reality" is often brought to bear as 
an evaluative criterion in regard to particular linguistic constructs. 
In the case of semantics, it has even been suggested that 
formulation of "psychologically real" semantic constructs is the only 
possible goal for semantics: 
7 
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The main problem in linguistic semantics is that of empirical 
validity. To construct a revealing semantic representation 
of an utterance is to show what thought this utterance 
corresponds to. When we propose a semantic representation we 
want to be sure that our formula actually has some 
psychological reality - that it is not a more or less elegant 
fantasy but rather a faithful portrait of a thought. " 
(Wierzbicka, 1978: 118) 
First we must be clear about what it would mean to claim 
"psychological reality" for a linguistic construct. To say that a 
construct is psychologically real is to say that the construct as 
described is a component of a system the brain uses, and to predict 
that if we could examine the operation of people's brains, we would be' 
able to recognise the particular cognitive construct in the processes 
going on in the brain from the description previously provided. A 
useful analogy is to say that a construct is psychologically real if 
it is part of the software held in the brain and used for cognitive 
processing. Since this is not the right setting for lengthy 
discussion of this question, I want briefly first to make the point 
that "psychological reality" so characterised is not. a reasonable goal 
for semantics, and neither therefore for this study, at present, and 
second to describe a relationship between theory-building and 
cognitive considerations which is reasonable, and is the one adopted 
in the present work. Finally I shall summarize the general 
psychological claims which can be made for this work. 
Kosslyn (1978)- in describing why, in general, the act of 
investigating how the brain works, verges on the impossible, shows us 
why 'psychologically real semantics' is not a reasonable goal: 
"This situation [that of the investigator] is rather like one 
where an unknown solid object is placed in a dark box and our 
task is to describe the surface of the object by shooting in 
BBs and observing how they bounce back. There are three 
important aspects to this situation: first, there is the 
nature of the hidden object of study; next, there is the 
data, the angle at which BBs bounce back when they are shot 
in at various angles; and finally, there is the systematic 
8 
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relation between the angle of incidence and the angle of 
reflection. It is clear from this example that one needs to 
know two of these things in order to determine the third. If 
one does not know that the angle of incidence equals the 
angle of reflection, one cannot use the data to deduce the 
shape. Similarly, if one wants to discover the 
incidence/reflection relation, one must have knowledge of 
both the data (the results of shooting BBs at particular 
angles) and the surface characteristics of the object. 
Consider the sorrow of one who knows only how BBs bounce out 
of our dark box, and knows nothing of the law relating the 
angles of incidence and reflection, nor anything about the 
concealed object. Somehow he must infer both the 
incidence/reflection relation and the nature of the surface 
of the object from the data, but he needs prior knowledge of 
the relation to infer the surface characteristics and vice 
versa! This pitiful creature is the cognitive psychologist. " 
(1978: 218) 
If we accept Kosslyn's analogy[31, the goal set out by Wierzbicka for 
semantics is unrealisable in the present circumstances. The situation 
, 
is that outlined by Wirth (Section 1.3.1); if three variables are 
involved in a function, and we know only the value of one, we cannot 
deduce either of the other two. Given this, it is misguided to use 
the criterion of psychological reality in criticising semantic 
constructs. 
This means that linguistic model making can be quite unconcerned 
by questions of the relationship of the model to the psychological 
mechanisms in the brain, if its proponents so choose. This attitude 
is made explicit, and to a certain extent has been viewed as 
sanctioned by, Chomsky's early statement that (1965: 9) "a generative 
grammar is not a model for a speaker or a hearer". A linguist may, 
3 And we-might not, since as Peter Monk has pointed out to me, an 
investigator in this position can use simple trigonometry to plot 
points which must be on the surface of the object, and thus, if he 
makes enough observations, he can arrive at quite a detailed 
description of the object. If this is the true analogy, psychologists 
and linguists are not in such a bad position. . 
9 
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and most do, legitimately choose to give an account of a particular 
subset of linguistic data without wishing to claim psychological 
reality for that account. Such an approach takes the view propounded 
for example by Wilks (1977: 72) that predictive power is the final 
test of a theory - "Their ultimate accountability [.. .1 can only 
be whether or not they work. " According to one widely quoted 
definition, such a theory could claim psychological reality simply by 
virtue of its ability to account for the observed data: 
"A linguistic concept is psychologically real to the extent 
that' it contributes to the explanation of behaviour relative 
. to linguistic judgments, and nothing more is necessary for 
this. " (Levelt 1974, vol 3: 70) 
(cf also, Kiparsky, 1968: 171) 
Because of the "bouncing ball" problem, this claim is in fact the 
strongest that can at present be made for a linguistic construct. 
Yet this is intuitively unsatisfactory. The problem is 
articulated by Wierzbicka in the passage previously quoted: many 
linguists would like to have a further criterion for empirical 
validity than mere descriptive adequacy. The appearance 1of an entire 
book devoted to the topic (Halle, Bresnan and Miller, 1978) testifies 
to the strength of this desire. Most discussions and invocations of 
psychological reality as a criterion spring'from, this wish, which is 
certainly one I share. Yet, as we have seen, a genuine claim of 
psychological reality is empirically impossible at present. 
There is, however, a further guiding principle which may be used. 
This is what I shall call psychological plausibility. Making a model 
psychologically plausible means on the one hand making' it compatible 
with any experimental information about psychological aspects of the 
phenomenon under investigation, and on the other, making it compatible 
with those sections of psychological theory which the investigator 
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finds convincing. (Note that the conclusions drawn by a psychologist 
are equally a matter of combining inference with plausible 
assumptions, see Kosslyn (1978: 218ff). 
It is important to realise that psychological plausibility in no 
way confers empirical validity on a model. I think this may be the 
mistake made by many people who invoke psychological reality; for 
example Bresnan (1978: ): "... previous attempts to realize 
transformational grammars as models for a speaker or hearer are 
valuable and informative. By showing us in what respects grammars may 
be psychologicaunrealistic, they can guide us in our efforts to 
construct better theories of grammar. 
" [my underlining] What 
psychological plausibility does do is to make the model more 
intuitively acceptable, and perhaps acceptable to a greater number of 
people. 
In the present work, for example, the theoretical discussion in 
Chapters 7 and 8 is, compatible with the results of research into 
cognitive aspects of perception of category membership (in particular 
that reported by Rosch and her various associates, see references). 
The fact that my, analysis of the vague expressions studied is 
supported by Rosch's results renders it more pretheoretically 
plausible, but it would not support the claim that it is 
'psychologically real'. 
The claims I would make then for the work presented here are the 
following: 
1 It is psychologically real only in the weakest sense of 
Levelt (1970) in that it gives a correct account of the data, 
and 
2 the proposals are psychologically plausible in that they 
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take account of available psychological data, and cognitive 
assumptions currently accepted by some psychologists. 
1.4 General Theoretical Approach 
The main emphasis of this work is descriptive. This section aims only 
therefore to provide information about the general theoretical (and 
pre-theoretical) approach which I adopted, and to describe my 
theoretical assumptions. 
1.4.1 Idealisation 
Any scientific investigation must idealise. It is impossible to study 
everything to the same depth from the beginning. I therefore set out 
to describe vague language use in just one speech variety of English: 
that of Standard English as used by educated native-speakers. As 
noted. by Milroy (to appear 1983: mimeo) "the notion of a standard is 
notoriously complicated and hard to pin down", yet it is reasonable in 
a linguistic study to make an overt assumption that such a variety can 
be the object of description (cf Lyons, 1977: 587). A sensible 
rationalisation of the choice of Standard English is given by Crystal 
(1969: 11-12): 
This choice was directed, not of course by any concept of a 
linguistic betterness within this dialect or accent, but by 
the greater usefulness of research based upon them, as 
opposed to any other British regional or class dialect or 
accent: this variety is the one upon which most research has 
already been done, and is the basis for the majority of 
textbooks available, hence its use will facilitate 
correlation of my results with already familiar information". 
In collecting my data I deliberately set out to minimise 
variation arising from social differences, by taking data from what 
might plausibly be assumed to be one speech community: that of people 
working and studying in higher and further education institutions in 
England. The written data is all from sources which should broadly 
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fall within the same category, mostly the 'quality' newspapers. The 
test subjects equally can be classified in this category, since one 
group were higher education students, and another sixth-form students 
from an 11-plus selected grammar school. 
An empirically testable prediction arising from this work would- 
be that a theoretical framework which successfully accounts for vague 
language use in standard English should be applicable in principle to 
vagueness in any other language or language variety. 
Another approach to vagueness is to view the vague expressions 
themselves as sociolinguistic variables. Dines (1980) suggests that 
for Australian English the tag approximations are markers of social 
class differences. Some subjective comments by test participants 
suggest this may also be true between varieties of English; and that 
especially is felt by some standard English speakers to be a 
stigmatised form (see Chapters 4 and 6). In order to discuss a 
particular set" of structures relatable -by their meaning as 
sociolinguistically variable, it is first necessary to have` an 
adequate description for just one variety. My decision was to provide 
that description, in order that further work could subsequently 
investigate the sociolinguistic aspects of vague language use. 
1.4.2 A Note on "meaning" 
"Pending a satisfactory explanation of the notion of meaning, 
linguists in semantic fields are in the situation of not 
knowing what they are talking about. " (Quine, 1953: 47) 
Since I believe that anyone not defining the term 'meaning' adequately 
before using it must be viewed, as suggested by Quine, as not knowing 
what they are talking about, there now follows a short section 
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describing the general approach to meaning adopted in this work. 
"Meaning' will be used as. a broad cover-term indicating all the 
propositions which a hearer can reasonably derive, taking account of 
contextual and background knowledge, from the utterance of a given 
sentence on a particular occasion. Thus part of the meaning of 
(2) Do you always make your own pastry? (Hudson, 1975: 4) 
in a given context, might be taken to be "This pastry is really 
leathery". Thus (meanings is used to encompass all the subdivisions 
which have been proposed for it, such as 'sentence meaning', 
'propositional content', 'entailments' and 'implicatures'. 
The meaning investigated is hearers' meaning. At a theoretical 
level, this is because hearers' meaning is seen as more 
conversationally salient in the sense that it is hearers' meaning 
which gets acted upon, and which therefore influences the developing 
structure of a conversation. The suggestion is that 'speakers' 
meaning' is , inasmuch as communication succeeds, the same as hearers' 
meaning , because speakers have to take into account the mechanisms 
they know "hearers will use, in formulating their utterances. Hudson 
(1975: 5), who is reformulating Grice (1967), with, I think a clearer 
example, puts this view forward as follows: 
"The work done by the speaker in conducting a conversation is 
closely related to that done by the hearer [... 1: what 
the speaker must do is decide what conclusions he wants the 
addressee to come to, and then find a way of ensuring that 
this happens. This means-that before saying [(2) above] Mrs 
Green has to work out how Mrs Brown is likely to take it: 
e. g. does she realise that Mrs Green prefers home-made 
pastry to shop-bought pastry? Needless to say, speakers 
often make mistakes in this kind of calculation, although 
they usually put the blame on the addressee: " 
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Psycholinguistic work offers confirmation of this point. Harris, 
Begg and Upfold (1980) report an experiment in which it was observed 
that speakers consistently tailored their messages to anticipate the 
hearer's interpretation. Therefore hearers meaning should be of the 
most interest to linguists. 
In attempting to describe hearers' meaning, I reject the 
formulation that what hearers do is to "recover" what speakers intend 
The meanings hearers arrive at may be quite other than those intended 
by speakers. For example in the following exchange: 
(3) [Context: wife to husband at 6.30 pm in Christmas week] 
+B: Would you like to have a bath - the water's hot? 
C: Why, where are we going tonight? [12.78] 
C's reply makes it clear that he had inferred that one 
proposition forming part of the meaning (as broadly characterised 
herein) of B's utterance is 
I think you should have a bath, because we are going out 
The subsequent breakdown and repair enabled the participants to see 
(amid hilarity) that B had not intended this proposition at all. So 
far as its role in determining subsequent conversation was concerned, 
the meaning of B's utterance was as understood by C, 
_its 
hearer. 
At a methodological level, the reason for preferring' to 
investigate and describe hearers' meanings is that while they may 
still be difficult to observe, they are more open to empirical. 
observation than information about speakers' intentions. For example, 
hearers' meaning may be construed through observation, of hearers' 
action resulting from a particular utterance. Thus the investigator 
observing the exchange at example (3), may legitimately attribute the 
proposition "request/strong suggestion" to the meaning of B's 
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utterance, on the basis of C's reply. C has indeed made inferences 
about B's intention, and has acted upon them in his reply. What the 
investigator may not legitimately do is either to state B's intentions 
on the basis of what B says, or to state that C has in some, sense 
"recovered" what B intended. The ways in which hearers' meanings are 
investigated are described in Section 1.5 Methodology. 
1.4.3 Grammar 
I assume that the three components traditionally recognised (syntax, 
semantics, phonology) can be separated for the purposes of 
description. (This leaves aside the question of whether they are 
valid for psychological models of speech production. ) 
Syntax 
This work makes no direct contribution to syntactic theory. Therefore 
the relevant assumptions about syntax are not well-developed. I 
assume that there are syntactic rules which map logical forms into 
"surface strings". Where syntactic terminology is used, it should be 
seen merely as a convenient way to refer to a generally acknowledged 
phenomenon rather than as indicating adherence to any particular 
syntactic theory. For example, I use the term "conjunction reduction" 
in reference to semantically-relatable sets of sentences like: 
(4) aI bought some apples and some oranges at the market 
bI bought some apples at the market 
cI bought some oranges at the market 
but this does not mean that I necessarily believe that (a) results 
from a transformation working on (b) and (c). I use the term as. a 
convenient way of linking with the relevant existing literature. 
Phonology 
The area of phonology which is drawn on in this study is intonation. 
Intonation is relevant in that it is observed that certain expressions 
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from the list at 1.1, which are structurally ambiguous between a vague 
and an exact reading, are differentiated by means of intonation 
differences. In addition the 'tag' expressions use intonation to mark 
the 'scope' of the tag - that is in an expression [ VP TAG ] where VP 
consists of [V NP ], whether the vagueness is relevant to the whole 
VP, or just to NP. 
Intonation should be understood in the sense of Crystal (1969: 
195) as "a complex of features from different prosodic systems. These 
vary in their relevance, but the most central are tone, pitch-range, 
and loudness, with rhythmicality and tempo closely related. " He has 
previously defined prosodic systems as "sets of mutually defining 
phonological features which have ahessentially variable relationship 
to the words selected"(1969: 5). 
The contrasts referred to in the first paragraph of this 
sub-section are contrasts of tonality and tonicity. Crystal notes 
(: 263) that tonicity may perform either an accentual function, as in 
the case of the choice of nucleus positions possible for a sentence 
like 
(2) Do you always make your own pastry? 
or it may perform what he calls a grammatical function, as in the case 
of, for example, 
(4) Was she wearing a green dress or a red one? (Crystal, 
1969: 263) 
where the word red must be nuclear. In the cases I consider, the 
tonicity and tonality have a grammatical function. 
The transcription system used is that developed in Crystal 
(1969). For convenience the symbols are set out in Table 2. 
Semantics and Pragmatics 
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I understand semantics and pragmatics to be convenient (or not so 
convenient) labels which arise from a hypothetical division of 
cognitive skills relating to meaning into those which are specifically 
linguistic and those which apply also to other types of behaviour. 
The considerable amount of attention paid to the exercise of 
boundary-drawing between semantics and pragmatics may be a 
pretheoretical indication that drawing such a boundary might turn out 
to be spurious. 
If the distinction is adopted, it will be axiomatic that 
SEMANTICS & PRAGMATICS ---> Pmsb 
(cf Wirth's formulation, Section 1.3.1 and Gazdar's "PRAGMATICS 
MEANING - TRUTH CONDITIONS"(1979: 2)) 
where SEMANTICS and PRAGMATICS are sets of hypotheses about the 
meaning of linguistic expressions, and Pmsb is any proposition about 
the meaning of particular speech behaviours (to the extent that the 
empirical difficulties outlined in 1.4.2 can be circumvented to allow 
observation). 
From observations of speech behaviour we have at present no 
clear-cut theoretical or practical way of deciding which aspects of 
meaning are semantic and which are pragmatic (it is again the point 
made by Wirth, in an expression with three variables, if only one 
value is known, its impossible to- deduce the other two). Wachtel 
(1980) in criticising Channell (1980), claims that it is invalid to 
base semantic constructs on evidence from observation of speech 
behaviour (specifically, elicitation tests). Lyons (1977: 117) states 
that "the distinction of pragmatics and semantics in-relation to the 
analysis of meaning in natural language is, [... ) generally 
recognized as controversial". This area of controversy will be taken 
18 
Chapter 1 
up in Chapter 7. 
Representations of Meaning 
A problem which has bothered many writers interested in semantics is 
what sort of representations should be found at pre-lexical level. 
Confusion arises because the most obvious way of talking about the 
meaning of words is with other words, with a consequent possible 
confusion of levels. Logicians-employ '' to mark the sentences of 
the object language, so in, for example, the expression 
'snow is white' is true, iff snow is white 
the sentence with '' refers to an object language proposition, and 
the whole expression is a statement in metalanguage of its meaning. 
Generative semanticists used capital letter written words, thus 
[WE CAUSE[DRAGONS BECOME DEAD]] 
SS 
"The terminal elements in this phrase marker are written in capitals 
to indicate that they are. not language specific lexical items but are 
universal semantic primitives. " (Fodor, 1977: 78) Others have used 
square bracketing around prelexical semantic features (eg Katz and 
Fodor, 1964; Lehrer, 1972). 
Such attempts at describing meaning by the use of a meta-language 
which is an adaptation of the object language have been termed as 
nothing but translations into "semantic markerese" by Lewis (1972). 
That is, he claims that merely using other words to describe meaning, 
reveals as few interesting generalisations about the nature of 
language as does translation from English to French. His criticism 
is, I think, too sweeping. The proposals for a semantic description 
of verbs made in Dixon (1971) use a small set of semantic components 
to define nuclear verbs, and then define non-nuclear verbs using them. 
Evidence from the Dyirbal 'mother-in-law' language demonstrates the 
19 
Chapter 1 
salience of the two categories, as does evidence about the order in 
which children acquire words (nuclear before non-nuclear, as a general 
rule). Rosch et al (1976) examined Roger Brown's corpus of 
spontaneous child speech of one child (Brown, 1973) and found that at 
Stage 1, only basic level (=nuclear) names were used (Rosch et al were 
only interested in nouns). So it may well be true that expressing the 
semantics of non-nuclear words in terms of nuclear ones does reveal an 
interesting generalisation about the nature of linguistic meaning. 
My purpose is not to contribute to this debate, but to state how 
descriptions will be made here. Despite the circularity and possible 
confusion arising from formulations in English, I shall continue to do 
this, principally so that the description is comprehensible. J. D. 
Fodor's rationalisation of this is to say that such descriptions 
"mirror the prelexical structures from which words would be derived 
[in a Generative Semantic Grammar]" (1977: 119). Contra the criticism 
of Lewis, I hold that the resulting descriptions will embody valid 
generalisations about meaning. 
Pragmatics 
Pragmatics is the area of language study which probably at present 
enjoys the smallest degree of agreement as to what it includes and how 
to study it. Since the purpose of the present work is practical more 
than it is theoretical, I shall not do more here than draw attention 
to some of the unresolved considerations, and say how I propose to 
proceed. 
Given the axiom 
SEMANTICS & PRAGMATICS ---> Pmsb 
it was inevitable that those with a major interest in semantics would 
assign to pragmatics observed aspects of meaning which they did not 
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wish to include in their proposals for semantics, and thus, that the 
area would acquire the 'waste-basket' air which has been attributed to 
it (for remarks in this vein, see eg Chomsky, 1969: 81; Bar-Hillel, 
1971; cited in Kasher, 1977). If however, we take as our object of 
study a set of observations of the meaning of, particular expressions , 
with a view to providing a description which accounts for that set of 
observations, we shall, as suggested by Levinson (1979) be equally 
interested in semantics and pragmatics. 
It is usually implied, if not made explicit, that hearers faced 
with incoming utterances first process these through their grammar, 
and then deploy pragmatic inferences to sort out problems (for an 
example of this view, see Smith and Wilson, 1979: 197). Contra this 
view, some recent work suggests that in accounting for language 
understanding, we should possibly be more interested in pragmatics 
than in grammar, on the basis of evidence that hearers deploy 
non-grammatical inferences of the type - "What could this speaker 
possibly, and reasonably, be meaning, in this context? " before they 
deploy the full range of relevant semantic and syntactic rules (cf 
Milroy to appear 1983: mimeo; Danell,. 1978: 14). 
There are currently no well-developed or-widely-accepted theories 
of pragmatics which can be adopted. Grice's (1968,1969,1975,1978) 
proposals provide a possible set of principles for a theory, but do 
not constitute in themselves such a theory. Gazdar (1979) is an 
attempt to formalise a theory of pragmatics, because such a 
formalisation, he contends, will expose directly the explanatory and 
predictive value of that theory (cf Gazdar 1979: 10). His formal 
system, it is claimed, "given an utterance, tells us what that 
utterance implicates and presupposes" (: 129). Examples are given 
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which show that his system makes correct predictions. I think it is 
correct to say that most of the examples used are invented. My view 
is that such examples cannot provide a real test of the validity of 
the proposed system. It must be tested against real utterances 
complete with accompanying observations relevant to determining 
hearers' meanings. 
Given the lack of any generally-accepted or developed theory, I 
shall proceed with the two goals of discovering (a) what propositions 
relevant to the meaning of vague utterances a putative pragmatic 
theory must account for; and (b) what its necessary components are. 
The putative set of pragmatic rules relevant to language 
understanding has, as noted, an interface with semantics. It also has 
an interface with more general rules of social behaviour. In drawing 
that other boundary, I follow the suggestion of Levinson (1979), 
whereby pragmatic rules make- reference to particular social 
relationships, which bear on the communicative effects arising from 
utterances, which in turn are codified by sociolinguistics. In the 
present case, for example, the pragmatics of vagueness could include a 
rule to the effect that number approximation is often used where a 
speaker is/feels inferior in knowledge/ability to his hearer(s); while 
the description of the social relationship which had as a product the 
use of a numerical approximation, would be the concern of 
sociolinguistics. This is a practical division of labour, and as 
Levinson notes "coincides with the kind of information that on the one 
hand one would expect, and on the other expect not, to find in a 
grammar, whether theoretical or practical" (: 218). Incidentally, it 
is also useful in that it allows a unitary approach to human 
communication, that is, the same kind of rules as will account for the 
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appropriateness of number approximation will also account for the 
appropriateness of kissing, or bowing. 
"Context" and "Pragmatics" 
The putative subject matter of pragmatics has been defined as an 
account of those meaning propositions not accounted for in semantics. 
The widely-held assumption is that propositions not directly 
attributable to the semantics are in- large part a result of the 
influence of context. Should this be taken to mean that all facts 
about any context of utterance were relevant to pragmatics, the 
linguist's task would be quite unmanageable. Clearly though, we can 
distinguish theoretically between linguistically relevant, and 
irrelevant context, as suggested by Lyons (1977: 572): 
"... the linguist abstracts from the actual situation and 
establishes as contextual all the factors which, by virtue of 
their influence upon the participants in the language event, 
systematically determine the form, the appropriateness or the 
meaning of utterances. " 
Yet this is unhelpful, unless accompanied by an indication of how to 
do it. "Here, I believe an ethnomethodological perspective is useful. 
In accounting for stretches of talk, we identify as pragmatically 
relevant those factors of context which emerge as relevant to the 
developing structure of the talk. Thus, for example, identifying a 
perceived social difference of the type mentioned above as relevant, 
must arise from evidence in the talk, possibly in the form of 
utterances like "you know more about this than I do" (examples of this 
approach will be seen in Chapter 5). In this way, all that is context 
is not necessarily relevant to an account of meaning, and yet what is 
excluded is excluded for motivated reasons. 
1.5 Methodology 
My fundamental assumption is that the linguistic study of meaning 
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should be an empirical study. It must involve accounting for real 
occurrences of talk, rather than accounting for invented sentences. 
There are reasons why this is particularly true for the study of 
meaning. The data relevant to the study of meaning is 'meanings'. 
They cannot be counted, measured, recorded and quantified in the way 
that sounds, syntactic patterns , and words can. Ringen (1980) makes 
the distinction by calling this data 'Putative Linguistic Facts', in 
opposition to 'Linguistic Data'. An example sentence on a page, or a 
recording of an utterance, does not itself provide information about 
its meaning. This must mean that the meanings investigated by a 
linguist are meanings which he has ascribed to an utterance or 
sentence by virtue of his knowledge of the language. Such use of 
intuitions does not appear very empirically valid (for a similar 
observation, see Fodor, 1977: 6-7)[4]. It is, however, greatly 
improved when the investigator attributes meaning to utterances 
forming part of real conversations. In this situation, his assignment 
of meaning to any utterance can be made on the basis of, and 
constrained by, the subsequent development of the talk (as was 
suggested for example (3), Section 1.4.2). No such constraints are 
present with invented sentences, the meanings attributed to which can 
be any the writer is able to persuade his readers to accept. 
Conversation data, used in the way I am suggesting, should lead to 
accounts of meaning more valid than those which arise from accounting 
for invented data. Martinet, as long ago as 1958, point out the 
dangers of abstracting language data from what he called "linguistic 
4 Despite this, most writers do not question the process, eg Gazdar 
(1979: 11) "I shall assume throughout this book that invented strings 
and certain intuitive judgements about them constitute legitimate data 
for linguistic research. " 
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reality in the raw". 
Naturally it is acknowledged that this type of post-hoc analysis 
has problems. The linguist's tendency to allow his theoretical 
perspective to influence his intuitions is well-known (see Spencer, 
1973, for an empirical study, and also Ringen, 1980: 115 footnote 30). 
Wootton (1975: 6 and 64), writing within a Conversation Analysis 
framework, gives examples where particular investigator glosses lead 
to particular analyses of the conversations being studied. 
I, would argue, however, that post-hoc analysis of meanings, if it 
is carried out with rigorous attention to seeking justification for 
glosses within the structure of the conversation or its situation, is 
a reasonable way to study meaning. (For similar discussion, see 
Milroy 1983, and references therein. ) 
In addition, using real data has certain other advantages: 
1 All utterances are attested as having been produced in -a 
non-experimental linguistic situation. Their acceptability can be 
assessed in part by the reaction of hearers to them. 
2 Examples drawn from real data can be seen in their real linguistic 
context. This avoids the uncontrolled recontextualisation by the 
reader which is necessary with ordinary decontextualised examples and 
which can drastically change his interpretation of them. It also 
greatly reduces the opportunity for the analyst to introspectively 
invent contextual or situational details to support his argument. 
3 Each example has been spoken naturally by a native speaker. It is 
therefore possible to make direct appeal to intonational and other 
non-segmental phonological features, rather than imagining what kind 
of prosodies would accompany an invented example. 
4 Real data reveals characteristics of English which might well not 
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, arise 
from introspection. 
1.5.2 The Data 
There are four types of data: 
1 Attested Conversation Examples 
Most of the examples used are taken from surreptitiously recorded 
conversations. The conversations are not a truly principled sample of 
all possible conversations. They were used because they provided the 
opportunity for recording. The participants did not know of the 
recordings until afterwards, when their permission to use the material 
was obtained. 
The practical and ethical difficulties of collecting naturalistic 
data are manifest (as noted by Crystal and Davy 1975: ix), especially 
with limited technical and financial resources, and working alone. 
The investigator must prearrange the recording materials without the 
participants' knowledge, and make sure he is not given away by sudden 
mechanical noises in the corner. Many people consider it an 
infringement of privacy to be recorded. So the investigator must also 
try to preselect participants who might be supposed, because of their 
interests and background, to be amenable. The students and resea*-h 
students I recorded were chosen with this in mind. 
The second type of recorded data was collected from BBC Radio, to 
serve as comparison data against the conversation corpus. 
Thirdly, Dr Marion Owen kindly supplied me with attested examples 
of number approximations from her corpus of surreptitious recordings 
made in a variety of everyday situations. Fourthly, some attested 
data published in other work has been used. In each case, this is 
credited to the investigator involved. In addition, many examples 
were observed and noted, but not tape-recorded, as and when I heard 
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them. 
A different type of attested examples are the written ones, 
collected from a random selection of reading matter encounted over the 
last four years. These are credited to their source. 
2 Elicitation Data 
The elicitation tests described in Chapters 3 and 4 aimed to 
complement the attested data by providing information about what 
meanings subjects acting as hearers would assign to vague expressions. 
This also provided a further check on my post-hoc assignments of 
meaning. In both tests, attested examples were used as stimulus 
items, together with invented items which systematically varied 
particular parts of the structures of vague expressions. 
3 Introspective Data 
After every session of elicitation testing, test subjects discussed 
the test material with me. These discussions were recorded, and the 
subjects comments are referred to. 
4 Unattested data 
Unattested examples occur where I refer to examples used by other 
writers. They also occur where I analyse the syntactic behaviour of a 
particular construction and need to try it in a number of similar 
environments. A limitation of real data is that it rarely (even if 
the corpus is enormous) produces examples of the same word or 
expression in even all of its commonly accepted environments. 
The work is limited by the scope, in terms of time and resources, 
of a D. Phil. thesis project. Further work using a much larger 
database, and considering a. greater range of expressions, should 
follow. Further elicitation tests could be designed to investigate in 
detail the pragmatic variables identified as relevant to vagueness. 
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1.5.3 Transcription of recorded data 
Given the principal interest of the work, the conversation data was 
transcribed in conventional orthography. Punctuation, which might 
impose the investigator's interpretation, is not used. The 
transcription schema is. set out in Table 1. 
Each example used 
_ 
is prefaced by introductory notes about the 
situation and participants in the conversation and, in some cases, a 
longer extract containing the example is reproduced in Chapter 5. In 
all conversations, participant A is me. 
1.5.4 Elicitation Tests 
I have said that the meaning under investigation is hearers' meaning. 
One way of obtaining information on hearers' meanings is by directly 
asking hearers (as subjects in tests) what they understand by certain 
expressions. As suggested, this also provides a check on the meanings 
assigned by the investigator. Leech (1970: 346-7) suggests three 
reasons for carrying out semantic tests in order to test introspective 
hypotheses about meaning - (1) it will give the resulting analysis 
claim to generalisability to a population, (2) it avoids the 
fallibility of the investigator's introspections, and (3), it corrects 
the bias possibly arising from the investigator's theoretical 
perspective. 
Clearly, however, there are problems with data obtained in this 
way. What subjects presented with a decontextualised linguistic 
stimulus do is to invent plausible contexts for that stimulus, and 
then attribute meanings to it in those contexts. The ways they 
individually recontextualise cannot be directly controlled by the 
experimenter. (For similar points, see Mikkel Blakar and Rommetveit, 
1975: 6; Lanin, 1977: 292; Channell, 1980; Wachtel, 1981; Greenbaum, 
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1977). Set against this is, however, the fact that the informants in 
the test reported in Chapter 4 all appeared to recontextualise the 
test stimuli in the same way (ie, they imagined the same or similar 
contexts), although no contexual information was given. I infer from 
this that such a test is valid, and that in addition, the systematic 
ways in which recontextualisation must take place are themselves of 
interest. 
Evidence from controlled tests designed to investigate the 
influence of particular variables on subjects' responses, shows that 
these may vary systematically according to the subjects' perceptions 
of, among other things, the purpose of the test (Greenbaum and Quirk, 
1970: 50ff); the number of contextual cues (Oller- and Eilers, 1975), 
and the linguistic discourse (Greenbaum, 1977). It has also been 
shown that the subject's state of mental self-awareness affects his 
responses (Carroll, Bever and Pollack, 1981). Given this evidence, it 
could be argued that elicitation data do not provide a valid basis for 
making generalisations about meaning. This is the substance of the 
criticism of my work made by Wachtel (1981). 
It seems to me that what is in question is really the status of 
the results. The most any investigator can claim for a test is that 
certain observations are true for a set of expressions and a set of 
subjects. If (as is the case for my two tests) the observations from 
the tests are consistent with quite unrelated, independent, 
conversation- data, then it is reasonable to claim that the test 
results are valid for a larger population. If test results are 
inconsistent with other data, then they are correspondingly less 
interesting. 
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1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
In Chapter 2, firstly, the general notion of linguistic vagueness is 
discussed, through description of the relevant literature. Secondly, 
a working classification of types of vagueness is presented, with 
examples. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are descriptive, each being devoted to one of 
the two major groups of vague expressions studied. These chapters 
present the results of the elicitation tests and set out in detail the 
observations about linguistic vagueness which linguistic theory must 
account for. 
Chapter 5 takes a different perspective, drawing on real data to 
describe the conversational effects which arise from use of vague 
expressions and the problems which participants may use them to solve. 
In Chapter 6I concentrate on lexical considerations. In 
particular, I discuss the relationship between the words found in the 
vague expressions, and their other (non-vague) uses. This leads 
naturally into consideration of the extent to which the expressions 
studied should be analysed as 'idioms'. 
Chapter 7 relates the descriptive content to linguistic theory, 
and in particular to semantics and pragmatics. It confronts existing 
proposals for drawing a distinction between semantics and pragmatics 
with the data on vague language, and concludes that no satisfactory 
ways of drawing it are forthcoming. Having reached this rather 
negative conclusion, in Chapter 8I finish by offering a speculative 
sketch of a possible future approach to the study of meaning. 
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Chapter 2 
Vagueness and Language 
[asking for a5x3 index card] 
A: + Have you got one that's blank 
B: Fairly blank yes. 
In a section entitled 'Words with blurred edges' Ullmann (1962) traces 
from Plato to Byron man's recurrent feeling of the inadequacy of 
language to express thought, particularly because of its lack of 
precision. He notes also the converse feeling among poets and 
creative writers, that such vagueness is in fact an advantage, 
reflected also by Wittgenstein who suggested that words are like 
blurred photographs and added "Is it even always an advantage to 
replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct 
one often exactly what we need? " (1953). 
In this chapter, I look generally at vagueness, and review other 
work. Most of this suggests that vagueness is present in a great deal 
of language use, and that therefore a complete theory of language must 
have vagueness as an integral component. I identify different ways of 
"being vague" and suggest that these should be divided into two 
general categories - cases of vagueness, and cases of suppression of 
reference. 
2.1 Vagueness vs. Ambiguity 
The standard distinction between vagueness and ambiguity is assumed. 
In both cases, speaking pretheoretically, the hearer does not know 
exactly what he should understand. Ambiguity has traditionally been 
identified where a sentence has two or more competing but distinct 
meanings attaching to it. However, for an analyst working on the real 
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data of conversations, questions of ambiguity are not as relevant to 
language understanding as they have been claimed to be by theorists 
studying sentences in vacuo. Lyons (1981b: 203) describes the attitude 
of philosophers and linguists to ambiguity as "a highly prejudiced and 
unbalanced view". He continues: 
"Not only is it frequently, and erroneously, associated with 
the view that all sentences have precise and determinate 
meanings; it is based on the equally erroneous assumption 
that clarity and the avoidance of vagueness and equivocation 
are always desirable, regardless of what language game we are 
playing. " 
As John Local has pointed out to me (personal communciations) 
ambiguity is rarely a factor in real communication, because hearers 
generally read off a meaning without even realising that there could 
have been another one. Ambiguity becomes interesting and 
descriptively relevant only when it can be observed to be being 
actually used by conversational participants, for example in punning, 
or where a breakdown can be attributed to a wrong reading being given 
to an utterance. Take the example: 
(1) A: +Tim Bailey plays the trombone 
B: No he doesn't, it's something else brass 
C: Well in that case, it must be a trumpet [NS, 10.9.79] 
The hearer of this (me) chose the wrong reading, paraphraseable by 
"given what you have told me, it's a trumpet", as was made clear by 
subsequent turns. The other reading can be glossed as "In a case 
shaped like that, it must be a trumpet". Here the difficulty arises 
from the structural identity of the partial idiom in that case with a 
locative prepositional phrase introduced by in. 
There is considerable intuitive agreement regarding the 
distinction between ambiguity and vagueness but independent evidence 
is lacking. Weinreich (1966: 411) suggests that if a lexeme "can be 
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understood as ambiguous" in a neutral context, it has two dictionary 
entries, if it cannot be understood as ambiguous in a neutral context, 
but different meanings seem possible, it is vague. In his examples 
eat is vague between the action required to eat soup and to eat bread, 
whereas file is ambiguous. - Considering a number approximation, such 
as around four o-clock "in a neutral context", we might want to argue 
that it can be understood as ambiguous between, say, all the various 
times between 3.45 and 4.15. But analogy with Weinreich's example, 
eat, however a vague assignment seems preferable, inasmuch as this is 
a valid test. 
Zeugma also shows lexical ambiguity, such, that: 
(2) ?I filed the letters and my nails 
should be either zeugmatic, or require bizarre contextualisation. In 
Chapter 3I describe how the number approximation n or m (like example 
(1) in Chapter 1) is distinguished from the alternative use of or, by 
a special intonation pattern. This means that zeugmatic examples 
cannot be constructed, because choice of one intonation or the other 
will automatically select only one reading. Zeugma does not arise 
with other number approximations, either. Comparing: 
(3) I saw her duck and I saw Susie bend down as well 
= potentially zeugmatic 
(3') She came at around 4 o-clock and so did Clive who arrived at 
4.15 = zeugma impossible 
we see that around 4 o-clock is not ambiguous. I have not succeeded 
in constructing potentially zeugmatic examples with or something 
either. 
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Zwicky and Sadock argue that a sentence "isn't many ways 
ambiguous just because we can perceive many distinct classes of 
contexts in which it would be appropriate or because we can indicate 
many understandings with paraphrases" (1975: 4). For example in the 
case of the number approximations described in Chapter 3, these are 
appropriate in varying contexts, and- moreover, are understood 
differently in different contexts, but this does not mean such 
expressions require analysis as being many ways ambiguous. 
Vague expressions appear to fail the contradiction test 
demonstrated by Zwicky and Sadock. Where there is ambiguity, a second 
conjunct denial, using the other sense, is possible, thus 
(4) That's a dog, but it isn't a dog 
but this is nonsense if done for a vague expression, thus 
(5) Sam is about six feet tall but he, isn't about six feet tall 
seems not to make sense, and it is certainly impossible to assign a 
meaning where Sam is 5' 11" in the first conjunct, and 6' 1" in the 
second, although, as we shall see, both of these meanings can be 
assigned to the expression about six feet tall. 
Lakoff (1970) proposes a test which works for some sorts of 
constructions but not for others. It shows that a number 
approximation like (1) in the last chapter is vague rather than 
ambiguous, since it is compatible with 
(6) George has written five or six articles and so have I 
that George has written seven articles while I've only written five. 
Lakoff's test is used where it is applicable. 
Confusing vagueness with ambiguity may lead to false attribution 
of polysemy. Bennett (1975) notes that 
(7) John has gone to the study 
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is, by Lakoff's test, intrinsically vague as to whether John is now in 
the study or outside it. However the possibility of either of these 
meanings, Bennett notes, led Lindkvist to set up two senses of 
to, one for each meaning. Dictionaries often multiply polysemy 
because lexicographers tend to identify vagueness as ambiguity (cf 
Weinreich 1966). Bennett's thesis, which describes the use. of spatial 
and temporal prepositions in English, identifies considerable 
vagueness in the meanings which can be attributed to these 
prepositions. 
It is important to understand that a sentence or an utterance can 
be both ambiguous and vague. Concerning number approximations, Zwicky 
and Sadock (: 31) analyse as ambiguous the distinction between a 
"literal" and a "hyperbole" reading, as in their example: 
(8) [31] There are about a million people in San Antonio and there 
are about a million people in my introductory course 
where the first is-literal and the second hyperbole. They claim that 
this sentence is acceptable, whereas 
(9) [32] There are about a million people in my introductory course 
and there are about a million people in San Antonio 
is not. This is, they say, because a violation of the sincerity 
condition causes a perceptual set in the hearer who then expects 
another violation and in (9) does not find it. I think that both 
these sentences are equally odd - they certainly create zeugma, 
deducible from a possible humorous effect, which would indicate that 
Zwicky and Sadock are correct in suggesting ambiguity is in play. At 
the same time about a million would receive a vague reading, as we 
shall see from informant test results in Chapter 3. 
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It is perhaps the case that linguists have been misled, by 
philosophers' emphasis on ambiguity as an important part of semantics, 
into thinking that ambiguity plays a greater part in the act of 
meaning than it actually does. From now on, I shall be concentrating 
on vagueness, which I do believe, and hope to show, plays a very 
important part in the act of meaning. 
2.2 Previous Work on Vagueness 
Interest in vagueness in language use and meaning has arisen in a 
number of disciplines: literary criticism, linguistics, psychology, 
philosophy. this survey sketches the lines of interest'that have been 
. pursued. 
Ullmann's discussion of vagueness has been introduced above. He 
notes that: 
"If one looks more closely at this vagueness one soon 
discovers that the term is itself rather vague and ambiguous: 
the condition it refers to is not a uniform feature but has 
many aspects and may result from a variety of causes. Some 
of these are inherent in the very nature of language, whereas 
otherg come into play only in special circumstances. " 
(1962: 118) 
He attributes vagueness to four factors: (a) generic character of 
words; (b) meaning is never homogeneous (ie, it is context-bound); (c) 
lack of clear-cut boundaries in the non-linguistic world; and (d)lack 
of familiarity with what the words stand for. 
Reason (a) yes indeed. As he says, words refer to "not single 
items but classes of things or events bound together by some common 
element" (1962: 118). This inevitably leads to vagueness which is "in 
some ways regrettable, but it is the price we have to pay for having a 
means of social communication flexible enough to cope with the 
infinite variety of our experiences". (For a similar view that if 
language were not vague, it would not permit adequate communication, 
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see Daitz, 1956). 
Reason (b) - interpretation of meaning is context-bound. 
Indisputably so, but Ullmann's implication is that context will permit 
an exact interpretation to be put on any word: "only context will 
specify which aspect of a person, which phase in his development, 
which side of his activities we have in mind"(: 124). That is, he 
holds that ultimately there are exact interpretations. I shall 
suggest, in reference to specific examples of vague language discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4, that this is not the case. 
Reason (c) - the extra-linguistic world is vague. Indeed, in any 
case as far as our subjective perception of it goes. Reason (d) - 
definitely, as we shall see from conversation examples in Chapter 5. 
Ullmann's points are true, but I think he confuses causes and effects. 
That is to say, (c) and (d) are facts about the world and people in 
it, which in turn are reflected by, even necessitate, the capacity of 
language to express vagueness, that is (a) and (b), among other 
factors. So linguistic vagueness is not gratuitous - it is caused 
(like many other observed characteristics of language) by the world 
(in the most general sense) in which language is used. 
Schmidt (1974) cites C. S. Peirce as the originator of the 
notion of vagueness, although as we have seen Ullmann dates it rather 
earlier. Peirce was perhaps the first to try to formulate the notion 
in any precise way, as follows: 
"A proposition is vague where there are possible states of 
things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain 
whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would 
have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. 
By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in 
consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because 
the speaker's habits of language were indeterminate; so that 
one day he would regard the proposition as excluding, another 
as admitting, those states of things. Yet this must be 
understood to have reference to what might be deduced from a 
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perfect knowledge of his state of mind; for it is precisely 
because these questions never did, or did not frequently, 
present themselves that his habit remained indeterminate. " 
(1902: 748) 
That is to say, the language system permits speakers to produce 
utterances without having decided whether certain facts are "excluded 
or allowed by" them. Taking this definition as her basis, Schmidt 
says "Language use (ie the use of words) is inconsistent. It is not 
only inconsistent among speakers, but within an individual speaker 
himself. The assumption that the speaker possesses an unchanging 
definition of the words which governs usage is not borne out by actual 
performance. " (1974: 620) Schmidt argues for the least specification of 
words in competence, to account for their varied uses in performance. 
She says "insofar as a word is vague on a particular occasion, it must 
be vague when considered in competence as well as in performance". 
The best way to account for inconsistent word meaning, she holds, is a 
dynamic model in which "the meaning of concepts or words [... ] is 
continually being reconstructed from event to event". It seems to me 
that allowing the semantic specification of words to change from use 
to use would be a highly dangerous proposal from the point of view of 
linguistic model making. In addition it would be difficult to account 
for how speakers and hearers actually do understand each other. Where 
'I do agree with Schmidt is in holding that vagueness has to be 
represented. 
Schmidt differs from Ullmann, and from Deese (below) in that for 
her vagueness is a phenomenon of language, and not of reality. There 
does not seem to be any strong reason why both proposals should not be 
the case (as suggested by Ullmann). That the extra-linguistic world 
(or rather, perhaps, our perception of it) is vague supports, at least 
intuitively, the view that the language system man has evolved to 
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Another approach to vagueness is found in the more 
psychologically oriented work of James Deese. He (in Deese 1974) 
holds that vagueness of communication is inherent in the structure of 
our ideas, rather, than in the language system: 
"I have been arguing for some years now [... ]. that the 
correspondence between the ideas possessed by two individuals 
who are in communication on a common topic is rather poor, a 
condition which-we ordinarily do not notice because we seldom 
make explicit attempts to validate a communicated idea 
against the original. When we do, as in the case of giving 
directions to someone about how to do something, we are 
suddenly made aware of the discrepancy that exists between 
'the same' idea in the minds of two different people. 
Ordinary situations demand that we place only the loosest of 
interpretations upon some linguistic utterance we hear. 
(1974: 72, underlining mine) 
My view would be that at present we have little more than intuitive or 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that -the poor apparent 
correspondence of ideas between two people results from their ideas 
rather than from the language system. Binnick (1970: 151) argues 
similarly that vagueness is not a concept which applies to language, 
"but rather to the ideas which language expresses". Ambiguity, on the 
other hand, he argues, is a property of language. I think Binnick was 
wrong, because he looked only at lexical vagueness vs ambiguity. When 
one considers (as herein) vague expressions, it becomes clear that 
vagueness can get into language via the combination of words involved. 
The idea that the structure of ideas is vague in no way precludes the 
language system also incorporating vagueness, but in a sense, 
discussing the structure of ideas goes beyond the proper province of 
the linguist (cf remarks in Chapter 1) in this matter, which is to 
explain how it is that vagueness is part of language. 
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Vagueness, or as they call it, imprecision, is referred to in a 
very different context by Crystal and Davy (1975), in an applied 
linguistics textbook which accompanies a series of recordings of 
natural conversations. Analysing conversational English from the 
point of view of helping the foreign learner,, they ' state that "lack of 
precision is_ one of the most important features of the vocabulary of 
informal conversation" (: 111). They put forward the view that 
vagueness is on a scale related to the formality of the occasion, and 
that speakers can, if they choose, be more precise. They give four 
reasons for vagueness: (a) memory loss - speaker forgets the correct 
word; (b) the language has no suitable exact word, or speaker does not 
know it; (c) the subject of the conversation is not such that it 
requires precision, and an approximation or characterisation will do; 
and, (d) the choice of a vague item is deliberate to maintain the 
atmosphere. (We shall see examples of all these in Chapter 5. ) They 
note that speakers in their extracts seem to mark vagueness by use of 
certain expressions. Among others they cite are something like that, 
or something, somewhere, probably, and in a way. Dines (1980) reports 
an investigation of some of these, from the point of view of 
sociolinguistic variation. This will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
A useful point which Crystal and Davy make is to draw attention 
to the existence, in spoken English, of three types of device for 
expressing vagueness: Firstly, a set of nouns "which express total 
vagueness", such as thingummy, thingy, thinguammajig, whatsit. They 
note that "their spelling is somewhat uncertain, since they are 
features of the spoken language only"(: 112). In the same way, 
Sankoff, Thibault and Berube (1978) note chose, affaire, de quoi, 
histoire, patente, machin and truc for Montreal French. Probably all 
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languages have dummy nouns of this sort. 
Secondly, Crystal and Davy note a number of generic terms and 
collective nouns, such as oodles, bags of, heaps of, umpteen and a 
touch of; and thirdly, ways of expressing number approximations: a 
class of thirty odd, there were about/around thirty, there were 
getting on for thirty. They note also-the existence of prefixes and 
suffixes which "are frequently used to express approximation, when 
precision is not of primary concern" (: 116), giving as examples 
(10) That mountain is rather table-like' 
(11) Linguisticswise she's-rather clever 
They conclude "Native speakers manipulate their language in this way 
all the time in informal speech". 
Their 'reasons' for vagueness mentioned informally begin to sound 
like informal statements of pragmatic rules relevant to vagueness. 
The existence of the words and expressions they note, and their 
prevalence in their recordings, lend support to the contention that 
vagueness is both intrinsic, and important, in the language system of 
English. 
Another writer approaching vagueness from an applied linguistics 
perspective is Brown (1979), who discusses the importance for foreign 
leaners of English of 'Learning to be Imprecise'. He says that 
learners who do not know how to refer vaguely are on the one hand 
often stuck for a way of talking about some item which they don't know 
the word for; and on the other, tend to sound "bookish and pedantic, 
which is to say, inappropriate". His observations about the English 
of foreign speakers make it appear that degree of vagueness is closely 
and importantly bound up with conversational appropriateness. 
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Crystal and Davy's number approximation examples recall the 
observation of Jespersen (1924: 325ff) who, in discussing the meaning 
of negation) introduces the idea of uncertainty as defined by Peirce, 
when he notes the contrast between 
(12) These shoes cost no less than £20 (=exactly £20)[1] 
and 
(13) These shoes cost not less than £20 
which "implies uncertainty with regard to the exact amount". 
A quite different slant on the inherent vagueness of language is 
given in Lakoff (1972), in which he attacks the tripartite division of 
sentences into true, false, and lacking a truth value: 
"Clearly any attempt to limit truth' conditions for natural 
languages to true, false and"nonsense" will distort the 
natural language concepts by portraying them as having 
sharply defined rather than fuzzily defined boundaries. " 
(: 183) 
He draws evidence to support this view of language from the work on 
category membership of Rosch (1973). Rosch reported experiments which 
showed that perceptual categories such as colour and shape have 
internal structure. By internal structure the following is meant: 
categories are composed of a "core meaning" which consists of the 
"clearest cases" (best examples) of the category, "surrounded" by 
other category members of decreasing similarity to that core meaning" 
(: 112). She then extended this to see if psychological categories not 
showing obvious perceptual scaling, such as vegetables, or birds, were 
also internally structured. Her results suggested strongly that they 
are and that there was a high degree of agreement about the 
"exemplariness" of any item for any category. For example, for birds, 
1 There is some evidence to suggest that the form in (12) may also be 
vague, since it is used also to predict costs in the future. 
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she found the following judgments held: 
typical birds: robins, eagles 
chickens, ducks, geese 
penguins, pelicans 
hardly birds at all: bats 
This is reminiscent of Ullmann's attribution of vagueness to "lack of 
clear-cut boundaries in the non-linguistic world". From Rosch's 
findings Lakoff suggests that sentences about category membership, such 
as 
(14) A penguin is a bird 
are judged by speakers as to degree of truth, (14) being more true 
than 
(15) A bat is a bird 
No classical set theory or logic can cope with this, but Lakoff 
deploys Zadeh's fuzzy set theory which can deal with degrees of set 
membership. 
For Lakoff, further, "some of the most interesting questions are 
raised by the study of words whose meaning implicitly involves 
fuzziness, words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less 
fuzzy"(: 195). These are Lakoff's hedges - sort of , kind of, 
technically speaking, etc. Lakoff's idea that the function of such 
expressions is "to make things fuzzier" is similar to the way Crystal 
and Davy suggest particular lexical items exist to make conversation 
appropriately imprecise. Lakoff's observations suggest strongly that 
vagueness is an essential feature of language, and one which any 
theory we devise must take account of .I shall suggest, in Section 
2.4.1, that Lakoff's hedges should be sudivided into different types, 
for purposes of analysis. 
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Lakoff proposes what he calls "fuzzy semantics", in which, 
however, the semantic representations which are arrived at in any 
given case (via functions mapping from context) are exact. Sadock 
(1977) devotes himself in part to showing that the neat formalism 
proposed in vacuo by Lakoff will not, in practice, produce acceptable 
semantic representations, because of its extreme complexity. Sadock 
(1977: 434): 
"If the reader is growing suspicious of this increasingly 
inelegant equation, I am not surprised. The more it is made 
to fit our impression of what determines the defensibility of 
an approximation, the more it diverges from an honest 
representation of a purposely, and unabashedly inaccurate 
statement, which is what an approximation is. Furthermore, 
and more importantly, nothing that I have observed about the 
various contingencies that seem to play a role in the 
evaluation of the validity of approximations is really true. " 
Sadock's own solution to the vagueness of number approximations is to 
make the semantics simple and exact. On his view it is the purpose 
(seen as part of the context of utterance) of the approximation which 
determines its acceptability in any given case. His view is that 
approximations are almost "devoid of real semantic content" (p435) and 
that the way to state the truth conditions of an approximation is to 
make it true in all circumstances, except those where the thing being 
approximated does not have the property at all. Sadock's account of 
number approximations leads to some wrong predictions, detailed by 
Wachtel (1980). His proposals will be evaluated in greater detail in 
Chapter 7. 
Weinreich's (1963) discussion of vagueness has broadly the same 
viewpoint as Sadock: 
"Some vagueness is inherent in every sign, and the vagueness 
of different signs is not commensurable since vagueness is a 
pragmatic factor in denotation and hence beyond the province 
of semantics as the study of designation. " (: 143) 
He discusses (: 130) "hedges" such as real and so-called "which 
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function as instructions for the loose or strict interpretation of 
designata". I think his view is that designation is always exact, but 
that pragmatic rules can mediate to give vague meanings. 
Wachtel's semantics for number approximations (1980,1981) 
involves an account in which the truth value of an approximation is 
dependent on its containing a number which is an appropriate exemplar 
number for the exact number in question. In this account, an 
approximative sentence is true if and only if (iff) the exemplar 
number in it is an appropriate round number for the actual number 
involved. Importantly, the formalisation states, for example, that if 
10 is an appropriate approximation for an actual quantity 8 then the 
definition would also be satisfied by any real numbers between 8 and 
10, and for real numbers above 10 up to the same distance away as 8 is 
from 10, ie in this case 12. So his function f associates an 'actual' 
number with an interval Iy, where y is the number appearing in the 
approximation, ie the exemplar number. The "appropriate round number" 
for any number in the interval x,..., z is the number central to the 
interval. On Wachtel's system therefore, understanding a number 
approximation entails computing an exact interval of acceptable 
numbers, and then seeing whether the actual number involved falls 
within that interval. This proposal will also be evaluated in Chapter 
7. 
The common thread running through Lakoff's. Sadock's and 
Wachtel's proposals for dealing with this particular bit of vague 
language is that the semantics for it will be exact, and trying to 
find ways of arriving at exact semantics leads them to the 
semantically complicated (Lakoff) and pragmatically complicated 
(Sadock and Wachtel) structures they propose. 
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For Fine (1975), vagueness is "a semantic notion" defined as 
"deficiency of meaning". For him, "any type of expression that is 
capable of meaning is also capable of being vague". He cites names, 
name-operators, predicates and quantifiers. For example, he says, the 
predicate 'bald' is extensionally vague, and intensionally vague in 
our particular world. He shows that logical relations hold among what 
he calls indefinite sentences (these are vague); for example, if P 
'the blob is pink', then P& -P is false even if P is indefinite. 
These logical relations are what he calls 'Penumbral Connections'. 
His paper is mainly concerned with the theoretical problems posed for 
a truth-conditional account of any language by the existence of 
vagueness in that language. His examples (: 276) which focus on 
NiEIý 
English, show that his discussion is chiefly concerned what I call 
Categorial Vagueness (see below, 2.4.2) - problems of extension. 
The same issue is one of the chief concerns of the concluding 
speculative chapter of J. D. Fodor's (1977) book which raises a 
number of issues connected with vagueness without explicitly 
explaining them in such terms. The causal theory of meaning, which 
she discusses, makes specific provision for vagueness in the sense 
that it attributes it'to lack of knowledge about which things are of 
the same kind: 
"Both for proper nouns and common nouns, one's knowledge of 
the referent may be extensive or quite fragmentary. One may 
even have to rely on more expert members of the language 
community to fill in gaps, to show how to distinguish tigers 
from leopards or Chomsky from Halle, and perhaps even to back- 
up one's belief that they differ at all. But though I may be 
hopelessly ignorant about tigers, my word tiger still refers 
to tigers, because I acquired it from someone who acquired it 
from someone who... acquired it from someone who does know how 
to attach it to the world. The chain of communication (some 
kind of causal chain) ultimately reaches all the way back to 
the original event of "baptism" in which tigers were given 
their name. "(: 210) 
Such an account fits in well with Ullmann's and Crystal and Davy's 
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remarks about lack of knowledge leading to vagueness. Fodor notes 
that the fuzziness of categories discussed by Lakoff can be explained 
in the same way. Lakoff's claim that the sentence a penguin is a bird 
is only partly true "seems to rest on the view that the word bird IN 
FACT applies to whatever competent English speakers BELIEVE it applies 
to, and that their criteria for 'birdiness' may be many and vague and 
can be satisfied to a greater or lesser extent. " (Fodor, 1977: 212) 
Fodor's view of the causal theory is that it probably exaggerates 
"the extent to which referents of common nouns are genuine natural 
kinds". She suggests: 
"A realistic view of natural language surely must recognise 
that ordinary people often do use the word bird without 
intending to include penguins, or use the word fish intending 
to include whales. To what extent do we really care, in our 
everyday conversation, whether the words we use carve nature 
at its joints? "(: 212) 
and concludes by making two speculations. Firstly that perhaps all 
kind terms will eventually be found to be fuzzy. If so, then an 
explanation of how we use such words will have to depend on 
stereotypes. Her second suggestion is that the special fuzzy 
properties of kind terms referred to, may perhaps not be so special 
after all, but be properties of language in general. This is the view 
of Bolinger (1965): 
"It is characteristic of natural language that no word is 
even limited to its enumerable senses, but carries within it 
the qualification of 'something like'. " (: 567) 
Danell (1978), in a wide-ranging but therefore rather general 
paper on vagueness and language, discusses whether apparent vagueness 
in language is the result of description based on faulty models, or 
whether language itself is vague. Drawing on speculative discussion 
of how language processing takes place, he concludes that "vagueness 
is a property of language that must be included in the models" (: 21). 
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2.3 Vagueness and Communication 
If words and expressions are vague as often as has been suggested in 
the preceding pages, we might reasonably expect communication using 
them to be rather inefficient and unsuccessful, as suggested 
informally by Deese. A piece of experimental work carried out by 
Lehrer (1975) shows indeed that, at least in one limited area of 
activity, this is the case. Lehrer was interested in vocabulary used 
for talking about wine, from two points of view. "Firstly, assuming 
that some of the wine words mean anything at all, even if they are to 
be interpreted subjectively and evaluatively what is the structural 
analysis of this vocabulary? Second, how do typical (non-expert) 
wine-drinkers use these words, and what do they understand when they 
hear these words? "(: 901) 
Lehrer's subjects all professed some interest in wine and drank 
it at least once a week, so they could reasonably be expected to be 
quite accustomed to manipulating the kind of vocabulary under 
investigation. There were two kinds of experiments; description tasks 
and communication tasks. On the description tasks 
"the most striking result on all the tasks, [... ] was that 
descriptions (not just evaluations), varied enormously 
depending on whether or not the taster liked the wine. Wine 
F was described by one person as 'sweet, bubbly... flowery, 
light fizzy feeling in the mouth' and as 'quite dry, quite 
tangy' by another (both liked the wine). The same wine was 
described as 'harsh odor, pungent, unpleasant; taste is 
bitter, sharp' by one who did not like it. " 
This already suggests that use of such terms cannot be regarded as 
leading to accurate descriptions. A more conclusive result was 
obtained in the communication tests in which the percentage of 
successful communications (ie, being able to identify a wine by its 
description) was never significantly above chance. 
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While, as Lehrer says, these results raise more questions than 
they answer, they do demonstrate fairly adequately that communication 
between participants on a topic on which they expect to share quite a 
lot of knowledge, is in fact very poor. These terms used to describe 
wine, despite appearances to the contrary, and protestations to the 
contrary by those that use them, are very vague, and their failure to 
provide adequate communication in the reported tests shows that this 
is so. 
In her concluding sections Lehrer raises a number of points about 
precision vs vagueness, and appropriateness. Professional experts on 
wine need to communicate precisely, whereas "the wine drinker who 
comments on the softness of the wine to his companion across the 
candlelit table does not need to be so precise", and we might add, it 
would be rather inappropriate if he was. Lehrer judges that the 
primary function of wine discussions in social settings is "to. share 
an experience rather than to convey precise information". This brings 
to mind Malinowski's (1923: 313-5) coining of the description "phatic 
communion" for communication which has more a social than an informing 
function, and again suggests a link between appropriateness' and degree 
of precision. 
Lehrer notes that wine experts have been carefully trained to 
know which wines are suitable for which descriptions, whereas "most of 
us have to learn to use these terms, and perhaps most of our language, 
in a rather haphazard manner, picking up what we can from conversation 
and abstracting properties from objects and contexts". This again is 
like the causal theory of meaning, and Ullmann's idea that vagueness 
arises from lack of knowledge of the words being used, or the subject 
under discussion. Lehrer is suggesting, I think, that a great deal of 
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language use is vague. 
An important point which she makes about vague and precise use, 
and one which will be taken up in Chapter 5 is the following: 
"When a need for precision and a scientific use of language 
does arise, as among enologists or shippers of wine, the 
vocabulary can be sharpened, both in its internal relations 
and the application; but this use is derivative - both 
historically and functionally. In other words, I am opposed 
to a view of language in which the scientific meaning 
attached to words is seen as basic and correct and where any 
deviations are looked on as performance errors made by sloppy 
speakers. " (: 920) 
I take Lehrer to be arguing here that vagueness of meaning is inherent 
in language and must be accounted for as such. 
Her speculative conclusion asks a question to which this 'study 
contributes part of the answer: 
"My study of wine words has 
, 
shown that people do not apply 
words to things in the same way. Is the domain of wine 
discussion an unusual one, or it is fairly typical of 
speakers' application of words? If the latter is the case, 
then speakers probably do not communicate with each other 
nearly as well as they think they do, since they usually have 
no way of knowing that others apply words differently. But 
perhaps they communicate well enough for their purposes, even 
without knowing. " 
As we shall see, especially in Chapter 5, where language is vague, 
speakers take this into account, and manage to communicate apparently 
rather successfully. 
The similarity of Lehrer's point to that raised quite separately 
by Fodor in relation to kind terms, taken together with the other 
investigations referred to in this chapter, indicate that the eventual 
answer may well be that, as both Lehrer and Fodor suggest, most 
linguistic communication is vague rather than precise. 
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Considering the disparate origins and purposes of the work 
referred to here, it might be quite surprising that everyone makes 
such similar points about the nature of and reasons for linguistic 
vagueness. It is less surprising if we construe their remarks not as 
a random selection of circumstantial and trivial observations about 
little understood areas of language, but rather as evidence for 
intuitions about the nature of language which will at some future time 
prove to be correct. 
2.4 Different kinds of vagueness: a working classification 
The varied work referred to in the foregoing review has suggested that 
there are a number of different ways in which speakers can avoid being 
precise or exact. From my observations of vague language, I can 
propose four categories, but this is not to say that there may not be 
others. They are VAGUE ADDITIVES, VAGUE WORDS, VAGUENESS BY OMISSION, 
and VAGUENESS BY IMPLICATURE. 
2.4.1 Vague additives 
In these cases lexical material is added to what would otherwise be a 
precise statement, to result in a vague reading. 
One type of addition is to embed a sentence under a predicate which 
confers vagueness on the whole assertion, for example: 
(16) It seems that he hit her 
where the same sentence, without the introductory element, makes a 
precise assertion. In general, these allow possibilities other than 
that the precise statement is true. Often they are used as 
self-defence to cover the speaker against the event of being mistaken. 
Similarly, Baker (1975) describes the way remarks which express a 
negative viewpoint are often prefaced with self-defence expressions 
like that in the title of her paper: "This is just a first 
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approximation, but". She claims the ability to use these things is 
part of "pragmatic-competence". 
Cogen and Herman (1975) describe the use of let's just say to 
introduce violations of conversational rules, which will create 
implicatures, for example in: 
(17) [6] Antony: Who was that man I saw you with last night? 
Cleopatra: Let's just say he's a friend 
The hearer reads off from the presence of lets just say that the man 
is in fact quite other than a friend, but his true status is left to 
guesswork. The use of friend is perhaps, in addition, an instance of 
paradigmatic vagueness (see below). 
2 Another type of vague additives are those found in combination with 
numbers, for example: 
(18) [article reviewing Habitat catalogue] 
+A team of around ten people at Conran Advertising works on the 
design and production for most of the year [ST 23.08.81] 
Here the precise quantity is made vague by the addition of around. 
Approximately, which was studied by Lakoff in his paper on hedges, and 
subsequently by Wachtel and Sadock, as mentioned previously, falls 
into this category. Chapter 3 gives a detailed account of number 
approximations. 
3A third type of vague additives are those referred to as TAGS by 
Dines ( 1980), and listed at the beginning of chapter 1. Here again, 
a precise assertion is made vague to allow for other possibilities: 
(19) [tennis commentary - Mark Cox at Wimbledon] 
+And we see McEnroe there with his foot - maybe a little bit 
of stone or something like that [DS/10] 
The structure, use and meaning of these expressions are described in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
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The set of expressions I am referring to as Vague Additives, as 
opposed to Vague Words (cf 2.4.2) and Vagueness by Omission (cf 
2.4.3), are, I think the same as those identified in Lakoff(1972) as 
HEDGES. He defines hedges as "words whose job it is to make things 
fuzzier or less fuzzy"(: 195). I have chosen, however, to subdivide 
the major category into different types of hedges, recognising (1) 
sentence hedges, (2) number hedges, and (3) tag hedges. Obviously 
there are other types. The major part of this thesis is devoted to 
investigation of types (2) and (3). I have chosen to focus on these, 
firstly because each forms a cohesive and identifiable set, and 
secondly because even my quite small sample of data contained plenty 
of examples. 
2.4.2 Vague Words 
1 Vague Substitutes 
This category embraces lexical items which are used as substitutes for 
exact specifications. Crystal and Davy's set of nouns which express 
near vagueness (thingummy, whatsit, etc) would be in this category. 
So would vague "pronouns" like someone, something. These items fill 
places for expressions which must be present but about whose exact 
specification the speaker wishes to remain vague or cannot be more 
specific (for example because lexical search has failed to yield an 
appropriate word). 
2 Vague Quantifiers 
Similar to place fillers, but giving a little more referential 
information, are what Crystal and Davy categorised as "generic terms" 
and "collective nouns", examples being oodles of, or a touch of. 
Since I prefer to reserve these terms for the types of words discussed 
in 3 below, I have called such expressions VAGUE QUANTIFIERS. Notice 
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that using a vague quantifier can fulfil a similar purpose to using a 
vague additive with a number, although it will give, usually, very 
much less information as to the quantity involved (compare oodles of 
mayonnaise with about six tablespoons of mayonnaise). 
3 Paradigmatic Vagueness 
Another sort of vagueness arises through choice of a superordinate 
lexical item when world knowledge and lexical knowledge would make 
further precision possible'. For example: 
(20) He came into the room leading an animal 
We know that a specific type of animal must have been involved, but we 
are not told what it was. Similarly in: 
(21) A person telephoned 
(22) The car has broken down again 
An interesting paper by Alan Cruse (1977) draws attention to the 
fact that in some cases it is actually inappropriate to give more 
precise information, even if it is known. For example, of 
(23) (a) I think I shall take the dog for a walk 
(b) I think I shall take the alsatian for a walk 
(where there is only one dog in the house) (a) is "more neutral, more 
matter-of-fact, perhaps also more usual". Cruse shows that the degree 
of specificity necessary is dictated by contextual features such as 
how much information is already known. 
The vagueness produced by these vague words is different to that 
produced by the Vague Additives itemised previously. These examples 
involve a lack of specificity to a greater or lesser extent, rather 
than a vagueness, at a fixed level of specificity, about what is and 
is not being 'asserted. 
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4 Categorial Vagueness 
This is the sort of vagueness to which Fodor drew attention in the 
extract quoted earlier - the fact that the terms we use for categories 
often do not have a completely agreed extension. Thus, is someone who 
asserts I love animals understood as including yeast or mosquitoes? 
And when does a hill become a mountain? Putnam (1975) addresses the 
question of what it means to 'know the meaning' of a word. He holds 
that knowing the meaning may involve being able to identiFj a 
stereotype, to which members of a category conform to a greater or 
lesser extent. The psychological evidence from the work on category 
membership by Rosch and her associates, and by Battig and Montague 
(1969), testifies to the psychological reality of this extensional 
fuzziness and also provides evidence for the notion of stereotypes. 
2.4.3 Vagueness by Omission 
A quite different way of being less than precise is by simply not 
saying things. 
The grammar of English allows this for example in the use of 
imperatives. Fowler and Kress (1979: 30ff) explain how imperatives 
involve massive deletion of elements which are supplied by the 
addressee "from his knowledge of the non-linguistic context in which 
the speech act occurs". One of their examples is 
(24) a Take particular care of untrained children 
[Rule of school swimming club] 
from which they say 
bI order you that you will 
containing Agent, Patient of order and person to whom the imperative 
is directed, can be reconstructed. Omitting these, as in (24a), 
enables the writer (in this case) to withold from the reader 
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information about the identity of the agent. 
They go on to discuss what might be called the social effects of 
such deletions: 
"Tne point at issue is that the uncertainty about agency 
spreads a general vagueness through the rules, and a 
vagueness precisely in the area of who does what, The readers 
of the rules are left in a situation of helpless ignorance: 
apparently the knowers know, but seem to keep the ignorant 
from knowing. A dissatisfied member can be left very 
frustrated by not knowing where to turn for specific action. 
Here the process merely confers the power derived from 
relatively trivial knowledge on those who have it, and 
creates a class of those who do not have such 
power/knowledge. In more important contexts it works as a 
powerful means of control. Anyone who has even comeýup 
against 'faceless bureaucracy' will know what this is about. " 
(: 32) 
A different example of omission is agentless ("truncated") 
passives. Here, the grammar of the language allows us to omit mention 
of the agent and thus avoid specifying its identity. Fillmore (1971) 
exemplifies this with: 
(25) The girls were blamed for the mess 
of which he says: "the speaker is merely being . 
indefinite about the 
identity of the accuser" (: 379). At the same time, knowledge of this 
grammatical structure allows hearers to infer that an agent is 
involved but has not been mentioned (Freidin, 1975, discusses the 
derivation of these structures via transformational rules). They are 
particularly well-exemplified in news reporting, where it is 
frequently essential that sources are disguised, for example: 
(26) +The Independent Peace Group was formed in Moscow in June. 
Since then its founder members have been detained for various' 
reasons [The World at One, 27.10.82] 
It will be clear that agentless passives are often used with the same 
power/knowledge versus ignorance/weakness effect, as that described 
for imperatives by Fowler and Kress. 
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A third type of omission occurs when elements which can be 
reconstructed from the semantics of the verb involved are omitted. 
Work, separate from this project, in which I have been involved 
(reported in part in Channell, Cowie and Jeffries, 1981, and in Willis 
and Jeffries 1982) investigated the way in which particular 
participants are necessarily present in a situation, for a particular 
verb to be appropriately used. Put in a different theoretical 
framework, the presence of these participants is part of the truth 
conditions for sentences in which the verb appears. To take a 
well-worn example (discussed by Fillmore, 1968: 390, and Anderson, 
1971, Freidin, 1975), for: 
(27) He bought a car 
to be felicitously uttered, it is necessary that there have been an 
exchange of money, and a vendor. If either of these are absent from 
the real life situation, buy cannot be used. So the semantics of b 
allows a speaker to suppress mention of both vendor and money, if he 
does not wish to detail them, and equally allows a hearer to infer 
that they were present in the reported situation. Again, with hit, 
Fillmore (1971) suggests that in 
(28) He hit the dog [21 
"the speaker is merely being indefinite about the implement he used". 
The vagueness by omission exemplified by (24) to (28) is again 
qualitatively different from additive vagueness in the sense that 
these are cases of things whose identity is unspecified in the 
sentence concerned. While the ordinary language user may refer to 
these three sorts of omissions as "being vague", an analytical 
2 Of course (28) is also ambiguous between the reading Fillmore is 
focussing on, and the one where he falls out of a tree and onto the 
dog. 
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approach will do better, on my view, to see this not as vagueness, but 
as suppression of reference/mention. Recalling Peirce's definition, 
and applying it to for example, (27) as a test, we can see that we 
would not want to say that it was intrinsically uncertain whether (27) 
applied to a particular vendor or not. It is rather that the identity 
of the vendor is simply not given. 
2.4.4 Vagueness by Implicature 
The fourth way of being vague which I have identified is where an 
apparently precise sentence can be used with a vague meaning. This 
has been observed to occur frequently in cases involving numbers and 
quantities. Wachtel (1980) notes that sentences like: 
(29) Sam is six feet tall 
(30) Sam has $10,000 in his savings account 
(31) Odessa has a population of one million 
are on one reading "inherently approximations" (of course there is 
also an exact reading), in the sense that (31) would not normally be 
considered false if the actual population of Odessa were 1,002,593. 
The reason for this is that the numbers in (29) - (31) are seen as 
'round' numbers within the base-10 number system. Attested examples 
from my data are similar: 
(32) [article about Habitat catalogue] 
+However, there is less difference between London and the 
provinces than one might suppose - 25,000 have bought a wok; 
they can't all be Wong and live in Gerrard Street [ST 
23.08.811 
(33) +I was teaching on a language summer school in UCL once and- 
they were working on the roof there and we were on the'top 
floor, there were no windows, it was a sort of attic floor 
really but there were skylights and every so often you'd 
notice a bit of disturbance around the class and there'd be 
half a dozen faces all looking, staring in at you (laugh) it 
was really creepy [Camb 13A180/9631 
In these two examples, hearers infer, I think, from the context 
supplied by the speaker, that the quantities given are not to be taken 
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as exact. 
Percentages are often used in this way. We all remember the 
household disinfectant which "kills ninety-ninety percent of all 
household germs". Presumably most people took this to mean "nearly 
all". Here is another similar example: 
(34) [electrical shop assistant explaining why repair cannot be 
carried out, because of lack of spares from factory] 
+They've had one fire which has destroyed ninety-five percent 
of their total, in fact ninety-five percent of their total 
stock [Camb 1B267/p. 7] 
tL 
The speaker, one infers, did not really know exactly how much stock 
was lost, 'he wanted rather to stress that it was most of it. 
In some cases, the implicated-vagueness use is institutionalised 
to the extent that it almost completely supplants the exact use. In 
North American usage, and similarly but to a lesser extent in Britain, 
a couple of means "a few" or "a low number". Bernstein (1971), a 
prescriptive guide to good Eng/sh, notes that "using a couple of in 
the indefinite sense of a few or several is frowned upon by judges of 
reputable writing; dictionaries tend to label it' "informal". " (: 27). 
Bolinger (1979) describes this use and its constraints in some detail. 
Clearly it is sufficiently widespread to make it worth legislating 
against. In an example from Cicourel's doctor/patient interviews we 
find an example of this use: 
(35) [patient sometimes "sees stars"] 
+P: Oh I see them occasionally [I: delivery] (pause) yes uh [I: ' 
okay] sometimes I see them during the day, like I saw (slight 
pause) a couple this morning [Cicourel, 1974] 
This process is noted by Menninger (1969), who calls it SEMANTIC 
FADING, because the exact number meaning "fades", leaving the 
signification "a few" or, more often "many". He says: 
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"In Greece both 60 and its multiples such as 360 were 
frequently used as "round numbers" - that is numbers whose 
specific meanings are inflated into the indefinite "many", as 
in the expressions "if I've told you once, I've told you 'a 
hundred times' that... " The inflation or semantic fading of a 
number word is the opposite of the specification of its 
meaning and usually involves the three ranks 10,100, and 
1000, but it can happen to any other number which for one 
reason or another has acquired special significance (as in 
seine sieben Sachen packen, 'picked up his seven things'. " 
(: 153) 
and quotes an example from the Odyssey: 
"the number of swine remaining was only 360" [Odyssey 14, 
20] 
Other common English examples are the sixty-four thousand dollar 
I 
question (="very important") and Ive got a thousand (and one) things 
to do (= "lots"). 
For the non-institutionalised examples, one question is what 
triggers the vague as opposed to the exact reading. One factor is 
whether or not the number is round. 
(36) Sam is five foot eleven and a half tall 
(37) Sam has $9,873 in his savings account 
(38) Odessa has a population of 1,002,493 
I submit that it is (at least) very hard to get a reading of these 
where they are vague, whereas as we have seen (29) to (31) are quite 
normally judged as being vague. The reason is that (36) to (38) do 
not contain what we think of as round numbers. Clearly the presence 
of a round number is a good indication that a vague reading is 
intended. Further, Menninger suggests that the numbers which are more 
likely to be institutionalised as vague quantities are round numbers. 
As we shall see in Chapter 3, round numbers also have a key role in 
the formation and interpretation of additive number approximations. 
In addition, as has been mentioned, context and world knowledge are 
important in deciding whether an exact or a vague quantity is being 
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given. 
2.5 Summary 
We have seen that there are, in English, a number of ways of "being 
vague". I have suggested that from the point of view of analysis, 
some of these are true instances of vague language, whereas others are 
cases of suppression of reference. Vagueness has been observed to 
occur widely in language use, and we have noted some investigators 
wishing to maintain that all language use is vague in some way. Vague 
utterances are defined here, following Peirce, as those for which it 
is intrinsically uncertain whether they apply to particular referents 
or states of affairs, or not. The major question which arises is how 
to deal with vagueness in an account of language understanding. I 
shall return to the issue of the theoretical implications of the 
existence of vague language, in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 3 
Number Approximations 
Neddie Seagoon: How far is it to the valley? 
Major Bloodknock: Roughly sixty miles. 
NS: I know it's roughly sixty miles but what is it exactly? 
MB: Seventy miles. 
NS: We'll go roughly, it's ten miles shorter. 
[The Goon Show] 
3.1 
We saw in Chapter 2 that there exist a number of ways of being vague 
about quantities in English. In particular, speakers have the option 
of either adding something to a precise number or numbers, or of using 
a vague quantifier , or of omitting information, the necessary 
presence of which can be inferred, for example from the semantics of 
the verb involved. In this Chapter I concentrate on the first of 
these types, those where lexical material is added, to result in a 
vague quantity reading. Examples of this are: 
(1) +You find that you get five or six articles and they're, all very 
much the same [11,21.2] 
(2) +He's producing about ten pages a week and they're all getting 
published [11,21.2] 
(3) +It's something around the twenty per cent mark, and it's never 
changed [11,21.2] 
(4) +This does save you eighty or so pence [W1] 
All these are examples of approximations which contain some lexical 
material (such as about or approximately) which leads to the 
approximation reading - these will be called APPROXIMATORS); one or, 
optionally, two numbers, which I shall call EXEMPLAR NUMBERS; and, 
also optionally, a measure noun (pounds, feet, etc). Note that this 
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use of the term APPROXIMATOR is quite different from and unrelated to 
that employed by Quirk et al (1972: 8.29ff) to refer to downtoners to 
the force of a verb as in, I almost resigned. 
An intuitive analysis of structures like those in (1) - (4) 
suggests that they designate not precise numbers or quantities, but 
rather intervals whose extent is apparently not exactly specified. 
"Interval", throughout the following, should be understood to mean 
"continuous sequence of whole numbers and parts of numbers, or real 
numbers". The expressions are in wide use, and despite their 
vagueness, it is clear that they present no problems of interpretation 
to either speakers or hearers: 
"There's a lot of occasions where you don't pay any attention 
to ... how exact it is so its like there's fifteen or so 
people out in the hall its probably likely to be less than 
that I would think rather than exactly fifteen or 
more" [comment made by test subject] 
The three theories of approximations which have been proposed 
(Lakoff, 1972; Sadock, 1977; and Wachtel, 1980,1981), which I 
referred to in the previous chapter, approach them as posing a problem 
for a bivalent truth-conditional semantics, in the sense that it is 
apparently impossible to specify the points on the number continuum at 
which any particular approximation ceases to be true [1]. These three 
accounts direct their attention towards the problem of incorporating 
apparently intractable data into an existing semantic theory. As 
such, they do not overtly interest themselves in psycholinguistic 
aspects , of approximations; 
ie what are speakers, and more 
particularly, hearers, actually doing when they process 
1 Klein (1982) discusses adjectival comparatives, which are similar 
to these expressions in being vague, but he notes specifically (note 
7: 121) that number approximations are an independent issue. 
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approximations? Neither do they interest themselves in attempting to 
discover empirically the propositions that are expressed by sentences 
containing approximators. They assume that they (and we) know them. 
The present study approaches approximations from the opposite point of 
view (ie, that of language users) and presents data which complements 
and illuminates the theoretical perspective of the studies mentioned. 
All four suggest that number approximations, rather than being 
phenomena which require a special theoretical corner of their own, 
have characteristics which are rather general in language use. 
In this Chapter I examine in detail the structure, intonational 
characteristics, and meanings of a sample of number approximations, 
drawing on other studies, conversation data, and informant work. A. 
note on data (3.2) is followed by an account of the elicitation tests 
I carried out (3.3), a full description of the structures involved and 
their meanings (3.4), together with some general aspects (3.5,3.6 and 
3.7). 3.8 is a note on Partial Specifiers, which are shown to be, in 
use, almost identical to Approximators. Finally a summary (3.9) of 
the propositions relevant to speech behaviour which must be accounted 
for by a theory concerned with the meaning of number approximations. 
3.2 Conversation examples 
The conversation data I had collected at the start of this study 
contained a number of examples of what I had tentatively identified as 
number approximations. These appear to be used naturally and with no 
observable difficulties of comprehension. As we have seen, Crystal 
and Davy (1975: 113) assign an approximation reading to these kind of 
structures, grouping them in "the wide range of devices that the 
colloquial lexicon contains which allows for approximations to be 
made". Quirk et al (1972: 13.70) comment similarly on the expressions 
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containing or that these are "expressions of approximation". Lakoff, 
Sadock, and Wachtel (op cit) also assign vague readings to these 
structures. A desire to test and confirm these plausible but 
intuitive assignments, was one of the motivations for the elicitation 
test I carried out. In Chapter 51 examine some of the conversation 
extracts in detail, and discuss the kinds of conversational effects 
which number approximations are used to achieve. 
3.3 The Elicitation Test 
3.3.1 Objectives 
The test had two main objectives: 
1 to test the hypothesis that number approximations designate 
intervals of numbers 
2 to find out the length of intervals which different approximations 
designate, and the placing of the intervals relative to the exemplar 
number(s) present. 
3.3.2 Method 
A paper and pencil test was used to present 32 examples of putative 
number approximations. Some were attested examples from my data, and 
the rest were invented sentences. The test items contained four 
different approximators and a-selection of exemplar numbers. Subjects 
were 26 first-year University of York students who took the test in 
two groups on two successive days. They were told that the two 
sessions would replace their normal descriptive linguistics seminar 
and that there would be a short test, followed by discussion. 
The test items were presented in reverse order to alternate 
subjects. This was intended to balance out the effects of practice 
and fatigue across the items, and also the effect of an item acting as 
context for the subsequent one (cf Greenbaum, 1977). It also had the 
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advantage that each subject was completing a test paper different from 
that of his two immediate neighbours. 
Before seeing the test materials, subjects heard a short tape 
extract of a conversation in which an approximation was used (it was 
example (1)), and they read a transcript of it, in which the 
approximation was underlined. This served two purposes: first to 
direct them towards the intonation normally used for n or m 
approximations (such as that in (1), see Section. 3.4.3 for discussion) 
and, second, more importantly, to encourage them to believe that every 
test item they read was an attested example from my corpus of data. 
For this reason also, each item was written between quotation marks. 
I wanted to encourage them to act, as far as possible, as hearers of 
the test stimuli; that is, rather than asking themselves "do I say 
this and what do I mean when I do? ", to ask themselves "if I heard 
this, what would I understand? ". The written instructions each 
subject saw are reproduced below: 
Example 
"You find you get five or six articles and they're all very 
much the same" 
Someone who thought this could ordinarily refer to anywhere 
between 3 and 8 articles (inclusive) would mark their answer 
as: 
123456789 10 
IF YOU FIND THE NUMBERS GIVEN NOT EXACT ENOUGH PLEASE WRITE 
IN ANY ADDITIONAL NUMBER YOU NEED 
PLEASE WORK ALONE 
The list of test items is given in Table 3.1 at the end of this 
chapter. 
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3.3.3 Results 
The results for each item (identified by its approximation) are given 
in Table 3.2. 
3.3. t1- Discussion 
The hypothesis that number approximations are understood to designate 
intervals of numbers was clearly supported by the large percentage of 
subjects (100 percent in 15/32 items and less than 90 percent for only 
five of the items) who marked intervals for each item. The 
comparatively low score for Item 10 around ten million is explainable 
by 
, 
faulty test design. In discussion after the test, subjects said 
that the interval for this did not go as low as nine million, or as 
high as eleven, yet the answer sheet had given only whole millions as 
possible numbers to mark. Despite the specific instruction to add 
additional numbers if they needed to, only one of them had done this. 
Commented one: 
"It was obvious that it wasn't exactly ten million people and 
I didn't think it was as few as nine million or as many as 
eleven. I didn't want to sort of go round deciding well its 
between ten million two hundred and fifty thousand so and so 
but you know sort of ... it obviously wasn't exactly the ten 
million" 
Results relative to the different approximators are discussed 
under separate headings below. 
The second finding was. that as a general rule, the length of the 
interval increases as a function of the size of the exemplar number, 
such that, for example, about £14,000 is judged as designating a much 
larger interval than about £500 (see Table 3.2). The results were 
equivocal as to demonstrating a consistent proportional relationship 
between exemplar number and interval length. As we shall see 
subsequently, this is because Interval length (hereinafter I-length) 
is determined not only by the E-number (=Exemplar Number), but also by 
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several other factors, such as the nature of the item being 
approximated, the purpose of the utterance in which it is found, and 
which approximator is used. 
The third finding supports the general observation made by all 
three writers on this topic that the nature of the item(s) being 
approximated affects the length of interval for which the 
approximation seems appropriate. Taking Sadock's example, he claims 
that we understand something different when told that a man is 
approximately six feet tall from when we are told that a cockroach is 
approximately six feet tall, because of our world knowledge about how 
tall men usually are. My own, more specific finding, is that a 
/ difference is discernable between discrete items (such as people, 
pages, replies) and non-discrete measure nouns (such as pounds, feet, 
litres). From Table 3.2, we see, for example, that responses to about 
ten pages were different, a longer interval resulting, than those for 
10 lbs or so and 10 or so litres. This is the more striking because 
it runs contrary to the general rule observed, that or so 
approximations designate longer intervals than about/around 
approximations. This difference would account for a secondary result 
of a series of experiments on category width (Pettigrew, 1958) which 
showed a distinct loading on test items involving time and speed 
measures (ie non-discrete items) in approximations, as opposed to 
another loading towards judgments on discrete items such as numbers of 
births, submarines, or churches. 
Having noted these three general results of the elicitation test, 
we now pass on to a detailed consideration of individual number 
approximators, drawing not only on the test data but also on attested 
examples and other studies. 
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3.4 Number Approximators 
3.4.1 about/around/round 
About, around and round appear to be interchangeable in most examples, 
and test results for about and around indicate that they have the same 
effect on the meaning of an approximation. About occurs more 
frequently in my spoken examples, and around more frequently in my 
written examples, but the samples are not large enough to draw any 
conclusions from this. I am treating round as a variant of around. 
Distribution 
These words appear as modifiers to a number and they always, appear 
before the number W. Anywhere that a number can occur, about, round 
or around can be added before the number and result in a grammatical 
string (except if the number is already modified by something which 
would contradict the approximator, ie *exactly about 10. ) Thus: 
(5) +1 wonder what time I've got to go to the dentist. Its 
always round four-o-clock [LJ 2,7] 
(6) [context: talking about buying Christmas trees] 
+I had one some while ago that my mother managed to 
keep for about three years [Camb 9B14/63] 
(7) [article on climbing Everest] 
+He hopes to set up an advance camp at around 20,000 feet 
in early July [written, ST 4,5,80] 
(5) - (7) could all have appeared without their approximators, and 
still been acceptable and meaningful. It is in this sense that I 
classify these as lexical additions to sentences which bring vagueness 
to propositions which could otherwise be precise. To schematise, an 
approximation of this type has the form: 
(about ) 
((a)round) n 
where the subsequent material is subject to the general constraints of 
what can follow a number. 
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Meaning: about/(a)round 
At this point I cover those aspects of meaning (construed in the broad 
sense in which it was characterised in Chapter 1) which are particular 
to about/(a)round. More general features are discussed later. The 
effect of "adding" about/(a)round to a sentence containing a number is 
to make it vague as to the exact quantity involved. The speaker in 
(5) wanted to include appointments at, perhaps, 3.45 and 4.10 in her 
reference to her dental appointments. The speaker in (6) was allowing 
for the tree to have lasted less than, or more than, or exactly three 
years, and so on. - 
From the test results for items containing about/(a)round it was 
observed that subjects judge these approximations as 'designating 
intervals of numbers which are symmetrical about the exemplar number 
given. Frequency counts on each item give in all cases a mode which 
is the E-number (or two modes, one of which is). Tabulating the 
frequency gives in every case a symmetrical figure (Table 3.3). So a 
hearer hearing example (2) understands apparently that this person 
writing "about ten pages a week" writes between 8.5 and 11.5 pages 
each week. 
These results explain the judgment reported in Sadock (1977), 
that 
(8) [26] *John ate around all of the beans 
is unacceptable. Clearly if around designates intervals symmetrical 
about their exemplar, a constraint on its use is that it cannot be 
used with an exemplar such as all which is at the extreme end of a 
continuum. Dubious for the same reason are sentences like: 
(9) *? About 100 percent of those questioned would vote for the SDP 
and *approximately/about/(a)round none is also not possible. 
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3.4.2 Approximately 
The use of approximately has received the largest amount of attention 
in the literature - Lakoff discusses a semantics for approximately 
without consideration of other approximators. Sadock only discusses 
approximately in any detail, though he does mention a few other 
approximators in passing (1977: 438). Wachtel (1980) discusses 
approximately and its relationship to sentences not containing a 
lexical approximator, but he does not refer to other approximators. 
Since Lakoff, Sadock and Wachtel are principally interested in the 
theoretical problem of finding a suitable semantics for vague quantity 
expressions, they look at only a very few (invented) examples. 
It is curious that approximately has received so much attention, 
since it does not appear to be the most commonly used approximator. 
My sample is perhaps too small for firm conclusions to be drawn from 
it, but in the informal conversations I recorded, there were no uses 
of approximately. The examples I have suggest that use of 
approximately is generally confined to rather specific official, 
semi-official and scientific registers. These two, examples appear to 
be semi-official situations: 
(10) [telephone call to estate agent] 
+B: How many houses are there in the street? 
C: There are approximately four houses in the street [ATP 
DN/ 9] 
(11) [Doctor (I) taking preliminary notes from patient (P)] 
I: Okay and when was that approximately? [P: hm] This was 
after delivery or [interviewer mumbled something] 
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P: yeah [slight pause] now this was [pause] the last visit I 
[pause] yeah [slight pause] this was approximately a month 
ago 
[Cicourel, 1974] 
Further examples will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Distribution 
The distribution of approximately is the same as about/(a)round, that 
is, anywhere a number can be used, approximately can be added to it 
providing 'a contradiction does not arise. It may well be that 
approximately and about/(a)round are in complementary distribution in 
different sociolinguistic contexts, but a large corpus study with 
control of the relevant sociolinguistic dimensions would be necessary 
to demonstrate this. 
A constraint on the use of approximately noted by Sadock 
(1977: 436) is the following: 
(12) [23] *Sam has approximately some money in his savings account 
(13) [24] *Sam has written approximately a few/several/many books 
That is, approximately is grammatical only when combined with exact 
numbers or measures denoting exact quantities. It is apparent that 
this constraint applies equally to all the approximators under 
consideration, thus: 
(14) *Sam has (about ) some () money in his savings 
(around) () account 
(round )() 
(or a bit of) 
(or so ) 
are all unacceptable. This constraint is easily explained by 
reference to the test results reported above. According to these, 
number approximations are understood by hearers as designating 
continuous intervals of numbers, whose position on the number 
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continuum is established by reference to the exemplar number given. 
An exact exemplar is required to do this (although as I shall show in 
3.6.1, some exact exemplars are more favoured than others). It is to 
be expected therefore that some, a few or several cannot act as 
exemplars because they are not exact. 
The requirement of approximators to be followed by something 
exact is shown also by what happens in combining approximately with 
other things than numbers: 
*? approximately pink and *? approximately rabbit-shaped are ruled out 
because they are not exact enough, whereas approximately circular is 
acceptable because circular indicates something precise. 
Meaning: approximately 
Lakoff (1972: 222) tries to demonstrate, by means of a series of 
invented examples, that the sentence 
(15) [3b] Sam had approximately $10,000 
is "true no matter what" of a situation 
and progressively less true 
$9,200, and so on. He 
judgments would hold 
claim about the meaning 
of one 
does not say 
in his savings account 
where he actually had $9,992, 
where he had $9,950, $9,500, 
whether he thinks the same 
for $10,021, $10,500, $10,750 etc, so his only 
of approximately is that it can 
different degrees in different circumstances. 
be vague to 
Much of Sadock's paper is devoted to showing that Lakoff's 
proposal for a semantics for sentences containing approximately is 
unworkable. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. He makes two 
important observations about the meaning of sentences containing 
approximately: Firstly, that the judgment of how good the 
approximation is, depends partly on the nature of the item being 
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approximated. He compares: 
(16) [8] Sam is approximately six feet tall 
(17) [9] That cockroach is approximately six feet tall 
and asserts that if both are actually 5 ft 8, (17) is a better 
approximation than (16), because of that we know about humans and 
cockroaches. That-is to say, we know that humans are often around six 
feet tall, and we know that cockroaches most usually, are not. Second, 
he holds that the form of the whole approximation alters the length of 
interval over which it is acceptable. By comparing 
(18) [11] Odessa has a population of approximately one million 
(19) Odessa has a population of approximately 990,000 
he suggests that the number of significant figures is relevant. He 
also asserts that about a dozen is rougher than about twelve and that 
approximately two and a half tons is "not as accurate sounding" as 
approximately 2.5 tons. Again here, since it is clear that if these 
points are valid, they apply equally to other types of number 
approximation , discussion of them is deferred to section 3.5 - 3.7. 
The sum of Sadock's account of the meaning of approximations is 
that they are in some way vague, but that the degree of vagueness is 
related to the two observations above. As the aim of this section is 
to set out observations about the meaning of approximately, rather 
than to discuss how to deal theoretically with that meaning, Sadock's 
proposals for the semantics and pragmatics of approximately will be 
dealt with in Chapter 7. 
Wachtel's (1980) paper makes a number of points relevant to the 
meaning of approximately, the most important of which is that if, in a 
given context, an approximation (containing approximately) is true for 
a particular actual number which is less than the exemplar number, it 
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is also true for any other number between the actual number involved 
and the E-number, and for all numbers up to the same distance away 
which are more than the E-number. Put another way, this says that an 
approximation using approximately is true for an interval of numbers, 
the centre point of which is the exemplar number. The exact length of 
the interval in any given case is determined, in his analysis, by a 
function from C, the set of contexts, into F, the set of rounding 
functions which map from actual numbers into the set of real numbers 
to select an appropriate approximating (exemplar) number. His account 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
The test results indicate that the meanings of the set of number 
approximations I looked at are basically of two types: those which 
have intervals symmetrical about their exemplar number, and those 
which have skewed intervals. Approximately is then, apparently, a 
symmetrical approximator. 
3.4.3 n or m 
These approximations differ from those so far considered, in having 
two exemplar numbers, thus: 
(20) [reporting on Christmas trees] 
+There's another shop in Blackheath that was selling really 
scrawny ones, five or six quid a time [Camb 9B14/32] [2] 
3 
Faced only with examples of this structure, and in the absence of any 
experimental evidence, a possible approach would be to subsume it into 
an analysis applying to other uses of or. Two analyses suggest 
themselves: 
1 the two numbers given are alternatives (like "either... or... " 
constructions) 
2 This example is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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2 the two numbers are inclusively disjunctive (either one is true, or 
both are true simultaneously). 
Evidence against these two approaches, but quite independent of that 
gained from the elicitation test, is provided by an examination of 
intonation patterns for or constructions. 
Intonation 
Crystal (1969). notes that tonality may have what he calls a 
grammatical function of distinguishing between "certain types of idiom 
and literal interpretation", among which he lists: 
(21) would you 
I 
like one or two lumps of 
'sugar ll 
compared with 
(22) would youI like one 
11 
or two lumps of sugar 
where the first is an approximation and the second presents two 
alternatives. Another example of alternative use of or which he gives 
(: 273): 
(23) would you like 
I 
gin or whisky) or tea 
also shows the same pattern of a separate tone unit for each 
alternative. Even where two alternatives are in the same tone unit, 
the tonicity is non-optional. In Crystal's example (: 263): 
(24) Was she wearing a green dress or a red one? 
"the item 'red' must be nuclear because of the grammar of the 
co-ordinate construction, and the speaker has no choice as to the 
distribution of emphasis when he enters the 'alternative' part of this 
construction". Alternative uses of or in my own data show the same 
characteristics: 
(25) +1 just intuitively feel that being in a department thats 
11 /\ 1i ^U\ 
full of people who are 
I 
really 11 really 
Ij 
famous either 
in their discipline or even further outside it 
( 
is likely 
n 
to be a good ideal [II, 21.2] 
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(26) +either you take them or you dont take them 
II 
or if 
it again 1ý [11,21.2] 
In contrast with these alternative constructions, my examples of 
approximative or show different tonality and tonicity: [3] 
(27) +yeh 
I 
but its 
I 
still around that 
II 
four or five 
Tregion 
11 
[1,13.2] 
In alternative constructions the two alternatives must both be 
stressed, and at least the second, or both, must be nuclear. In the 
above example, fourtor five region is one tone unit and region carries 
the nucleus. It is behaving intonationally like any prehead modifier 
plus noun group, eg 
(28) 1 want some; orange paint 
Similarly in: 
(29) you find that you get five or six 
tarticles 
and 
\I IN 
theyre very much 
II 
the same 
II 
[11,21.21 
This shows that n or m constructions are distinct from alternative 
uses of or and should not be analysed like them. It also underlines 
the necessity of using real data in a study of meaning of this kind, 
in order to be able to draw on intonational evidence where it is 
relevant. 
Distribution 
There are some restrictions on the way an n or m approximation can be 
put together. Firstly the smaller number must always precede the 
larger: 
3 Notice that this same intonational contrast occurs also to 
differentiate more or less with the reading "nearly" from the reading 
"either more, or less". 
theyre` good well fair enough youve said once 
ll 
why say 
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(30) *There were twenty or fifteen people there 
Secondly there are some constraints on what the two numbers may be: 
(31) There were ten or twelve people there 
(32) *There were ten or a hundred people there 
(33) *There were five hundred and nineteen or five hundred and twenty 
people there 
(34) *There were (fifteen or twenty-one ) people there 
(fourteen or twenty-two ) 
(sixteen or twenty-three) 
If the * examples are considered with the one tone group intonation' 
observed in attested examples of approximations (and described above) 
they seem rather unacceptable (and even quite difficult to say). Of 
course as presentations of alternatives (using the other intonation 
pattern) they are quite all right. 
These unacceptable examples, plus evidence from my attested 
examples, suggest the following pattern for acceptability of n or m 
approximations (with other combinations being, in general, 
unacceptable): 
The m number is: for an n number which is: 
adjacent up to 19 
2 above even, 6- 18 
5 above a multiple of 5,10 - 95 
10 above a multiple of 10,10 - 190 
20 above a multiple-of 20,60 - 140 
50 apart a multiple of 50,150 - 950 
Hundreds, thousands and millions follow the same rules applied to the 
numerals preceding them, eg: 
two or three hundred 
eight or ten thousand 
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i 
fifteen or sixteen thousand 
A general constraint is that the higher level round number (ie 200 vs 
150) is preferred in the m position, that is to say, everyone accepts 
950 or a thousand, but some informants find 900 or 950 awkward. The 
top ends of the intervals of possibilities for n numbers are also 
variable across speakers, but not in a way whch affects the general 
pattern. So, for example, no speakers I have found can make an 
x approximation out of (33). 
From this patterning it appears that for an acceptable 
approximation to be made, the distance apart of the two exemplar 
numbers increases with the size of the numbers involved. 
The above observations highlight, I think, important facts about 
the way number concepts are internalised, and their relationship to 
the number names of English. Numbers which we think of as "round" 
have special functions. It is clear that unity, duality, base 5, base 
10 and base 20 play a vital role in the way speakers of English 
manipulate these approximations in particular, and their base 10 
number system in general. 
Meaning: n or m 
Quirk et al (1972: 13.70) suggest that these structures designate 
continuous intervals of which the two exemplar numbers are the extreme 
ends. They note that such expressions "will not normally allow the 
actual time to go beyond the specified range though it could err 
slightly upwards". They do not unfortunately discuss n or m where it 
refers to other things than time. Their suggestion about time 
expressions is partly supported by the result obtained for the one 
time expression I tested - six or seven hours which produced a mean 
interval centre of 6h 42 mins and a mode of 7h, with 80 percent of 
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Y 
informants marking times above 7h, compared to 42 percent marking 
times below 6h. 
It is. clear that the two numbers given are highly relevant to the 
interval designated. Over the ten examples tested, the mean 
percentage of informants marking both given numbers as part of the 
interval was 79.0. Scores for the individual items are given in Table 
3.4. 
Table 3.4 shows why Quirk et al's ascription of meaning is not 
viable. Over the ten items, the percentage of informants marking 
numbers outside the interval bounded by the two exemplar numbers was 
75.0, nearly as high as the number marking the two exemplars. The 
majority of informants clearly did not feel that the two exemplar 
numbers marked the ends of the possible interval. As to Quirk et al's 
other suggestion, we can see from Table 3.4 that the overall tendency 
for the n or m expressions I tested was to allow an interval running 
higher above the higher exemplar than it did below the lower one. 
A further observation concerned whether n or m was combined with 
a quantity measure or with a discrete item. It was observed that this 
had no effect on the percentage of subjects who judged the interval to 
extend outside that bounded by the two E-numbers. The difference was 
that where a quantity measure was used, fewer subjects judged the 
interval to extend below the n number: 41.5 percent, compared to 56.0 
percent of subjects for n or m with discrete items. As far as the 
upper limit went, a marginally larger proportion of subjects (66.1 
percent) thought the interval could stray upwards where there was a 
quantity measure, than where there was a discrete item (60.8 percent). 
The ten n or m items were ranked according to the percentage of 
informants who judged both E-numbers to be included in the interval. 
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Of the five items in the lower half of the ranking, four out of five 
used another quantity measure. 
These two results demonstrate that, as Sadock and Wachtel 
suggested, the item being approximated is important in determining the 
length of the interval understood. 
The test results contribute the following factors relevant to the 
meaning of n or in approximators. They designate intervals, which 
contain the two exemplar numbers. The most frequently occurring score 
(mode) is most often the point half way between the two exemplar' 
numbers. That is, here is a symmetrical approximator, symmetrical 
about the mid-point between its two exemplar numbers. 
A notable contrast between n or m and the other symmetrical 
approximators is in the general length of intervals it triggers. 
Expressing interval lengths as a percentage of the exemplar number 
given, (or for n or m, of the mid-point) shows that about/around 
approximations had mean interval lengths varying from 7.6 to 32.3 
percent of the exemplar. n or m approximations had interval lengths 
of 22.9 to 66.6 percent of the mid-point. Thus an observed effect of 
using an n or m approximator is to increase the size of the interval 
designated, or, to put this another way, to be more vague. 
Here I have treated n or m holistically, having rejected its 
analysis as a use of alternative or. While still maintaining that it 
should be analysed holistically, in Chapter 6I examine . the 
relationship between its observed meaning, and the meanings of its 
constituent parts. 
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All the approximators discussed so far appear to designate 
symmetrical intervals. We now come to consideration of an apparently 
different phenomenon - approximations' whose intervals are skewed in 
relation to their E-numbers. 
3.4.4 n or so 
Distribution 
For some speakers, the following judgments hold: 
(35) Six or so books 
(36) *six books or so 
(37) ten pounds . or so 
[lbs] 
(38) ? ten or so pounds 
With regard to the unacceptability of (36) Quirk et al state: The 
items preceding the or so approximation must be units " of measurement 
or items contextually rendered units of measurement". For certain 
speakers an arrangement like (38) is also unacceptable. These people 
appear to have simplified their grammar such that they have one rule 
stating that Ns designating units of measurement precede or so and Ns 
designating discrete items follow it. A further factor is that an 
arrangement like (36) becomes more acceptable (less awkward) where the 
number involved is larger, eg: 
(39) three thousand students or so 
Quirk et al's observation is born out by all the examples I 
collected, thus 
(40) [letter to York Weekly Advertiser] 
York is a wonderful place. All through the year we have 
holes in the road, we have the tourists and for six months or 
so we have the stink from the sugar beet factory [DN/7] 
whereas if the N is not a unit of measurement, it follows: 
(41) [questionnaire on student housing] 
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+The response was again poor - only fifty replies from the 
1,500 or so questionnaires which were 
distributed [written SO 4.12.81] 
Configurations of the type in (38) also occurred ("eighty or so 
pence", "ten or so years ago"). No obvious explanation for Quirk et 
al's rule suggests itself. The unacceptability of (36) as compared to 
(35) may arise- from what can be observed of their meanings. Or so 
triggers -a vague reading which is understood to attach vagueness to 
the item immediately preceding the or so. Where a number immediately 
precedes, this means that parts of whole numbers (ie real numbers 
between the whole numbers) may be involved in the'interval. Something 
hearers know about the number system is that there are units smaller 
than whole numbers. Equally where a measure noun is immediately to 
X the left of or so as in (37), it is this which is made vague, but 
quite acceptably, since language users know that the units designated 
by measure nouns are susceptible to division either into smaller units 
or into parts of units. But where the item preceding or so cannot be 
so subdivided, as with books or people, the approximation seems 
contradictory, 
_ 
and gives rise to a judgment of unacceptability. This 
would leave the contrast between (36) and (39) still unexplained. We 
know from the test that, pragmatic considerations aside, larger 
E-numbers produce longer intervals; so the interval in (39) may be 
something like 500 (cf Table 3.2, item 21, the result for 3,000 or so 
students), whereas that for (36) might be 2.5 (cf Table 3.2, item 15). 
One possibility is an explanation connected with the way people 
perceive numbers. The quantities involved with low numbers can" be 
conceived of at a practical level, in a way that. the high numbers 
cannot. "Six people" are imagineable, and picturable, in the mind, in 
a way that 3,000 are not. From the point of view of perception 3,000 
is just "very many". In this connection we may note the many examples 
83 
Chapter 3 
cited by Menninger (1969) of 'primitive' peoples having only lexical 
items for a few low numbers, and a word for "many". It can be said 
perhaps that we "know the meaning" of the high numbers intellectually, 
but not experientially. So, a hearer interpreting an utterance 
containing "3,000" does not "picture" 3,000 students; he notes rather 
that a high number which he knows of is being used. Pragmatic 
knowledge about the possibility of dividing up students (or not) is 
perhaps not called on in this juxtaposition so no clash results. 
Whereas in the case of six books or so the ability to "picture" six 
whole entities conflicts with the vagueness arising from or so. This 
is not a very well-developed or well-motivated explanation, but since 
I believe that the work necessary to improve it lies in the area of 
perception of number, I feel justified in excluding further pursuit of 
it from the current work. 
Meaning: or so 
Two main characteristics differentiate or so approximations from those 
mentioned so far. Firstly, a comparison of interval lengths shows 
that an or so approximation tends to designate a longer interval than 
an about/(a)round one. It shares that tendency with n or m. On 
about/(a)round approximations the sizes ranged from 7.6 to 32.3 
percent of the exemplar numbers, whereas for or so the percentages are 
from 15.5 to 56.8. 
The intervals judged in the test as being designated by 
approximations containing or so, are skewed upwards from their 
exemplar numbers in the manner shown by the histograms in Table 3.5. 
This result confirms the observation of Quirk et al (1972: 13.70) to 
this effect. 
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Again I discuss or so in Chapter 6, from the point of view of its 
lexical composition. 
3.5 Combinations of Approximators 
From the data, it appears that some approximators may be combined, and 
others not. Examples of combinations are: 
(42) [tutorial discussion: length of sequence of numbers you can 
hold in short term memory]. 
Yeh but its still around that four or five 
region [I, 13.2] 
(43) B: What's the time now 
C: It's about-sevenish or a bit later [Carob 9B14/70] 
-ish when added to numbers representing times appears to mean "about". 
Quirk et al (App 1.29) say "with ages, it has the meaning 
'approximately'. They do not discuss its use with time expressions. 
And: 
(44) [paper reporting informant work at LAGB] 
+We've got about five or six of them but I'm only going to 
talk about three of them today [LAGB 9,811 
Sadock notes in his paper (: 436) certain combinations which he judges 
unacceptable: 
(45) [21] *Sam is about approximately six feet tall 
As we saw previously combinations like approximately some are not 
possible, and I suggested that this is because a symmetrical 
approximator like approximately requires an exact number. The 
unacceptability of example (45) would appear to be for the same 
reason. But, as we can see, -this explanation is challenged by'(42) - 
(44) which according to my explanation, should not be possible. What 
alternative account can be given? 
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The first point to note is that (42) to (44) all contain a use of 
or". Combination possibilities appear to be restricted to: 
approximately 
( about )n (or m) (or so) 
(a)round 
AB 
with no combination of the items in group A being allowed[41. This 
restriction of combinations appears at first arbitrary - why some 
combinations of approximators, but not others? 
Firstly, B contains approximators with or, whereas A does not. I 
have described the meaning differences observable between the 
approximators in Group A, whose meaning is close; and those in B. 
Clearly, then, those in Group A are in a simple paradigmatic 
opposition which disallows combination (as in *a the book). 
By analogy, then, the two approximators-in Group B should not 
combine, but they do. - This must be because, being partial idioms (as 
I contend in Chapter 6), they retain some syntagmatic properties of 
alternative uses of or, which permits several disjuncts, as in: 
(46) Mary or Bill or I will meet you at the station 
As we have seen, the effect of adding an approximator is to give a 
vague reading, so what happens when you add two or three, is that the 
reading is even vaguer, cf 
4 There is another approximator (not considered here because of lack 
of data), seen in 
He's coming over round about seven 
This is not just the result of combination, since (a) *about (a)round 
seven is not an acceptable substitute; and (b) a fixed intonation 
pattern has to be applied. Hence it should be seen as a partial 
idiom. 
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(47) 
a It's seven 
b It's sevenish 
c It's about sevenish 
d It's about sevenish or a bit later 
which seem to me to allow a progressively greater latitude as to the 
actual time. Had I been aware at an earlier point in this study of 
the interest of these double and triple approximation cases, I would 
have liked to offer informant data to show this. I would predict 
quite confidently a result supporting my intuition. 
These data, incidentally, demolish one of Sadock's arguments for 
proposing that approximations are more or less semantically empty. If 
approximators have semantic content, he argues, you should be able to 
pile them up. Look at (45), you cannot. All the approximator does is 
to trivialise the semantics so "double approximations would therefore 
be ruled out since a single approximator does as much semantic 
trivialising as is possible". This falls, since'(a) double and even 
triple approximation is allowed (42) - (44) and (b) examples like (47) 
seem to show that combining does indeed give vaguer and vaguer 
readings. 
3.6 Numbers in Approximations 
3.6.1 Certain Numbers are Favoured 
In theory, it is possible to combine any number approximator with any 
number, whole or real, so about 10 and about 9.568 are equally 
possible. In practise however, approximations are very much more 
likely to occur with what we think of as "round" numbers, such as 
multiples of 5 and 10, hundreds or thousands. I have very few 
examples of approximations containing non-"round" numbers. We shall 
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see below that using a non-"round" number in an approximation may 
produce several particular effects not observable with "round" 
numbers. Earlier in this Chapter, I described how "round" numbers 
appear to be important in dictating the acceptable combinations of n 
or m approximations. Given their importance for both the form and the 
meaning of approximations, it is. necessary to establish more 
definitely what exactly the notion "round number" means to language 
users. 
3.6.2 "Round" Numbers Reference Point Numbers 
In a paper entitled 'Cognitive Reference Points', Rosch (1975b) 
investigated the composition of what she called "natural categories": 
ie sets of items perceived as belonging to the same set, eg 'numbers, 
fruits, straight lines. She tested the hypothesis that such 
categories, rather than being undifferentiated bundles of items, are 
in fact structured internally, in the sense that some members of the 
set serve as reference points for positioning the other members in 
relation to the whole set. She has previously shown (Rosch, 1973) that 
certain members of such sets were judged as 'more typical' than others 
or even as 'best examples' of their set. For example, her informants 
judged an orange to be a more typical fruit than a tomato. In her 
1975 experiment, subjects were required, among other tasks, to place 
given numbers in particular 'hedge' sentence frames such as "..... is 
roughly ..... " or "..... is basically..... ". The numbers used are 
shown in the Figure 1. The numbers in the Stimulus 1 column for 
experimental pairs were those expected to be taken as reference 
points. 
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STIMULUS PAIRS USED IN EXPERIMENTS I AND II 
Stimulus type 
Experimental pairs Control pairs 
Pair Stimulus I Stimulus 2: Stimulus I Stimulus 2 
Numbers 
Set 1-Variation "greater than" 
1 10 11 17 18 
2 50 52 36 38 
3 100 103 164 167 
4 1000 1004 1027 1031 
Set 2-Variation "less than" 
1 10 9 17 16 
2 50 48 36 34 
3 100 97 164 161 
4 1000.996 1027 1023 
Figure 1 (adapted from Rosch, 1975b) 
The following figure shows the number of subjects (out of a total of 
240) who used stimulus 1 as the reference point (ie, they placed it in 
the right hand blank in the sentence frames, producing a result like 
'eleven is roughly ten': 
Set 1 Set 2 
Experimental Control Experimental Control 
166 109 220 151 
p- <. 001 
Figure 2 (adapted from Rosch, 1975b) 
Rosch reports her results as "highly confirmatory of the basic 
hypothesis. Subjects consistently judged supposed reference stimuli 
in the domain of ... numbers in the decimal system to belong in 
the reference position in sentence frames containing hedges. " The 
substantive implication of this result, she suggests, is that in a 
natural category such, as numbers, not all members are equivalent. 
Certain members of'the category serve as reference points to which 
other members are related. The relevance of this finding to the 
present study is that Rosch's number stimuli (that is those judged to 
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be reference points) were all multiples of ten. I have already 
suggested that multiples of ten are among those numbers available for 
making n or m approximations. They are are also frequently found in 
other approximations. These observations allow us to go beyond an 
intuitive judgment that certain numbers are "round", to the point 
where we may suggest that the expression "round number" designates, as 
far as ordinary English is concerned just those numbers which, in 
Rosch's terms, are reference points in the base ten number system. To 
take this (speculatively) further, if we imagine a mental lexicon 
which utilizes these reference points in its organisation, we might 
expect the reference point numbers (RPNs) to be more "easily" 
accessible, and therefore perhaps faster to interpret. If language 
processing uses what Yorick Wilkes (personal communication) has called 
'the laziness principle', RPNs might require less processing than 
other numbers, and therefore be suitable for use in approximations. 
Coincidentally, when I asked some test informants why speakers would 
use an approximation. when they in fact knew the exact number in 
question, they said that it was "easier". 
It may be seen that those numbers which emerge as RPNs, do so in 
part as a result of the structure of the base-10 number system. The 
whole system is generated by a small set of recursive rules. Thus 
Hurford (1975) was able to propose grammars which would generate all 
the number words from a fixed set of recursive rules, plus some 
phonological exception rules. 
Henninger (1969: 10) suggests that the structure of the number 
system has perceptual effects on how we use it. He thinks we access 
RPNs by grouping, and other numbers by counting on from an RPN; so 
that 1000 is "found" sooner than 543. He writes: 
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"Even today, if we contemplate the number sequence in our 
minds, 1000 seems clearer, more "available" to us than 543, a 
number of which we can really say only that we must certainly 
arrive at it if we keep counting long enough. We can 
visualize it directly only with difficulty, if at all. " (: 46) 
If this is right, it accounts for the test subjects believing that 
approximations containing round numbers are "easier" to use than exact 
numbers. 
But it is the case that the numbers which function as reference 
points may be determined by other factors than the structure of the, 
number system. Menninger notes the importance of 12 in Western 
European Cultures. 56 lbs (a half a hundredweight) is an RPN 
quantity while we still use non-metric measures, as is 8ozs. Again, 
six feet is an RPN quantity in Western Europe and North America, when 
talking about people's heights (but as Sadock points out, it is not 
perceived as such if we are talking about the height of cockroaches). 
A different kind of evidence for the importance of RPNs in 
communication, and a good indication of which numbers they are, 'comes 
from word frequency counts. Johansson (1980) looked at the frequency 
of the words for numbers one to twenty in four different corpora. His 
findings are reproduced in Figure 3. 
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The frequency of the forms one to twenty 
LOB Brown Carroll Jones and 
et al Sinclair 
one 3,203 3,439 19,976 775 
two 1,652 1,516 10,085 251 
three 787 704 4,413,157 
four 442 417 2,357 87 
five 334 385 1,725 127 
six 269 247 1,229 92 
seven 140 132 687 51 
eight 121 123 651 45 
nine 100 103 417 31 
ten 203 185 1,225 100 
eleven 49 40 146 17 
twelve 58 49 339 32 
thirteen 11 11 116 0 
fourteen 22 34 93 0 
fifteen 48 61 23 23 
sixteen 27 21 104 17 
seventeen 21 27 59 10 
eighteen 24 18 68 13 
nineteen 14 21 40 17 
twenty 189 174 387 66 
Figure 3(from Johansson, 1980) 
He notes that there is a pattern of decreasing frequency from low to 
high numbers, except that: 
"The consistently decreasing frequency with higher numbers 
is, however, broken by peaks for 'round' numbers (10,15,20 
etc). There are also one or two other deviations, in 
particular a peak for twelve and a slight drop for 13. " (: 69) 
He notes that in Jones and Sinclair 
"there is a peak for five, which seems to count as a 'round' 
number in spoken English (: 71) 
The RPNs are very apparent, and include 12. 
RPNs are also important for approximation because they can be 
used to approximate on their own, without a lexical approximator, as 
we saw in Chapter 2. Wachtel (1980) has some discussion of these 
uses. 
3.6.3 Reference Point vs Non-Reference Point Approximations 
Number approximations often contain RPNs. What happens when they do 
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not? Some examples: 
(48) [doctor/patient interview] 
+I: When were you, how old were you uh (pause) when you were 
in Japan? When you were in Japan at that time? 
P: (mumbling and unclear initially) I'd say three years ago 
I: Okay so you were about age 31 [Cicourel, 1974] 
(49) [article in The Guardian on the history of the death penalty] 
+The records, though far from complete, show that about 61 
people died on the block 
Now in (48) the doctor's use of about reflects the patient's 
uncertainty (indicated by "mumbling" and "I'd say"). Neither of them 
know exactly how old she was (cf Chapter 5, Section 5.4.4). But 
supposing it was three years ago, 31 would be-right rather than the 
nearest RPN, 30. (Although years can be subdivided, we do not usually 
divide them when talking about people's ages, so the effect I describe 
below relevant to (53) and (54) is not present here. Of course we can 
imagine a situation where years would be seen as divisible, for 
example a discussion of children's ages for examinations. ) Notice now 
that one would tend as a hearer to understand a different (longer) 
interval in: 
(48b) Ok so you were about age 30 
than in (48) as it was actually said. (48) is a narrower 
approximation. This is shown also by considering the invented 
(50) It's going to cost about £25 to have the exhaust done 
(50') It's going to cost about £26 to have the exhaust done 
where in the same situation, the interval for "about £26" would appear 
to be understood as smaller than that for "about £25", an RPN. I am 
arguing that whether an approximation contains an RPN or not affects 
the length of interval understood. A different account, proposed by 
Sadock, is that the number of significant figures in the E-number 
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X 
alters the meaning, such that 
(18) [111 Odessa has a population of approximately one million 
(19) Odessa has a population of approximately 990,000 
are judged as designating a wider and a narrower interval, 
respectively. He further suggests that the relevant interval can be 
obtained by subtracting fifty percent from, and adding fifty percent 
to, the last significant figure (: 433). This would give an interval 
of half to one and a half million for (18) but only 945,000-1,035,000 
for (19). This appears to be quite a good explanation. The entry 
referring to Mount Everest in the Encyclopaedia Britannica says that 
it has a height of "29,028 feet". The presence here of five 
significant figures has the'function of telling the reader that this 
height is being given to the nearest foot. Compare the heights given 
in the accounts of particular ascents, for example: 
(51)+ Norton went on to 28,300 ft, a height unsurpassed until 1953 
(52)+ Finch and Bruce reached 27,300 ft 
which I think have the interpretation "approximations to the nearest 
hundred feet". 
However, Sadock's account will not deal with (50) vs (50'). 
Neither will it explain an effect which I think is present in (48) - 
(49). In each of these, hearers receive, I think, 'a strong impression 
that the figures given are the exact figures involved to the best 
knowledge of the speaker or writer. The tendency is to suspend the 
conventional approximation reading, and understand rather a self- 
defence ploy : "this is the figure, but just in case it is slightly 
different, I'm using an approximation, so that I'm not wrong". I 
discuss. this effect further in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.5. The point 
here is, why does the effect arise in these examples, but not 
apparently with RPNs? I suggest that hearers have a very strong 
94 
Chapter 3 
predisposition to expect RPNs to follow approximators. When they do 
, not 
find them, they judge that there is a special reason for it, and 
read off particular implicatures (ie, there is a violation of the 
Maxim of Quantity). If it was not the case that RPNs have special 
status and that approximations usually use RPNs, this effect could not 
be accounted for. 
There is another effect which arises from using anon-RPN. This 
is described in Wachtel (1980: 204). Compare 
(53) Sam has $10,000 in his savings account 
(54) Sam has $ 9873 in his savings account 
of which Wachtel says: "10,000 is a round number and 9,873 is not, if 
we are measuring Sam's wealth to the nearest thousand dollars, but 
9,873 is a round number if we are measuring his wealth to the nearest 
dollar, his account may actually contain exactly $ 9,872.91. " 
[It must be remembered that for Wachtel "round number" - appropriate 
exemplar number, in my terms; it has nothing to do with RPNs]. Now, 
what triggers the reading of 9873 as expressing a measure to the 
nearest dollar, is that it is a non-RPN. This reading of a non-RPN is 
different from the "self defence" one suggested for the earlier 
examples. I think this one arises in this case because dollars are 
perceived as things which can be subdivided into smaller conceptual 
units (=cents). If a non-RPN is used of something which cannot be so 
subdivided (eg people, as above) the self-defence reading is favoured. 
Wachtel's paper takes no account of these differences (cf Channell, 
1980, for discussion in the same vein). 
3.7 Implicatures and Entailments of approxitnator +n structures 
In considering several different approximators, we have seen that the 
effect of using an approximator is to designate an interval of 
iý - 
I 
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numbers, any of which could be the exact number in question. In his 
1980 paper, Tom Wachtel makes some interesting observations about the 
likely implicatures arising. from, and also the entailments of, 
sentences containing approximators. 
Firstly, a sentence containing an approximator has the 
im-plicature (Gazdar's term for a potential implicature not 
necessarily realised in any given case; Gazdar, 1979: 55), that the 
exemplar number is not the number in question. For example, the 
assertion of example (41), repeated below: 
(41) [questionnaire on student housing] 
+The response was again poor - only fifty replies from the 
1,500 or so questionnaires which were 
distributed [written SO 4.12.81] 
implicates that not exactly 1,500 questionnaires were distributed. 
Furthermore, as Wachtel notes, this im-plicature can be explicitly 
cancelled (Grace 1975), or reinforced (Sadock 1978), cf 
(55) 1,500 or so questionnaires were distributed - in fact 
exactly 1,500 
(56) 1,500 or so questionnaires were distributed, but not exactly 
1,500 
(cf Wachtel's examples, 203-204) 
Another im-plicature is "speaker does not know how many questionnaires 
were distributed", and this can also be cancelled by (55) or (56). ' 
Secondly, an exact sentence always entails its equivalent with an 
approximator; that is 
(57) Exactly 1,500 questionnaires were distributed 
entails 
(58) 1,500 or so questionnaires were distributed 
A third point, not noted by Wachtel, but which follows quite naturally 
from this entailment, is that an approximation like (41) cannot ever 
A 
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be used to assert (57). An approximation of this type can never, 
whatever the context, be interpreted as asserting that exactly and 
only its exemplar number is the quantity in question (although a 
hearer may infer this, as we saw above in relation to approximations 
with non-RPN numbers). 
Notice that this is not the same thing as saying that the fact 
reported in (57) is not compatible with (41). Precisely as we have 
seen, from the test results and other evidence, the quantity 1,500 is 
among those for which (41) would be Appropriately used. 
3.8 A Note on Partial Specifiers 
Not less than is one of a set of expressions which specify upper or 
lower limits (Wachtel's term is PARTIAL SPECIFIERS) for quantities on 
the number continuum. Others are at least, at most, less than, (not) 
more than, under, over. These contrast with the approximators under 
investigation here in that they do not apparently involve the cut-off 
point problem which is the focus of interest of the expressions 
discussed so far. As noted by Wachtel (1981: 320), in terms of 
truth-conditional semantics, 
(59) She was wearing a dress costing not less that £500 
[test item 11] 
"is not false even if the dress cost £900 or £3,500". 
I had included two examples with not less than in my test to 
provide a deliberate contrast to the other test items. I thought that 
people would treat these expressions differently. Contrary to my 
expectations, however, many subjects indicated that not less than 
expressions designate intervals which extend below their exemplar 
numbers, 27 and 24 percent respectively for the two items tested. 
i 
i 
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Furthermore, contra the contention that there is no upper cut-off 
point for these expressions, subjects gave consistent upper limits. 
The size of the interval designated by not less than appeared to 
be the same as that for about. For example "about £500" produced a 
mean interval length of 51.92, and "not less than £500", a mean 
interval length of 54.62. The important difference is that for not 
less than the mode in each case is higher than the exemplar number 
rather than the same. That the majority of subjects place their 
interval for not less than above the exemplar number is shown by the 
resulting positively skewed histograms (see Table 3.6), which can be 
revealingly compared with the symmetrical ones for about/(a)round 
(Table 3.3). 
Apart from having failed to show a result contrastive with that 
for the approximators, the effect noted raises a distinct question 
mark over the suggested analysis of these partial specifiers, ie that 
they have a specified limit in one direction and none in the other. 
Could it be that these should be dealt with in the manner of the other 
approximators? While partial specifiers (if such they are) have not 
been singled out for close attention herein, a short digression on the 
above question is justified, inasmuch as the relevant arguments are 
closely related to (or the same as) those pertaining to the 
established set of approximators. In addition, an answer to the 
explicit criticism'of my approach made by Wachtel (1981) is required. 
So there are two problems: (1) subjects judged that the intervals 
could run below the point marked by not less than, and (2) subjects 
judged that there was an upper limit. I shall first consider these 
separately. 
j' t 
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One possibility is that the test result is spurious. Wachtel 
(1981: 320) suggests this, claiming that subjects were misled into 
judgment (1) by the use (in both items) of natural round numbers, 
which are habitually used alone to imply symmetrical approximation (cf 
discussion in Wachtel, 1980, Channell, 1980, and 3.6 above). 
Furthermore, the experimental set across items could have led them to 
erroneously judge these two items as more like the others than they 
really are in non-test uses. Wachtel takes this result as evidence 
that one should not rely on the results of elicitation tests to give 
indications about semantics. 
Let us now consider a non-test use of not less than n. 
Unfortunately this was not collected verbatim, and so is to a certain 
extent reconstructed. I telephoned the garage to book my car in for a 
rear brake overhaul. To help myself come to terms with the eventual 
bill, I asked for a verbal estimate of the likely cost and was told 
"not less than £60, more if we find anything else wrong". Now, 
suppose that when I collected the car, I was told that the cylinder 
seals had not needed replacing, so the bill was only £58.50. I think 
I would be unlikely to challenge the garageman with the falsity of his 
estimate for the job. That is to say, I would be making exactly the 
same kind of judgment as we have seen applying to classical 
approximations - not less than £60 would not normally be considered 
false, say, for amounts between £57 and £60. cf the formulation of 
Wachtel (1980: 204): "(14) would not normally be considered false, or 
even misleading, if the actual population of Odessa is, say, 
1,002,493". 
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Another example shows that the point "specified" by the partial 
specifier does not have to be exact. In this case, the point is made 
vague by an approximator. If the point mentioned by a partial 
specifier was perceived as a fixed limit, (60) would be some sort of 
contradiction, or at least should sound odd: 
(60) +She's not old enough, rubbish. Well she's only about 45 
at the very most [Camb 1B267/p3] 
If these examples are typical of the use of partial specifiers, 
then the result obtained in the test may be seen as a true reflection 
of the meaning attaching to them. 
It appears therefore that in this respect the evidence which will 
constrain our treatment of the meaning of not less than n is exactly 
the same as that which will constrain our treatment of the 
approximators. Note also that the same sort of pragmatic factors as 
have been mentioned previously also influence these meanings. Not 
less than n will receive a very different reading depending on whether 
it is being used in an engineering shop, or to talk about dress 
prices. 
. 
The second point was that subjects judged upper limits to apply, 
in direct contradiction to the usual view that no limit is involved in 
these cases. As pointed out by Wachtel, what happens is that hearers 
draw on such information as the purpose of the utterance, and 
assumptions about the speaker's knowledge, to determine the extent of 
the interval of possible numbers in a given situation. Examples show 
these factors at work. 
(61) [Customer telephoning builder] 
+B: Could you give me some idea of how long it would take? 
C: Well the quote might be done within three or four days 
but the job won't be done for at least five weeks [Carob 
111B1058] 
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I think it is likely that the customer in this example would decide 
that a false or very misleading estimate had been given if no work had 
been done after twelve weeks. One normally reads at least five weeks 
as "in an interval including five, but more likely over than under". 
Here, the situation appears entirely parallel to that for the 
approximators, and just the same kind of pragmatic information is 
involved in deciding where the upper limit comes. 
My conclusion (contra that reached by Wachtel; 1981: 320) is that 
partial specifiers are actually used to approximate in very much the 
same way as the approximators so far discussed. 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented a considerable quantity of different 
data concerned with number approximations of the approximator +n 
type. I have been especially concerned with describing the meanings 
which hearers attribute to these expressions when they are used. 
Before turning to look at data concerned with another set of 
vague expressions, I summarise below the Propositions about Speech 
Behaviour relevant to the meaning of number approximations, which a 
theoretical analysis must account for. 
1 There is a set of expressions whose effect is to bring a vague 
reading (= an approximation) to an utterance containing a number 
2 The resulting approximations are understood as designating 
continuous intervals of numbers 
3 Different approximators change the interval designated. Given an 
Exemplar-number x, (and setting aside the effect of other factors such 
as situation, and the form and nature of the E-number), the effect of 
the different approximators (as observed from the test results) can be 
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seen schematically as follows: 
about/(a)round 
n or so 
norm 
---------------- 
= minimum 
-------= maximum 
X 
7.62 [--7-- 
---------- 32.30 
15.46 
------- ------ -------56.69 
22.86 
ý--- - -- -- ------------ 66.60 
Figure 4 
4 Although there is a high degree of agreement among speakers that 
numbers near the exemplar number are members of the interval, there is 
variation about the extent of the interval in any given case 
5 The size and form_of the exemplar number both affect the length of 
the interval 
6 Whether the E-number is a round number (- Reference Point Number) 
or not affects the length of the interval ("about 31" vs "about 30") 
7 The nature of the item being approximated (discrete vs 
non-discrete, man vs cockroach) affects the interval 
8 The conversational setting in which an approximation occurs affects 
how it is understood 
9 Sentences containing approximators characteristically have the 
entailments and implicatures described in 3.7. 
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Table 3.1 
List of items used in number approximations elicitation test 
1 "After the girl had rung up everything I'd bought, I suddenly 
realised I only had about £2.00 on me" 
2 "You'll need about 4lbs of oranges" 
3 "We should be there around 6" 
4 "He's producing about ten pages a week and they're all 
getting published" 
5 "There were about 15 people there" 
6 "... it's something around the 20 percent mark and it's 
never changed" 
7 "We sent out two hundred questionnaires and had about 40 
replies" 
8 "It's going to cost about £500 to fly there and back" 
9 "I want to spend about £14,000" 
10 "In a country with a population of around ten million, like 
Belgium, proportional representation makes much more sense" 
11 "She was wearing a dress costing not less than £150" 
12 "The repair bill certainly won't be less than £500" 
13 "It was a good evening, we must have drunk a bottle or so 
of wine each" 
14 "How much flour shall I put? " "Two spoonfuls or so" 
15 "Six or so books will be enough for a week's reading" 
16 "There are ten pounds or so of butter in the freezer" 
17 "Ten or so litres of wine should be enough for the party" 
18 "They hired the de Grey rooms and invited 200 or so people 
to a champagne lunch" 
19 "It's okay, I've got £500 or so in my account at the moment" 
20 "It'll cost two thousand or so pounds to do this place up 
reasonably" 
21. "There are 3000 or so students at York" 
22 "The Tower of London gets 30,000 or visitors a year" 
23 "You'll need three or four metres of rope" 
24 "Yes, but it's still around that four or five region" 
25 "It takes six or seven hours to drive from Paris to the 
Midi" 
26 "The garden extends eight or nine feet beyond the true 
boundary of the property" 
27 "Eight or ten students were waiting in the entrance" 
28 "How many people will turn up for the meeting? " 
"We usually get fifteen or twenty" 
29 "They had seventy or eighty people with broken bones over 
just one weekend" 
30 "He's bought a stereo costing three or four hundred pounds" 
31 "Two or three thousand people turned up to hear him speak" 
32 "A burst water main in the Hull Road flooded neighbouring streets 
with two or three thousand gallons of water" 
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Table 3.3 
Frequency Distribution of Informant Responses-for ABOUT/AROUND Approximations 
Note: 
The score at the mode is often 25/26 informants. This is almost 
always due to the divergent performance of just one informant who 
consistently gave a low interval relative to each exemplar, or 
no interval at all (cf note to item 19). He apparently had his own 
theory of approximations which he was putting into practice. In 
discussion after the test he said that he thought approximations 
were always used for exaggeration. A second factor which could 
account for his different responses is that all the informants 
except him were in the age range 18-25, while his age was more 
like 50. 
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Tables 
Table 3.4 
Special results for n or m approximations 
subjects % subjects 
Item specifying specifying % subjects % subjects 
no. interval cont. int. bounded specifying specifying 
both e-numbers by e-numbers nos below nos above 
23 57.7 76.9 
24 100.00 57.6 
25 69.4 88.5 
26 88.5 73.1 
27 96.2 77.0 
28 92.3 77.0 
29 80.8 88.5 
30 69.2 61.5 
31 69.2 76.9 
32 73.1 76.9 
30.8 
50.00 
42.3 
46.2 
61.5 
65.0 
57.7 
30.8 
41.1 
57.7 
73.1 
46.1 
80.8 
65.4 
57.7 
69.2 
65.4 
53.8 
65.4 
57.7 
Mean over 79.6% 75.4% 48.8% 63.5% 
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Chapter 4' 
Vague Category Identifiers 
The second type of vague expressions which I have chosen to examine in 
detail 23, exemplified in the following: 
(1) +There was no kind of social contact - there was no 
coffee room or anything (11/21.2) 
(2) +But what about things like when you read sentences or something 
and then you're asked to reproduce them or something (1/13.2) 
(3) +You can remember four lots of four fairly easily say in the form 
of dates or something, 1972 or something like that (1/13.2) 
(4) +Lady Arran, who pays for her hobby by 'selling off silver and 
things' set a world record at Windemere last October (DS/1T 
(5) +1 hope we didn't have lots of horrible conversations when you 
went out of the room in tutorials and things like that 
(11/14.3) 
The structures in the underlined parts of these examples will be 
referred to, following Dines (1980), as TAGS, because they can be 
"tagged onto" the end of otherwise more precise statements. They are 
in the category of vague additives, similar in effect to the number 
approximators just looked at. The structures which I shall consider 
here are the following: 
or something or anything 
or something like that or anything like that 
and that 
and things 
and things like that 
What are these tags, and how are they used? 
In this Chapter, I look in detail at their distribution and 
structure (4.4 and 4.5), I again draw on the results of an informant 
test designed to investigate their meaning (4.2 and 4.3 ). Intonation 
is important here in showing how much of the preceding string the Tag 
I 
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is operating on, and this is described in 4.6. In Section 4.7 I 
describe some co-occurrence restrictions which I have observed. 
Finally, as for the number approximations, I summarise (in 4.8) the 
propositions relevant to their meaning which a theory of vagueness 
must account for. 
One suggestion for the function of these tags is that they are 
purely performance 'fillers', introduced to give both speaker, and 
hearer, additional time for processing. While this may be the case 
for some occurrences, it is obviously not always so, since removing 
them makes a difference in meaning : 
(6) You can remember four lots of four fairly easily say 
in the form of dates , 1972 
This sentence has lost something which (3) had, and needs additional 
paraphrase to recover it, cf 
(7) ... say in the form of dates, like 1972 
More convincing than juggling around with examples is the following 
extract which neatly shows that or something is far from empty: 
(8) [Context: A is going to the shops. B asks A to buy him 
some bread. Just as she leaves] 
A: So you'd like some bread? 
B: Or something. Anything edible will do. (DS/8/11.9) 
If or something were a filler, B would hardly use it to modify what A 
had said. He is giving additional information. He then clarifies 
with "anything edible will do" which I take to be a gloss for bread or 
something. Further evidence that these tags are not empty is 
presented in Dines (1980) who cites an investigation by Brotherton 
(1976) in which "the majority of her lay judges classified all the 
terminal tags as qualifying elements". Dines says "This data suggests 
that terminal tags out of context are not considered redundant by 
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middle-class speakers but are salient as elements which qualify the 
content of the utterance" (: 19). 
What then do these tags mean? My intuitive analysis, which was 
the same as the suggestion made independently by Dines (1980) was. that 
these tags "cue the listener to interpret the preceding element as an 
illustrative example of some more general case" (: 22). That is to 
say, the preceding element, which I shall call an exemplar, directs 
the hearer to access a set, of which the exemplar is a member whose 
characteristics will enable the hearer to identify a set. We may note 
in support of this that speaker B in example (8) goes on to gloss 
"bread or something" as "anything edible", which suggests that "bread 
or something" is to be understood in this context as referring to the 
set of edible things. Thus an exemplar + tag construction fuctions as 
a (vague) CATEGORY IDENTIFIER, and this is how I shall now refer to 
them. 
Duncan and Fiske (1977) classify or something as a "sociocentric 
sequence", in which category they also include but uh and you know. 
They cite Bernstein (1962) as the source of this attribution, but 
although Bernstein does use the term in his paper, it is nowhere 
defined, nor are examples of what it covers given. Duncan and Fiske 
say that these are "stereotyped expressions" (: 185) which "when used, 
[. . .) typically follow a more substantive statement" (: 171). I am 
worried by the glibness of these assignments of value (what counts as 
"stereotyped" in language? Do they mean 'idiomatic', or 'frequent'? 
What would a substantive statement be? ). If by substantive statement, 
they mean 'some language string which does not have explicit 
vagueness', then it is certainly true for the vague Category 
Identifiers. Their exemplars are not vague. But Duncan and Fiske 
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should I think have looked further at the meanings of the various 
expressions they consigned to the category "sociocentric sequence". 
As far as or something goes, this will now be done, and it will become 
apparent that it is rather different from but uh and you know. 
4.2 The Elicitation Test 
4.2.1 Objectives 
The test had two main objectives: 
1. To find out what the Tags mean, and possibly, to confirm 
the hypothesis outlined above 
2. to get some indication of the effect of different exemplars 
preceding the Tag 
4.2.2 Method 
A paper and pencil test was used to present 31 examples of, tags (one 
item contained two different ones). These consisted of 15 attested 
examples, and 15 constructed examples using items from Rosch's (1975a) 
work on prototypicality within categories. The reasons for 
constructing examples from Rosch's data will be explained below in the 
general discussion of the results. A pilot study was first carried 
out using four items, in order to see whether subjects could perform 
the test, and as a result of this, certain modifications were made, 
for example, providing longer extracts in some cases. Table 4.1 gives 
the complete list of test items with their reference numbers, showing 
in each case the parts of the item that were underlined. The test 
contained three attested examples of structures which were not 
eventually selected for detailed analysis herein: no. 5 or anything 
else, and nos. 10 and 14, or whatever. They are however of interest, 
in that they appear to be interpreted similarly to the tags under 
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investigation. 
The subjects first read the following instructions: 
This is a very simple experiment to investigate the meanings 
of utterances which occur in ordinary speech. For 
convenience they are presented in written form, but you 
should try to think of them as spoken. 
Now read what you have to do. DO NOT START UNTIL I TELL YOU 
TO. 
On each page in the answer books is one example of a spoken 
utterance. In each case, please list at least two items 
which the speaker could reasonably have been thinking of when 
he/she said the underlined part of the sentence. Imagine you 
are trying to understand the speaker. 
When I say 'turn to the next page', read the sentence and 
write your answer as fast as you can until I tell you to turn 
to the next page again. 
Now we're going to do a trial answer, Please do not turn, to 
the next page until I tell you. 
The subjects did not see any example answers, and so were free to 
interpret the test as they chose. I was anxious to avoid any 
suggestion as to the kind of responses I expected. The test items 
were presented in reverse order to half of the subjects in each group, 
to compensate for any practice or fatigue effect across items. 
Subjects had a timed 60 seconds for each answer, and they had a 
resting time between each answer book of 10 answers. 
4.2.3 Subjects 
Subjects were drawn from three groups: 
1. first-year language students at University of York 18 
2. arts students at the College of Ripon and York, St John 6. 
3. sixth-formers (age range 16-18) at Nunthorpe Grammar School, York 
and their teacher (age 53) 30 
Since, for timetable reasons, it wasn't possible to test the Nunthorpe 
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subjects on the complete 30 items, they were tested on alternate 
halves of the test, and their results matched in pairs to give the 
equivalent of 15 subjects, and thus, a total of 39 subjects' answers 
was analysed. 
4.2.4 General Approach to the Data 
The following terminology will be adopted: 'answer' will refer to the 
whole of what any subject wrote in response to any test item; 
'response' will refer to discrete parts of a subject's answer. 
were two distinct types of response: 
1 single-word-responses (for example "classes", "lessons") 
There 
L pnrases 'a pnrase was taxen to De any part or a subject s answer 
where two or more contiguous words could be syntactically related; for 
example "formal teaching methods", "anything formal obviously 
teacher/pupil") 
Analysis of the content of these two types of response brought 
further coding problems. Broadly there were three types of content 
found in both the two categories: 
Type 1: the further example type, that is, naming items 
belonging to the same category as the exemplar 
Type 2: the category identifying type, that is, describing or 
identifying categories which could reasonably be held to 
include the exemplar, either by a gloss, or a category name 
Type 3: the non-compliant type (in the sense of Greenbaum and 
Quirk, 1970) where subjects did other things than what they 
were asked, such as describing the situation where somebody 
would say the stimulus, or describing the speaker's attitude 
These three types of responses, and the problems inherent in 
categorising them, may be exemplified by examining the responses to 
one particular stimulus in some detail. 
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Item 18 
Stimulus: A: But when you were an undergraduate, didn't you ever 
feel you were being taught by people who weren't 
actually that good? 
B: No it didn't seem -I mean, well - we had a very 
funny undergraduate - there were no lectures 
or anything like that, it was all sort of 
seminars. (1/21.2) 
Total of responses: 84 
Type 1 46.4 percent 
Type 2 45.2 
Type 3 8.3 
Rank Order of Type 1 responses 
classes 6 
lessons 6 
films 3 
tutorials 3 
discussions 3 
talks 2 
conferences 2 
assessment 
debates 
dictations 
essays 
examinations 
exhibitions 
grading 
groups 
marks 
putting in order, ranking 
practicals 
teachers 
teach-ins 
Type 2 Responses 
formal classes 2 
formal talks 2 
formal teaching sessions 2 
anything formal obviously teacher-pupil 
anything that there should have been 
any kind of tuition where you can take notes and are talked 
to entirely by a professor 
big groups 
big lessons 
discussions apart from seminar 
formal conventional methods 
formal dictation 
formal lessons 
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formal situations professor makes a speech 
formal teaching methods 
hard work 
informative talks 
instruction 
large formal teaching groups 
large groups, in lessons 
lessons where no participation expected 
little teacher participation 
nothing easy to cope with 
one-many talks 
professors teaching in (illegible) intimidating 
proper teaching 
serious classes 
set curriculum 
set talks 
talks apart from seminars 
talks compulsory attendance 
talks to lots of people 
teaching 
teaching without feedback 
traditional teaching 
usual expected methods 
Type 3 (other) Responses 
at-all hardly, means nothing, redundant, to speak ofj no 
formal lectures, no teaching as such 
Firstly, we may agree that the type 1 responses clearly share some 
aspects of meaning. Yet linguistic theory at the present time 
lacks 
any tried and tested, and more important, any non-intuitive method of 
classifying their differences and similarities. Pre-establishing such 
a method would surely fall outside the scope of the present 'study, 
whose objective is to describe an aspect of vague language use, "rather 
than to do lexical semantics. So a 'working solution' must be sought. 
A useful way of discussing the type 1 responses is in terms of the 
concept of 'gamelike similarity' invented by Wittgenstein. He gives 
the example of games which all belong'in some sense to a category. 
Yet we should be hard put to it to actually state what similarity it 
is that they all share. Perhaps there is none, yet they share a 
'category' by virtue of each having something in common with some of 
the other members. Rosch and Mervis's (1975) study of 
'family 
110 
Chapter 4 
resemblances' demonstrated experimentally that subjects could work 
with this kind of similarity. I suggest that the type 1 responses for 
each question in this test should be analysed as having gamelike 
similarity to each other. Clearly, though, decisions about gamelike 
similarity will largely be intuitive ones. There is however, other 
evidence available which suggests that the type 1 responses fall into 
coherent categories, and this is described in 4.3.1. 
Secondly, for type 2 responses, which give what I have suggested 
are category identifying glosses, or superordinate terms, the only way 
to use these is to subjectively interpret them. We may agree that 
s03 Lessons where no participation expected 
s04 Any kind of tuition where you can take notes and are 
talked to entirely by a professor 
s16 formal situations: professor makes a speech, no 
interraction between students and teachers 
for example, are all describing very much the same thing, but it would 
quite difficult to say exactly how, since they are in general not 
using the same words. A possible way to achieve greater objectivity 
in interpretation of the type 2 responses might be a rank order 
frequency count of different words used in the responses. From this 
we could learn that here, for example, 'formal' was used 5 times, and 
'talk' 4. Yet I do not believe that this would be a helpful or 
revealing piece of data, because such an analysis would lack all the 
semantic import deriving from precisely the combination of lexical 
items in the phrase responses. Accordingly, analysis was performed as 
follows: the total number of responses for each item was counted. 
Where the same word appeared in the singular and the plural these were 
totalled. Three separate counts were made of type 1,2 and 3 
responses and these are given in Tables 4.4,4.5 and 4.6. Then, 
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percentages of each type of response were calculated for each item and 
these appear in Table 4.2. Assigning responses to type 1 or type 2 
was in some cases contentious, and readers may choose to disagree with 
my decisions for certain responses. Alterations to the categorisation 
of the few contentious responses would not however alter the general 
effects which I describe for the test results. 
Null Answers 
A null answer was scored for any item where a subject wrote nothing, 
or wrote something illegible. 39 subjects responded to 31 stimuli, 
giving a total of 1209 possible answers. Out of these, there were 58 
null answers - 4.83 percent of the total. 
Null answers followed a pattern, with certain items attracting 
significantly more than others. The test items ranked in order of 
numbers of null answers appear in Table 4.3. No Rosch-type item 
scored more than 2 null answers (out of a possible total of 39) and 
most scored none. The three items attracting a lot of null answers 
were 28,10, and 19. In addition these items received in total very 
many fewer responses (46,56 and 71, respectively) as against, say, 
191 responses for item 16 and 200 for item 27. (note also that item 
10 contained or whatever, and so might be expected to be different. ) 
When questioned afterwards, many subjects said that they just did not 
understand what was being talked about in these three items. It is 
fairly obvious that some specialised knowledge would be required. 
This probably demonstrates a disadvantage of using real examples in a 
test - they can be rather complicated, and almost definitely more 
complicated than invented ones. Thus in this case they detracted from 
the test results by confusing the subjects. 
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The second point is that null answers were not distributed evenly 
across subjects. They were much more frequent among the sixth-former 
subjects -a mean of 3 per 'subject' as against only 0.5 per subject 
for the other two groups. This should probably be attributed to two 
factors. Firstly, the sixth form pupils would have less experience 
and less world knowledge, which might have led to comprehension 
difficulties, especially on the three items mentioned above. Item 28 
demonstrates especially well the comprehension failure resulting from 
lack of necessary world knowledge. Supervisors do not form part of 
school life, so the school subjects did not, presumably, know about 
them. Thus 12 out of 15 gave a null answer. Lack of knowledge might 
in turn have given them less confidence, and a fear of giving the 
wrong answers (even though I had specifically told them that there 
were no right answers). Secondly the school subjects may have been 
less motivated to fulfil the task well. The other two groups were 
volunteers, whereas the Nunthorpe boys had been volunteered by their 
teacher. 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
The results show clearly that in the majority of cases subjects judged 
that the tag was an instruction to think of a category consisting of 
items similar in meaning to the exemplar. We remember that subjects 
had no example to suggest a particular answering strategy, yet between 
X 87 and 100 per cent of their responses on every item either named 
category members, or gave category identifying glosses or category 
names. 
4.3.1 "Rosch" type test items 
These used as exemplars items taken from Rosch's (1975 work on 
category membership and prototypicality. I used these in order to 
have an independently established measure of category membership with 
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which to compare my results. Rosch used constructed lists of category 
members. In her work, categories were initially adopted if at least 
five items from them appeared in the Kucera and Francis (1967) 
Frequency List with a frequency of 10 or greater. All the categories 
she used were also in Battig and Montague's (1969) tabulation of 
production frequencies for responses to a particular category name. 
Each of Rosch's categories had 50 or 60 items in it, and her subjects 
were asked to judge each item for how good an example of the category 
it was. Drawing on her results, I'used some items having a high 
degree of prototypicality and others have_a low degree, in order to 
see the effect of the difference. We shall now examine the type 1 
responses to these "Rosch" test stimuli in some detail. 
Rosch's category lists are compared with my subjects' type 1 
responses, by obtaining the intersection-union ratio of the two sets. 
Thus, for item 1 union yields 43 items of which 15 intersected. This 
gives a percentage overlap of 34.9 percent. The results of doing this 
for each 'Rosch' test item are presented in Table 4.4. In making the 
comparison I have felt justified in omitting from Rosch's lists those 
items which (a) do not exist in Britain, or (b) have different names 
here, since my subjects could not be expected to mention them. Where 
translation equivalence exists (eg ' US slingshot - Br catapult) I 
treated the equivalents as naming the same item. 
The Rosch-type test items fall into two categories. Firstly 
those with a high percentage overlap with the original Rosch category 
(upwards of 34 percent), that is, items 1,3,6,14,16,22,27, and 
30. In every case the exemplar for these was one having a high degree 
of prototypicality for its category. Secondly, those having a 
markedly low percentage overlap (below 13.4 percent), that is, items 
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4,9,17,20 and 24. In every case (with the exception of item 24, 
discussed below) the exemplars for these were items having a low 
degree of prototypicality for the category involved. Of the two 
remaining items, 11, with a percentage overlap of 27.6, was a bad 
example, and 25, with 28.2, was a good example. 
These results show quite clearly I think, that successful 
category identification using a tag-necessitates giving a prototypical 
example of the intended category. Giving a 'bad example' as an 
exemplar results in hearers identifying a category which has little 
correspondence with the intended category, as, shown by the low 
percentage overlap items listed above. 
The idea that hearers take the exemplar as a good example is 
additionally supported by the results for some of the 'bad examples'. 
I suggest that where a Rosch 'worst example' may be the worst example 
for the category she (and her subjects) had in mind, it is, as well, a 
best example for another category. Taking item 4, necklace was judged 
by Rosch's subjects as the worst example of the category CLOTHING. 
The category members given by my subjects in response to this seem 
fairly obviously to belong to the category JEWELLERY, of which 
presumably necklace and bracelet are good examples. That is, they 
took it to be a good example. This is shown also by item 17 where a 
poor example of the intended category WEAPON was taken by subjects as 
a good example of the category TOOL (cf their type 2 responses in 
Table 4.5). 
A general question arising from these results is whether we 
should consider the tag as an instruction to access a semantic 
category, or to access a non linguistic associational or perceptual 
category. By 'semantic' I mean one whose members are related by 
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entailment: "I bought apples" --> "I bought fruit" and "I bought 
oranges" --> "I bought fruit". It is of course often the case that 
semantic and associational categories can coincide, as with the 
category FRUIT, but by no mean always, since things whose names are 
not at all semantically close, may be strongly associationally 
related. 
Initially, the results for the 'best examples' items which we 
have just looked at, suggest that semantic categories are involved. 
But the results for other items suggest rather the opposite, that in 
fact it is rather pragmatically established associational categories 
that are involved. For example, responses to item 9 showed subjects 
focussing on culturally defined categories: 
s05 "vegetarian context" rice beans dried-vegetables 
"chinese context" rice chicken green vegetables sweet and sour 
"greek context" stuffed pepper pilaf 
s16 chinese food exotic vegetables (superordinate term) farinaceous 
food potatoes polenta pasta 
a27 Eastern foods curry chinese take-away food 
The responses occurring more than twice in the rank order of responses 
of both types are mostly not semantically relatable to rice, the 
exemplar, but associationally, in terms of what people know about food 
in the world, they clearly are. 
curry(ies) 
vegetables 
pasta 
bread 
chinese food 
corn 
macaroni 
maize 
potatoes 
bamboo shoots 
beans 
carbohydrates 
12 
7 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
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fish 
foreign food 
health foods 
Indian food 
oats 
rice 
spaghetti 
spices 
tapioca 
water 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Again for item 24, most subjects appeared to put car in the 
associational category "possessions of affluent persons", rather than 
in the semantic category "vehicles". Hence the low percentage overlap 
recorded. Their most frequent type 1 responses were: 
caravan 10 
washing-machine 8 
tv 7 
colour tv 6 
motor bike 6 
boat 5 
dishwasher 5 
house 5 
trailer 5 
freezer 4 
big house 3 
nice house 3 
record player 3 
scooter 3 
bicycle 2 
bike 2 
f ridge 2 
mortgage 2 
stereo 2 
Subject 11's response is especially telling: 
washing machine, dishwasher, 3-bedroomed semidetached, 2 children, 
dog, cat, mortgage, steady income 
Their type 2 responses also show the same idea, for example: 
s02 expensive things 
s24 everything you could wish for 
b31 any material goods of a middle class nature 
(these are given in full in Table 4.5) 
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Contextualisation 
Another effect which is important is the effect on the responses of 
the contexts which subjects attributed to the different items. This 
is especially clear where a word occurred in two different test items. 
For example, car appeared as an exemplar in both 16 and 24. From the 
type 1 responses listed in Table 4.4 we can see that subjects 
interpreted the two items very differently, because of the context 
imposed by the surrounding language. In one case(16), they judged car 
to be an exemplar of the set of wheeled vehicles which go on roads, 
and in the other (24), as a member of the set of desirable material 
goods. 
4.3.2 Attested Test Items 
The Rosch-type test items were included in the test, as I said, to 
provide an independent measure of categorial similarity. We have seen 
that where the exemplar was prototypical of the intended category, 
there was a very marked similarity between Rosch's ranked category, 
and the rank order frequency count of my subjects' responses. This 
was taken to demonstrate that what subjects did for those items was to 
access a category consisting of items they judged to be similar to the 
exemplar given, and a category for which the exemplar was 
prototypical. 
When it comes to interpreting the results for the attested items, 
no independent evidence fox the categories is available. It seems 
more than reasonable, however to assume that what the subjects did for 
the attested items was the same as what they did for the Rosch items, 
and that therefore they again provided answers which either gave 
category members, or category names. 
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It is, -, of course, only possible to evaluate these data 
subjectively, but it is the case for each attested item that the 
responses-show quite convincingly a majority of these two types of 
response. The full rank order frequency count of responses for these 
15 items is given in Table 4.6. In' addition, the answers to 
individual items show particular factors at work, as follows: 
Item 2: "One of the secretaries was saying there was a film 
or something. ' (B: -really? ) Last Thursday we were all down in 
2017 and the lecture was actually in Vanbrugh so I went to 
the secretary and, said where is everyone, and she got out 
this book and said its in Vanbrugh but some weeks there's a 
film can you have films in linguistics? " 
The responses to-this item-demonstrate particularly well the influence 
of given linguistic context on subjects' interpretation of the 
exemplar +-tag. The seven most frequent responses, in rank order, 
were lecture, slides, talk, video, play, show, discussion. Now I do 
not think that out of context lecture would normally be considered to 
be most similar to film - T. V. and video are much closer. What 
brings lecture, talk and discussion into prominence is the context 
provided which suggests that academic teaching is what is being talked 
about. In this particular context, lecture, talk etc are likely 
members of the category understood. 
In the pilot study for this test, item 2 appeared with only the 
speaker's first remark (up to B's interjection), and subjects 
responded with slides and video. These pilot informants suggested 
longer extracts should be given, since they found the short ones 
difficult to interpret. 
Item 19: "I'm talking about acceptable middle class language and 
sort of working class language - the thing that Bernstein, 
you know, sort of - elaborated code and things like that" 
This shows I think how important it is in comprehension to understand 
the topic that is being spoken about. Many subjects commented 
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afterwards that this was among the items which were difficult 'to 
answer. This is reflected firstly in the high number of null answers 
(viz 7 out of 39). Secondly it is reflected in the low degree of 
sharedness of responses. Only 5 response tokens out of a total of 72 
were shared at all, and then only by a maximum of 3 subjects. 
The smaller quantity of responses, and greater frequency of null 
answers for the items where subjects, on their own admission, did not 
understand what was being talked about, shows, I would judge, the same 
effect as that demonstrated experimentally by Bransford and Johnson 
(1972). This work'showed that their subjects experienced considerable 
difficulty in assigning meaning to, and recalling, stimulus material 
which had been artificially contrived to omit suitable contextual 
cues. 
Item 23: "You can remember four lots of four fairly easily - say 
in the form of dates or something - 1972 or something like 
that" 
Because the exemplar consisted of a number, these answers show 
especially well the difference between type 1(further example) and 
type 2 (category identifier) responses. By subject, they were as 
follows: 
sOl ymca ucca 
s02 1974 1979 a recent date, a used date, a reoccurring date 
s03 [null] 
s04 some type of group of numbers/figures, various other dates 
s05 16 4x4x4x4 etc significant year names eg 2000 1984 1000 
s06 four-syllable words 
SO sequence, year 
s08 1970 1971 2000 4000 1000 6000 9000 7000 1001 
s09 other similar dates, other relevant dates 
s10 1843 1652 1004 5302 6392 
sll 1875 1066 
s12 1973 2001 8.8.60 any year 
s13 1066 and all that, 1945, numbers of relative importance for 
historic or personal reasons 
s14 phone numbers, mnemonics, paradigms 
s15 1968 1964 the olympics 
s16 don't know [null] 
s17 for example, that's a date isn't it? the full date I mean, 1948 
1976 etc 
s18 another year 
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s19 1810 2001 
s20 1843 1764 
s21 1971 1973 1974 
s22 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1800 1801 1802 1926 1923 
1921 1851 1854 1960 1901 1700 
s23 1066 1666 1665 1969 
s24 telephone numbers, birthdays 
b25 mnemonic, catchphrase, cliche 
b26 [null] 
b27 other easily remembered numbers 
b28 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 
b29 1976 1980 1984 1988 
b30 early 70s 62 72 82 years of the Olympic games, years of the 
European soccer championship 
b31 any other relative date, any other mnemonic 
b32 1968 
b33 [null] 
b34 [null]. 
b35 1976 
b36 Boycott's. run total for season 
b37 1973 1977 
b38 16 
b39 ABCD 
The type 2 responses show subjects imposing different 
recontextualisations as they try to identify likely categories. Many 
of them concentrate on the remembering aspect, eg subject 13,14,24, 
b27 and b31. Several subjects saw 1972 as an exemplar of a category 
consisting of years when particular events took place: s15 the 
Olympics, suggested again by s30, who also tried "years of the 
European Soccer Championship". Subject 6's response is unexpected, 
given that 1972 is not a four syllable word. I wonder whether subject 
b36 was being non-compliant, or whether he sees the world entirely in 
terms of cricket? 
Item 26: "Could we, when you give us our essays back, and give us 
titles, could we sort of meet or something because, I mean, 
there might be things we want to ask" 
This item shows the influence of the subjects' perception of purpose - 
in this case the purpose of the event proposed by the speaker. 
Equally ranked in first place were both get together, and discuss, 
with 11 occurrences each. There were many responses containing 
phrasal equivalents to discuss (see Table 4.6). Discuss is not 
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however semantically close to net and not always associationally 
close. One can discuss without meeting, and meet without discussing. 
Yet here the subjects judged that the purpose of the meeting, which 
they interpreted as. "to discuss", was highly salient. It is of course 
specified by the speaker: "there might be things we want to ask". 
To sum up, then, the answers given for the attested test stimuli 
show (a) subjects interpreting the tags as instructions to access 
categories, and (b) that the characteristics of the categories they 
fixed on are determined not only by the given exemplar, but also by 
linguistic context, situation and pragmatic knowledge. I asked some 
of the university test subjects what they thought the function of the 
exemplar word was. Two of them suggested: 
B: It's a member of the class of objects 
C: and it's got - it calls up associations with it... 
4.3.3 General Conclusions from the Results 
The observations above lead me to propose that the correct way to 
interpret these data is as follows. The exemplar + tag construction 
is understood as an instruction to access an associational category, 
whose characteristics are defined for the hearer by the exemplar 
provided, taken in conjunction with relevant pragmatic information. 
It is for this reason that I have called the exemplar + tag 
construction a (vague) CATEGORY IDENTIFIER. The associational 
category may be coterminous with a semantic set to which the 
exemplar-word belongs (if it is a word). This is expected, since 
words which are semantically related often refer to entities which are 
associationally related, at least in some contexts. It appears, as we 
have seen, to be the associational relationships which are most 
important in determining the categories hearers think of. 
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I think the categories hearers use are probably those identified 
. by Klatsky and Stoy (1978) as 'higher order categories'. In their 
experiments, they found that knowledge of category membership had an 
effect on- subjects' performance in a simple visual task of comparing 
pictures. Klatsky and Stoy state that their results indicate subjects 
using a higher order category (not necessarity a namable one) to 
compare instances. 
The general meaning effect described above is the one I shall 
work with in subsequent chapters. 
4.4 The Structure of the Tags 
These tags contain either and or or: 
or something/anything (like that) 
{things 
and {things like that 
{that 
The test results and data examples both indicate that there is no 
difference in the way that the tags containing like that and those 
without are. understood. It is reasonable to see the shorter tags as 
ellipted or shortened variations of the full ones. 
Secondly or something (like that) and or anything (like that) are 
found in complementary distribution as between assertive and 
non-assertive contexts, thus: 
(9) There was no coffee room or anything (11/21.2) 
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i (10) *There was no coffee room or something [11 
(11) One of the secretaries was saying there was a film or something 
(12) *One of the, secretaries was saying there was a film or anything 
In this they follow a rather general rule of special marking in non- 
assertive contexts, (cf Quirk et al, 1972, pp 376ff, for discussion). 
Thus there are really just three tags under consideration: 
or {something} like that 
{anything } 
and things (like that) 
and that 
The relationship between the meaning of the words which constitute the 
tags, and the meanings of the tags in use, is discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.5 Structure of Exemplar + Tag Constructions 
The exemplar always precedes the tag. In my data I have examples of 
the following syntactic types of exemplars, shown here with the tags 
they occurred with: 
NP: and things like that 
and things 
and that 
or something 
or something like that 
or anything like that 
VP: or something 
and things like that 
Adverbial phrase: or something 
or somewhere 
or something like that 
In each case, intonation makes it clear which constituent is being 
tagged, as I describe in Section 4.6. 
1 (10) is not asteriskable if the tag applies to the whole sentence, 
rather than just to coffee room 
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4.5.1 NP + Tag 
In the category NP + Tag, the three possibilities countable singular, 
countable plural,. and uncountable N all occur, thus: 
(13) [tutorial discussion] 
+I'm talking about acceptable middle class language and sort 
of working class language the thing that Bernstein you know 
sort-of elaborated code and things like that [II, 8/3) 
(14) [title of children's book] 
+All about cuckoos and robins and things 
(15) +Lady Arran, who pays for her hobby by 'selling off silver 
and things', set a world record of 96 mph at Windemere last 
October [DM, 17.5.80] 
But there are far more examples of countables. I cannot see any 
immediate reason for this. The examples I have with uncountables 
sound quite normal, and I would have expected as many of these as of 
countables. Possibly they do not occur because many uncountables are 
also abstract. An uncountable abstract exemplar is perhaps not felt 
to be able to exemplify a category. Made-up examples seem acceptable, 
though: 
(16) He's studying syntax for something 
{and things like that 
(17) I don't like Peregrine, I think its his 
bumptiousness {or something 
{*and things 
NPs with tags tend not to be subjects (I have no examples). Some 
made-up examples seem acceptable: 
(18) A pub or something in the next few miles would be most welcome 
In this case, however, the exemplar is grammatical subject, but 
semantic object (ie 'we' would welcome a pub). More importantly, it 
is the 'new' information in the utterance (as opposed to given). I 
suspect that tags on 'given' information are virtually ruled out by 
the fact that speakers cannot be uncertain about something which is 
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being considered as given in a conversation. Since grammatical 
subjects often embody the 'given' information in an utterance, tags 
are not found with them. 
4.5.2 VP + Tag, 
(19) +Could we, 'when you give us our essays back, and give us 
titles could we sort of meet or something ... 
(20) +"that most people" they're three words that fit together 
and could fit into the sentence and things like 
that [I, 13.2 
(21) [J. MacEnroe's father in TV interview] 
+He's a bit impish or scampish or something like that [DS/9] 
(21) looks as if the tag might be attached to the adjective, but it is 
not, since it is not possible to move in into attributive position: 
(21') *He's an impish or scampish or something tennis player 
There don't appear to be any restrictions structurally on what VPs can 
be tagged, although very long ones are avoided because they give rise 
to problems for the speaker when he tries to provide the appropriate 
intonation (see 4.6 below, test item 21). 
4.5.3 Adverbial + Tag 
My examples are adverbial strings: 
(22) [magazine] 
+It comes out every four months or something like 
that [DS/7] 
(23) [eye pain] 
+I happen to have that when my - when I menstruate or just 
before my period or something [Cicourel, 1974] 
4.6 Intonation and Vague Tagging 
As noted in the previous section, these tags may be adjoined to an NP 
or to a VP. In the case that a VP has the structure 
[V NP] 
VP 
there may be a structural ambiguity as to whether the tag applies to 
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the NP, or to the whole VP. The recorded examples show that this 
ambiguity is not present in speech because it is avoided by use of 
intonation... 
The material to which the tag applies (ie, the exemplar), and the 
tag, always appear in the same tone group (except obviously where the 
tag has been added by another speaker). Usually the tone group 
beginning shows where the material to which the tag applies begins. 
The nucleus is carried by the principal item of the material to which 
the tag applies, and the tag appears as a tail. This tail has either 
a level intonation or in some cases a slight rise. A straightforward 
example is: 
You can remember four lots o four fairly easily i'""' in the form 
I IN Ii 
of 
Idates 
or something nineteen seventy two or something like thatll 
where or something tags dates, with the nucleus, a fall, on dates 
and or something with a level pitch. Nineteen seventy two or 
something like that shows the other pattern observed, with a very 
slight rise on something. The usual pattern ism "'"'"'/ , with a 
fall on the tagged material paired with a rise on the tag. 
In the case of a VP the same thing occurs: 
e\1 
and then youre asked to sort of reproduce them or something 
and[2] 
with the nucleus -a fall - on reproduce and a level pitch on the tag. 
2 apostrophes have been omitted in this section, in order not to 
interfere with the transcription of intonation 
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A structurally ambiguous case is: 
(24) What about things like when you read sentences or something 
where the tag could apply to the full NP things...., or to the VP 
read..., or to sentences. In speech, however, it is clear that the VP 
read sentences is being tagged. 
But what about things like when yourewhen you 
I 
read sentences or 
0I a\ 
something 
II 
and 
Ithen, 
youre asked to sort of reproduce them or 
u 
something) and you reproduce them in the way that it struck you 
most 
Another structurally ambiguous example (from the same speaker, but on 
a different occasion), is: 
It was really difficult (. ) because theyd read these words in a 
book or somethinglf and theyd 
)come 
to me and say what does this 
mean 
where the tag applies to the whole VP read.... 
Speakers may use other very clearly observable prosodic features 
to delimit the exemplar + tag structure. For example in: 
I had to give them all these different sort of meanings) like 
i 
(. )I sentences wi with it in and things like that and it was 
1% 
1 low 
really difficult for them to grasp itl) 
to mark the beginning, there is a tone group boundary after meanings, 
then a very discernible pause after like, and a clearly stressed onset 
on the first syllable of sentences. To mark the end, as well as the 
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tone group boundary, there is also a marked drop to low pitch, plus 
acceleration on and it was. It is apparent that speakers go to quite 
some lengths, prosodically, to ensure that the reading NP + tag, in 
the situation. like this where the NP is in a VP, cannot be 
misunderstood as a VP + tag reading, seen so clearly in the previous 
two examples. , 
This example is additionally interesting because it appears to 
show the speaker getting into slight difficulties, due I think to the 
NP sentences with it in being a bit long or "heavy" and thus making 
its tag (with its rise) rather uncomfortably far away from the nuclear 
fall which'it pairs with. Having placed a fall in the expected 
position on sentences, the repetition wi with shows something going 
wrong. The repair seems to be to'copy the fall on sentences exactly 
onto in and then bring the tag in normally with a rise on things. 
Given this differentiation by intonation alone, when these 
structures are written, ambiguity can arise. As we might expect, this 
showed up in some of the responses to the test stimuli, which were 
presented in written form. This occurred with Test item 21: 
+I hope we didn't have lots of horrible conversations when 
you went out of the room in the tutorials and things like 
that 
[II, 8.3] 
In written form, the tag could apply either to tutorials, or to the 
adverbial phrase when you went out of the room or to the VP part of 
it, or even the NP the room or to horrible conversations. Test 
answers among the 39 subjects divided as follows: 
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conversations 
went out of the room 
tutorials 
other (null, deviant etc) 
12 
3 
21 
4 
40* 
*because one subject spotted the ambiguity and gave two sorts 
of content answers 
Although tutorials was favoured, there are enough answers choosing the 
other options to show that the ambiguity is present. The fact that 
the test stimuli were presented written is thus an advantage and a 
disadvantage. The division of answers into broadly two content types 
is useful evidence for the structual ambiguity I am claiming. 
Secondly (by their absence in the test), it is shown that phonological 
features muse be responsible for clarifying the ambiguity. The 
disadvantage is, of course, to withold from the test subjects an 
important piece of information which they would have had as hearers. 
The prosodies for this example actually were: 
Ilhope we didnt have lots of horrible conversations when you went 
\a1 
out of the room in the t torials and things like that 
This shows again the problem of interposed material. In the tutorials 
is prosodically subordinated, so as not to interfere with the 
fall-rise pattern on room and things. This rules out tutorials as the 
exemplar for the tag. 
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Something noticeable about this utterance is that the whole thing 
is one quite unusually long tone group. Given the syntactic 
arrangement, this is actually non-optional, if 'the speaker wanted to 
link the tag to the whole VP 
[have lots of horrible conversations when you went out of the room] 
VP 
A boundary after conversations would have tagged only the adverbial 
phrase. I'd argue that the former account is the correct 
intdpretätion of the prosodic evidence on two grounds. Firstly, 
situational factors; given the context, there is not any set of events 
that could reasonably be intended by the exemplar when you went out of 
the room. The tutor is either in, or out, and that's it. Secondly, 
the way this utterance is understood by subsequent speakers. They 
focus on thinking of whether or not A did actually leave the room 
during any of the tutorials or not, and she states that she did not. 
Thus when you went out of the room is seen by them not as vague, but 
as precise. 
Among the test subjects, the favoured exemplar was tutorials. It 
might be thought that this was purely because of its contiguity to. the 
tag. However another test item, 13, shows that contiguity cannot be 
the only factor in play. 
Test Item 13 
+But lots of big sort of important numbers that you have to 
remember and things, I'm sure they're made into a pattern 
that you can remember them by... 
In this case, the relative clause on numbers creates several possible 
scopes for the tag, as follows: 
NP + tag: [big sort of important numbers and things] 
NP [that you have to remember] 
S 
VP + tag: [have to [remember] and things] 
VP S 
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VP + tag: [remember and things] 
VP 
The spoken example had the the following intonation: 
\ ýButl 
lots of big sort of (. ) important numbers 
11 
thatI that you have 
IN I 
to ring and things and they Im sure theyre made into a kind of 
patter 
11 
that you can remember them byfl [3] 
The tag thus applies unambiguously to ring. 
Without knowing the prosody, the 39 subjects again divided 
between the different possiblities, as follows: 
numbers 26 
have to remember 1 
remember (_ "ring") 9 
null 4 
The favoured interpretation is numbers, a long way back from the tag, 
thus suggesting that contiguity is not guiding the subjects' 
interpretation. Probably the informational importance of numbers as 
the head of the relative clause, led them to focus on it. 
4.7 Co-occurrence restrictions 
Apart from the syntactic distributional constraints described in 4.5, 
there are also co-occurrence constraints related to meaning. The 
constraints I have observed are however explained quite naturally by 
the meaning specification for tags which has been provided in 4.3. 
Here are two instances reported to me as violations of proper 
vague tagging[4]: 
3 Reexamination of this example showed that it had originally been 
transcribed wrong, with remember for ring. But this fact does not 
alter the import of the test result. 
ol 11 s, \ 
132 
Chapter 4 
(25) [Context: a baby has just been born, someone is asked what sex 
it is] 
+It's a , boy or a girl or something 
(26) [Context: Chairman of a Linguistics Department is looking for 
part-time tutorial staff; what will they have to teach? ) 
+Syntax and phonology and things like that 
The explanation-for these strange sounding combinations lies in what 
has been observed of the way people understand exemplar + tag 
constructions. We have seen that they are understood as designating 
an, associational category whose characteristics are defined in part by 
the situation involved. The exemplar(s)(a) are taken as good 
example(s) of the set, and (b) must be capable of being members of 
some reasonable set. Example (25) names both members of the set of 
possible human offspring, so there are no other members which the or 
something can be standing for. Therefore it sounds wrong. 
The second example is a bit more complicated. It is not so much 
a violation of vagueness tagging, as a failure to give expected 
information. I take syntax and phonology and things like that to be a 
direction to the set whose cover-term is Linguistics. Given that here 
we have two 'linguistics Professors in conversation, the questioner 
knows that teaching linguistics is involved, he wanted to know, as he 
reported, which branches of linguistics were required. He gave the 
reply the reading I've suggested, and thus found it less than 
informative. If we assume the speaker intended to be informative, 
another permissable reading of (26) is "the core areas of linguistics" 
(as opposed to sociolinguistics, stylistics, textlinguistics etc). ' 
4I am grateful to Patrick Griffiths and Bob Le Page respectively for 
these examples. 
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Here then we see two pragmatically determined conditions on 
successful vague tagging: 
1 There must be other members of the set which the tag can 
stand for 
2 The hearer must make the relevant category boundaries at 
least similarly to the speaker 
1 is a powerful influence on interpretation of these structures, such 
that if an exemplar which is a member of a category of only 1 is used, 
the interpretation preferred will be that the reference is to a larger 
category of which the exemplar is also a "good example" member. 
Imagine, for example: 
(27) She wants to become Prime Minister or something 
There is away in which prime minister belongs to a category with only 
one member: the category of current Prime Ministers of the U. K. If 
one is trying to refer to that particular category, (27) will not be 
acceptable. The interpretation given to (27) is rather that it refers 
to a category such as "important people in Government", or "the 
Cabinet". 
A different type of constraint is on which kinds of exemplars can 
be, used. The following sound odd, although I would not want to 
suggest that there might not be contexts in which they would be 
suitable. - 
(28) It was a freestone peach or something 
(29) It was a metallic finish 1975 Renault 5TL or something 
Regrettably I have no examples of violations of this type, and so was 
forced to invent. If (28) is intended to designate members of the 
category of fruits (apple, orange etc), or (29) the category of small, 
fuel economic cars, then it is apparent that too much information is 
being given. These are simple violations of the conversational rule 
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w 
described by Grice as the Maxim of Quantity. This indicates that one 
rule relevant to category reference by tags is that only sufficient 
. 
information to identify the exemplar as a member of the category need 
be given. The over-specifications in (28) and (29) leave the hearer I 
think searching for a smaller, more specific category, of which the 
exemplar could be a good example. 
At the other end of the scale, supero inates do not make good 
exemplars either, so: 
(30) ? *She went by plane or something 
is odd. The only category which plane can plausibly be an exemplar 
for is METHOD OF TRANSPORT. Since a hearer knows from she went, that 
transport is involved, plane or something fails to be informative, 
again violating the Maxim of Quantity. Contrast: 
(31) She went by 747 or something 
which acceptably suggests, perhaps, the set of large modern planes[5]. 
The constraints on what can be suitably tagged, then, interact 
with the principles of categorization outlined in the work of Rosch 
(see Rosch 1978: 28-49). Rosch observed that given the existence of 
taxonomic relationships of the type: 
superordinate basic level subordinate 
furniture chair kitchen chair 
the basic level is the one usually used in referring to objects which 
could be included in the taxonomy, instead of either the subordinate, 
or the superordinate. It looks as though the basic level is most 
likely also to be used with tags. 
51 am indebted to Michael Lumsden for this point 
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Of course, Rosch was only working on taxonomies of concrete 
objects. We do not yet know whether the principles of categorisation 
she proposed are applicable to terms designating non-concrete things. 
A study carried out by Pulman (1983) indicated that subjects could 
judge prototypicality within given sets of verbs, but it is not known 
whether a 'basic level' can be identified for referring to actions and 
abstracts. 
In support of her claim for the salience of the basic level in 
communication, Rosch cites what she claims are two different types of 
deviations from it. Firstly the experiments conducted by Bransford 
and Johnson (1972), referred to above, in which they omitted context 
cues. Rosch suggests that context cues are actually "basic level 
events". The effect of missing them out of a text is to impede or 
block comprehension. Secondly, "substitution of subordinate terms for 
basic-level object names in scripts gives the effect of satire or 
snobbery" (1978: 45). She quotes a book review: 
"And so, after putting away my 10-year old Royal 479 manual 
and lining up my Mongol number 3 pencils on my Goldsmiths 
Brothers Formica imitation-wood desk, I slide into my 
oversize squirrel-skin L. L. Bean slippers and shuffle off to 
the kitchen. There, holding Decades in my trembling hand, I 
drop it, plunk into my new Sears 20-gallon celadon-green 
Permanex trash-can. " 
in which the effects are, I would judge, similar to those in (28) and 
(29). 
As far as the tag constructions are concerned; the examples show, 
I would hold, that you can tag at any of Rosch's levels, but that the 
general rule is the one given with a picturesque analogy by Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (1976: 259): 
"treat your hearer like the tax-man, give him no more than 
you have to. " 
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4.8 Summary 
In this chapter I have described a second type of vagueness arising' 
from the use of vagueness-bringing additives. I have called this set 
of additives TAGS, and the resulting exemplar and tag combinations, 
(vague) CATEGORY IDENTIFIERS. We have seen that the tags are combined 
freely by speakers with a variety of grammatical categories. In 
particular we have looked at evidence of how hearers interpret these 
tags. The set of propositions relevant to their meaning, which the 
theory of vagueness must account for, includes the following: 
1 Vague tags are understood to designate categories, either 
conjunctively or disjunctively, consisting of either concrete 
("bread", "silver") or abstract ("meet", " elaborated code")entities. 
2 These categories are associationally rather than semantically 
defined 
3 Several factors establish for the hearer the characteristics 
determining membership of the category. They are (a) the exemplar, 
which is understood to be a "good example" of the intended category; 
(b) the surrounding linguistic context; (c) the purpose of the 
conversation; and (d) the hearer's world knowledge which he brings to 
bear as relevant to the linguistic context and conversational setting. 
4 There is some evidence to suggest that these expressions cause 
particular comprehension problems for hearers who lack specific world 
knowledge of the conversational topic. That is to say, more problems 
than non-vague expressions in the same situation. 
In the next chapter, I shall look at attested examples of these 
vague tags (with other examples of vagueness) in order to ascertain 
the conversational purposes which speakers use them to achieve. Then 
in Chapters 1 and 8I discuss theoretical considerations relevant to 
accounting for the observations in 1,2,3 and 4 above. 
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Table 4.1 
Stimulus Items used in Tag Informant Test, in Order A 
Notes: 
(a) half the subjects responded to these in reverse order (B) 
(b) 'R' denotes an invented 'Rosch' item 
1. "Could you get me some oranges or something at the market? "[R] 
2. A: One of the secretaries was saying there was a film or 
something. (B: really? ) Last thursday we were all down in Z017 
and the lecture was actually in Vanbrugh so I went to the 
secretary and said where is everyone, and she got out this book 
and said its in Vanbrugh but some weeks there's a film .. can you 
have films in linguistics? 
3. "I love peas and things like that"[R] 
4. "... and when you think of necklaces and things like that, the 
possibilities are endless"[R] 
5. "I think its just sort of learning ability that's sort of there, 
you've got sort of sponge waiting to soak things up and whether it 
be language or anything else -" 
6. "What about if you carry a gun or something like that"[R] 
7. "... and they're much easier to remember than say your friend's 
telephone number because they give you something like 23578 or 
something like that which is much easier to remember" 
8. "and I just could not translate it and I had to give them all 
these different sort of meanings like sentences with it it and 
things like that and it was really difficult for them to grasp it" 
9. "She said they eat rice and that, didn't she"[R] 
10. "Maybe its just because you're so its not exactly innate but 
its just because at the start you realise you're so dependent or 
whatever on ... I mean human babies particlarly are so dependent 
that they need communication so much that they have to somehow get 
it over to someone that what they want is what they need or 
whatever" 
11. "She said it was olives or something"[R] 
12. "Well she felt a bit out of it all ... you know she saw her 
supervisor during the week whenever it was and they had these sort 
of lectures and that, and that was it. There was no kind of 
social contact ... there was no coffee room or anything" 
13. "But lots of big sort of important numbers that you have to 
remember and things, I'm sure they're made into a pattern that you 
can remember them by... " 
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14. "okay so you take the trousers or whatever and you spray them with 
this spray... "[R] 
15. "But what about things like when you read sentences or something 
, and then you're asked to sort of reproduce them or something, you 
reproduce them in the way that it struck you most - its the 
meaning that's the most important in reproducing what's there" 
16. "I stopped my bike by the" verge, then a car or something came. 
along and splashed me all over with water"[R] 
17. "He used a screwdriver or something"[R] 
18. A: "but when you were an undergraduate, didn't you ever feel you 
were being taught by people who weren't actually that good? " 
B: "No, it didn't seem -I mean, well - we had a very funny 
undergraduate - there were no lectures or anything like that, it 
was all sort of seminars" 
19. "I'm talking about acceptable middle class language and sort of 
working class language - the thing that Bernstein, you know, sort 
of - elaborated code and things like that" 
20. "Have you got a wheelbarrow or anything like that which we could 
borrow? "[R] 
21. "I hope we didn't have lots of horrible conversations when you 
went out of the room in tutorials and things like that... " 
22. "She's mad, she has no money - but she bought some new trousers or 
something only yesterday... "[R] 
23. You can remember four lots of four fairly easily - say in the form 
of dates or something - 1972 or something like that" 
24. "They've got a car and that"[R] 
25. "You had to hand in guns and things like that"[R] 
26. "Could we, when you give us our essays back, and give us titles, 
could we sort of meet or something because, I mean, there might be 
things we want to ask" 
27. "... they don't need a dessert, they can eat oranges and things 
like that"[R] 
28. A: "What else do we want to talk about on friday? " 
B: "Well, wait a minute, what are we doing, we're having, second 
supervisors -" 
A: "- or something -" 
B: "subsidiary -" 
29. "When I was trying to teach them certain words it was really 
difficult because they'd read these words in a book or something 
and they'd come to me and say what does this mean" 
30. "They never give us peas or anything"[R] 
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Item 
no. 
Title 
Table 4.2 
Tag Informant Test: Summary of Results 
Total 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Responses 
(further (category (other) 
example) identifier) 
%%% 
or something/anything: 
1 oranges 165 77.0 21.8 
1.2 
2 film 86 86.0 9.3 4.7 
11 olives 106 79.2 17.9 2.8 
12b coffee room 75 64.0 30.7 
5.3 
15 read sentences 133 94.0 
3.0 3.0 
16 car 191 86.4 
7.9 5.8 
17 screwdriver 128 83.6 
11.7 4.7 
22 new trousers 189 81.5 
14.8 3.7 
26 meet 99 85.9 
8.1 6.1 
28 supervisors 46 60.9 26.1 
13.0 
29 book 129 96.1 3.9 0.0 
30 peas 161 82.0 17.4 0.6 
or something like that/anything like that: 
6 gun 153 75.2 20.3 4.6 
7 23578 119 61.4 37.8 0.8 
18 lectures 84 46.4 45.2 8.3 
20 wheelbarrow 110 85.5 11.8 2.7 
23 1972 109 71.6 24.8 3.7 
or anything else: 
5 language 127 85.0 13.4 1.6 
or whatever: 
10 need 56 50.0 35.7 14.3 
14 trousers 167 80.8 15.0 4.2 
and that: 
9 rice 123 50.4 45.5 7.4 
12a' lectures 76 80.3 17.1 2.6 
24 car 144 84.0 8.3 7.6 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.2 
and things like that: 
3 peas 164 73.8 25.6 0.6 
4 necklaces 166 80.7 19.3 0.0 
8 sentences 78 76.9 14.1 9.0 
19 elaborated code 71 57.7 33.8 8.5 
21 horrible conversations 92 84.8 7.6 7.6 
25 guns 176 73.9 24.4 1.7 
27 oranges 200 85.0 14.5 0.5 
and things: 
13 numbers 91 85.7 12.1 2.2 
Table 4.3 
Test Items arranged according to frequency of Null Responses 
Item Title No. of Total 
No. Nulls Responses 
28 supervisors 14 46 
10 need or whatv 10 56 
19 elaborated code 7 71 
12a lectures 5 76 
13 numbers you 4 91 
23 dates 4 109 
21 cony/tutorials 3 92 
2 film 2 86 
8 sentences 2 78 
9 rice R2 123 
11 olives R2 106 
14 trousers R2 167 
20 wheelbarrow R2 110 
24 car R2 144 
12b coffee-room 1 75 
15 read sentences 1 133 
1 oranges R. 0 165 
3 peas 'R0 164 
4 necklaces R0 166 
5 language 0 127 
6 gun R0 153 
7 23578 0 119 
16 car R0 191 
17 screwdriver R0 128 
18 lectures 0 84 
22 new trousers R0 189 
25 guns and things R0 176 
26 meet"or somethg 0 99 
27 oranges R0 200 
29 book or sth 0 129 
30 peas R0 161 
Table 4.4 
Rosch-type test items: 
Type 1 responses compared to Rosch's category ranking 
1 "Could you get me some oranges or something at the market? " 
Responses 
apples 27 
pears 18 
bananas 12 
grapes 8 
tangerines 8 
lemon(s) 7 
satsumas 6 
grapefruit(s) 6 
mandarins 5 
peaches 5 
plums 4 
cabbages 2 
carrots 2 
oranges 2 
potatoes 2 
(water)melon 2 
tomatoes 2 
pineapples 2 
clementines 
greengages 
lime 
mushrooms 
nuts 
quince 
Xmas trees 
Rosch's category ranking 
[orange] 
apple 
banana 
peach 
pear 
apricot 
tangerine 
plum 
grapes 
nectarine 
strawberry 
grapefruit 
cherry 
pineapple 
blackberry 
melon 
raspberry 
lemon 
lime 
fig 
mango 
pomegranate 
cranberry 
prunes 
gooseberry 
intersection: 15 Union: 43 
date 
raisin 
coconut 
avocado 
tomato 
nut 
olive 
pickle 
percentage overlap: 34.9 
3 "I love peas and things like that" 
Responses 
beans 24 
sprouts 20 
carrots 15 
cabbage 14 
cauliflower 7 
broccoli 5 
french beans 3 
greens 3 
green beans 3 
lettuce 3 
potatoes 3 
broad beans 2 
sweetcorn 2 
turnips 2 
beetroot 
celery 
f inocchio 
lentils 
meat 
mushy peas 
onions 
peppers 
pulses 
pumpkin 
runner beans 
silver beet 
spinach 
tomatoes 
zucchini 
Rosch 
[peal 
carrot 
green beans 
string beans 
spinach. 
broccoli 
asparagus 
corn 
cauliflower 
brussels sprouts 
lettuce 
celery 
cucumber 
beets 
greens 
tomato 
artichokes 
parsley 
mushroom 
avocado 
rhubarb 
kale 
pickles 
baked beans 
pumpkin 
seaweed 
garlic 
dandelion 
rice 
turnip 
eggplant (- aubergine) 
peppers 
radishes 
onions 
bean 
potato 
parsnip 
watercress 
leek 
sweet potato 
Intersection: 21 Union: 47 
percentage overlap: 44,. 7 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
4 "... and when you think of necklaces and things like that, the 
possibilities are endless" 
Responses 
bracelets 27' 
rings. 24 
earrings 16 
brooches 11 
pendants 10 
watches 6 
chains 5 
anklets 4 
beads 3 
pearls 3 
bangles 2 
charms 2 
perfumes 2 
tiaras 2 
trinkets 2 
beetlecrushers 
choker 
cufflinks 
diamonds 
diamond rings 
drainpipes 
hairslides 
hair decorations 
head bands 
home made pottery 
mugs 
Rosch 
pants (= trousers, Br. E) 
shirt 
dress 
skirt 
blouse 
suit 
slacks 
jacket 
coat 
sweater 
sweatshirt 
underpants 
sports jacket 
jumper 
panties 
socks 
parka 
pajamas 
undershirt (a vest) 
overcoat 
nightgown 
raincoat 
bathing suit 
bathrobe 
lockets slip 
papier mache bra 
f lowers 
pieces of string 
rosaries 
scarves 
Intersection: 7 Union: 76 
shoes 
stockings 
vest (- jacket) 
nylons 
cape 
boots 
sandals 
tie 
girdle 
belt 
scarf 
mittens 
slippers 
hat 
gloves 
apron 
earmuffs 
handkerchief 
purse (- handbag) 
hairband 
ring 
earrings 
watch 
cufflinks 
[necklace] 
bracelet 
cane 
percentage overlap: 9.2 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
6 "What about if you carry a gun or something like that? " 
Responses 
knife(s) 27 
pistol 10 
dagger 6 
sword 6 
revolver 5 
rifle 5 
axe 4 
club 4 
truncheon 4 
bow and arrow 3 
cosh 3 
spear 3 
chain 2 
crossbow 2 
dart 2 
razor 2 
addresses of terrorists 
aerosol 
baton 
bludgeon 
bottle 
brick 
catapult 
false passport 
hand grenade 
hat pin 
hatchet 
knuckleduster 
lead-filled cosh 
lead pipe 
light sabre 
mortar " 
phial of poison gas 
pickaxe handle 
poison 
rope 
sharp stick 
shield 
staff 
stake 
stick 
weight 
whip 
Intersection: 27 Union: 77 
Rosch 
[gun] 
pistol 
revolver 
machine gun 
rifle 
knife 
dagger 
shotgun 
sword 
bomb 
hand grenade 
A-bomb 
bayonet 
spear 
bazooka 
cannon 
ice pick 
hatchet 
slingshot (s catapult) 
fists 
axe 
bow 
razor 
razor blade 
rocket 
judo 
stick 
poison 
rock 
stone 
gas 
chain 
bow and arrow scissors 
club bricks 
lance pitchfork 
brass knuckles hammer 
bullet words 
mortar hand 
arrow pipe 
tank rope 
teargas 
missile 
whip 
airplane 
foot 
car 
screwdriver 
glass 
shoes 
percentage overlap: 35.1 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
9 "She said they eat rice and that, didn't she? " 
Responses 
curry(ies) 12 
bread 3 
corn 3 
macaroni 3 
maize 3 
potatoes 3 
bamboo shoots 2 
beans 2 
fish 2 
oats 2 
rice 2 
spaghetti 2 
tapioca 2 
water 2 
barley 
bran 
chicken 
chow mein 
dogs 
dried fish 
flies 
lentils 
mangoes 
meal 
pepper 
pilaf 
polenta 
semolina 
soya beans 
stuffed pepper 
sweet and sour 
sweet potatoes 
wheat 
Rosch 
pea 
carrot 
green beans 
string beans 
spinach 
broccoli 
asparagus 
corn 
cauliflower 
brussels sprouts 
lettuce 
celery 
cucumber 
beets 
greens 
tomato 
artichokes 
turnip 
eggplant (- aubergine) 
peppers 
radishes 
onions 
bean 
Intersection: 7 Union: 66 
potato 
parsnip 
watercress 
leek 
sweet potato 
parsley 
mushroom 
avocado 
rhubarb 
kale 
pickles 
baked beans 
pumpkin 
seaweed 
garlic 
dandelion 
[rice] 
percentage overlap: 10.6 
11 "She said it was olives or something" 
Responses 
cherries 7 
gherkins 7 
grapes 7 
figs. 6 
pickled onions 4 
plums 4 
anchovies 3 
dates 3 
garlic 3 
onions 3 
peppers 3 
chives 2 
pickle(s) 2 
prunes 2 
stuffed olives 2 
almonds 
aubergines 
biscuits 
broccoli 
brown olives 
carrots 
cashew nuts 
courgettes 
crisps 
cucumbers 
gherkin 
gooseberries 
green olives 
lemons 
nuts 
okra 
peanuts 
pickled cucumbers 
pimentoes 
pineapple 
pomegranates 
sheeps eyes 
stuffed baby egg plants 
sultanas 
tomatoes 
vol-au-vent 
Intersection: 16 Union: 58 
Rosch 
orange 
apple 
banana 
peach 
pear 
apricot 
tangerine 
plum 
grapes 
nectarine 
strawberry, 
grapefruit 
cherry 
pineapple 
blackberry 
melon 
raspberry 
lemon 
lime 
fig 
mango 
pomegranate 
cranberry 
prunes 
gooseberry 
date 
raisin 
coconut 
avocado 
tomato 
nut 
[olive] 
pickle 
percentage overlap: 27.6 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
14 "Okay so you take the trousers or whatever and you spray 
them with this spray" 
Responses 
shirt(s) 17 
coat(s) 13 
jacket(s) 13 
skirt(s) 13 
shorts 8 
jumper(s) 8 
jeans 5 
socks 5 
dress(es) 5 
blouse(s) 2 
boots 2 
hat 2 
pants 2 
pullover 2 
shoes 2 
suit 2 
underpants 2 
waistcoat 2 
vest(s) 2 
cagoule 
cloth bag 
cloth 
costume 
culottes 
drain-pipes 
dungarees 
gloves 
handbag 
mack 
material 
overalls 
rucksack 
sacks 
short trousers 
sleeping bag 
suede shoes 
swimming-trunks 
tent 
tie 
towel 
trousers 
trunks 
Rosch 
[pants (a trousers)] 
shirt 
'dress 
skirt 
blouse 
suit 
slacks 
jacket 
coat 
sweatshirt 
underpants 
sports jacket 
jumper 
panties 
socks 
parka 
pajamas 
undershirt (e vest) 
overcoat 
nightgown 
raincoat 
bathing suit 
bathrobe 
slip 
bra 
shoes 
stockings 
vest (- jacket, Br) 
nylons 
cape 
boots 
sandals 
tie 
girdle 
belt 
scarf 
mittens 
slippers 
hat 
gloves 
apron 
earmuffs 
Intersection: 26 Union: 66 
handkerchief 
purse (= handbag) 
hairband 
ring 
earrings 
watch 
cuff links 
necklace 
bracelet 
percentage overlap: 39.4 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
16 "... a car or something came by... " 
Responses 
lorry 
van 
bus 
motor-bike 
truck 
coach 
bicycle 
taxi 
wagon 
articulated lorry 
dustbin lorry 
31 
29 
23 
17 
9 
,7 5 
3 
3 
automobile 
station wagon 
truck (a lorry) 
[car] 
bus 
taxi 
jeep 
ambulance 
van 
2 Honda 
2 cable car 
juggernaut 2 train 
milk cart 2 trolley (car) 
moped 2 bicycle 
small van 2 carriage 
ambulance airplane 
armoured car bike 
bike with side-car attached boat 
boy jet 
car ship 
caravan scooter 
cattletruck tractor 
cement mixer 
donkey 
dormobile 
fire engine 
girl 
heavy goods vehicle 
horse 
invalid-car 
man 
motorcycle with sidecar 
police-van 
racing car 
small truck 
station wagon 
steam-roller 
three-wheel-car 
traction engine 
tractor 
woman 
Intersection: 24 Union: 61 
wagon 
Rosch 
trailer 
cart 
wheelchair 
yacht 
tank 
go-cart 
rowboat 
dogsled 
tricycle 
canoe 
raft 
submarine 
sled 
horse 
rocket 
skates 
camel 
feet 
skis 
skateboard 
wheelbarrow 
surfboard 
percentage overlap: 39.3 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
"17 "He used a screwdriver or something" 
Responses 
spanner 12 
knife 11 
hammer 10 
chisel 9 
nailfile 9 
wrench 4 
bradawl 3 
pliers 3 
hairclip. 3 
crowbar 3 
drill 2 
file 2 
pen 2 
pencil 2 
penknife' 2 
rod 2 
stick 2 
allen key 
awl 
crow bar 
edge of a coin 
finger 
gimlet 
high-power drill 
iron rod 
jack 
knife blade 
lever 
mallet 
metal rod 
nail 
penknife blade 
ratchet 
scissors 
screwdriver 
screwed 
sixpence 
small file 
strong finger nail 
toe tap 
turned 
twig 
vice 
Rosch 
gun 
pistol 
revolver 
rifle 
knife 
dagger 
shotgun 
sword 
bomb 
hand grenade 
A-bomb 
bayonet 
spear 
bazooka 
cannon 
bow and arrow 
club 
lance 
brass knuckles 
bullet 
mortar 
arrow 
tank 
teargas 
missile 
whip 
ice pick 
hatchet 
slingshot (- catapult 
fists 
axe 
bow 
razor 
razor blade 
rocket 
judo 
stick 
poison 
rock 
stone 
Intersection: 7 Union: 90- 
gas 
chain 
scissors 
bricks 
pitchfork 
hammer 
words 
hand 
pipe 
rope 
airplane 
foot 
car 
[screwdriver] 
glass 
shoes 
percentage overlap: 7.8 
20 "Have you got a wheelbarrow or anything like that which 
we could borrow? " 
Responses 
cart " 14 
trolley 13 
trailer 7 
bucket 5 
pram 3 
spade 3 
t ruck 3 
old pram 2 
rake 2 
sack 2 
shovel(s) 2 
van 2 
box(es) 2 
articulated lorry 
barrel 
barrow 
basket 
bogey 
box cart 
box on wheels 
carrier 
carrier-bag 
car, boot of which can be used 
dumper 
fork 
hand-truck 
hand cart 
hand trailer 
hob 
hod 
hoe 
large box 
lawn mower 
little truck 
push chair 
scythe 
shopping jeep 
shopping trolley 
skip if it is big rubbish 
sled 
tractor 
tractorlette with wagon 
transporter 
tray for carrying rubbish 
trowel 
wheelbarrow 
wheels on a base 
Rosch 
automobile 
station wagon 
truck 
car 
bus 
taxi 
jeep 
ambulance 
motorcycle 
van 
Honda 
cable car 
train 
trolley (car) 
bicycle 
carriage 
airplane 
bike 
boat 
jet 
ship 
scooter 
tractor 
wagon 
trailer 
cart 
wheelchair 
yacht 
tank 
go-cart 
rowboat 
dogsled 
tricycle 
canoe 
raft 
submarine 
sled 
horse 
rocket 
skates 
camel 
feet 
skis 
skateboard 
[wheelbarrow] 
surfboard 
Intersection: 11 Union: 82 
percentage overlap: 13.4 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
22 "... some new trousers or something... " 
Responses 
skirt(s) 20 
dress 15 
shoes 12 
coat 11 
blouse(s) 11 
jumper(s) 11 
jeans 9 
shirt 9 
jacket 6 
hat 4 
socks 4 
boots 3 
dungarees- 3 
slacks' 3 
tights 3 
bra 2 
cardigan 2 
culottes 2 
new shoes 2 
stockings 2 
vest 2 
corset 
handbag 
jersey 
jump suit 
new blouse 
new dress 
pants 
record 
scarf 
shorts 
ski outfit 
suit 
suspenders 
suspender belt 
tee-shirts 
tie 
track suit 
trouser suit 
Rosch 
[pants (- trousers)] 
shirt 
dress 
skirt 
blouse 
suit 
slacks 
jacket 
coat 
sweater 
sweatshirt 
underpants 
sports jacket 
jumper 
panties 
socks 
parka 
pajamas 
undershirt (" vest) 
overcoat 
nightgown 
raincoat 
bathing suit 
bathrobe 
slip 
bra 
shoes 
stockings 
vest (= jacket) 
nylons 
cape 
boots 
sandals 
tie 
girdle 
belt 
scarf 
mittens 
slippers 
Intersection: 25 Union: 65 
hat 
gloves 
apron 
earmuffs 
handkerchief 
purse (- handbag) 
hairband 
ring 
earrings 
watch 
cuff links 
necklace 
bracelet 
cane 
percentage overlap: 38.5 
Table 4.4 1 
24 "They've got a car and that" 
Responses 
caravan 10 
washing-machine 8 
tv 7 
colour tv 6 
motor-bike 6 
boat 5 
dishwasher 5 
house 5 
trailer 5 
freezer (deep-freeze) 4 
nice house 4 
big house 3 
record player 3 
scooter 3 
bicycle 2 
bike 2 
f ridge 2 
mortgage 2 
stereo 2 
annual holidays 
automatic washer 
bus 
canoe 
carpets 
car accessories 
cassette player 
cat 
decent looking garden 
dog 
expensive , 
house 
fitted carpets 
garage 
good job 
holiday bungalow 
income 
money 
moped 
two children 
music centre 
outboard motor 
posh car 
pots of money 
private house 
roof rack 
servants 
steady income 
swimming-pool 
telephone 
tent 
three bedrooms 
transport 
two toilets 
vacuum 
washing up machine 
water skis 
3- bedroomed semidetached 
Rosch 
automobile 
station wagon 
truck 
[car] 
bus 
taxi 
jeep 
ambulance 
motorcycle 
van 
Honda 
cable car 
train 
trolley (car) 
bicycle 
carriage 
airplane 
bike 
boat 
jet 
ship 
scooter 
tractor 
wagon 
trailer 
cart 
wheelchair 
yacht 
tank 
go-cart 
rowboat 
dogsled 
tricycle 
canoe 
raft 
submarine 
sled 
horse 
rocket 
skates 
camel 
. feet 
skis 
skateboard 
wheelbarrow 
surfboard 
Intersection: 9 Union: 93 
percentage overlap: 9.7 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
25 "... guns and things like that" 
Responses 
knives' 27 
pistols 10 
rifles 9 
ammunition 5 
chains 5 
hand grenades 5 
bullets 
.4 
revolvers 4 
swords 4 
clubs 3 
coshes 3 
daggers 3 
grenades 3 
bombs 2 
bottles 2 
cameras" 2 
bows and arrows 2 
gun powder 2 
tanks 2 
pen knives, 2 
airguns 
atom-bombs 
big sharpened sticks 
bomb-making equipment 
Boyes anti-tank rifles 
cans 
cassettes 
contraband 
cut throat razors 
dangerous drugs 
explosives 
flamethrowers 
gelignite 
hatchets 
inflammable liquids 
keys 
knitting needles 
knuckle dusters 
mortars 
nuclear weapons 
razors 
razor blades 
rockets 
sawn-off shotguns 
sharpened scythes 
shells 
stakes 
sticks 
taperecorders 
tapes 
truncheons 
[gun] 
pistol 
revolver 
machine 
rifle 
knife 
dagger 
shotgun 
sword 
bomb 
gun 
hand grenade 
A-bomb 
bayonet 
spear 
bazooka 
cannon 
bow and 
club 
lance 
arrow 
Rosch 
brass knuckles 
bullet 
mortar 
arrow 
tank 
teargas 
missile 
whip 
ice pick 
hatchet 
slingshot 
fists 
axe 
bow 
razor 
razor blade 
rocket 
judo 
stick 
poison 
rock 
stone 
gas 
chain 
scissors 
bricks 
pitchfork 
hammer 
words 
hand 
pipe 
Intersection: 24 Union: 85 
catapult) 
rope 
airplane 
foot 
car 
screwdriver 
glass 
shoes 
percentage overlap: 28.2 
27 "oranges and things like that" 
Responses 
apples 31 
bananas 23 
pears 23 
grapes 17 
peaches 11 
tangerines 6 
plums 6 
cheese and biscuits 5 
melons 5 
apricots 4 
pineapples 4 
satsumas 4 
cheese 3 
lemons 3 
mandarins 3 
. nuts 
3 
pomegranates 3 
sweets 3 
biscuits 2 
grapefruit 2 
cake(s) .2 
avocado pear 
citrus fruits 
damsons 
dates 
fresh fruit salad 
mars bars 
strawberries 
Intersection: 17 Union: 43 
Rosch 
[orange] 
apple 
banana 
peach 
pear 
apricot 
tangerine 
plum 
grapes 
, nectarine 
strawberry 
grapefruit 
cherry 
pineapple 
blackberry 
melon 
raspberry 
lemon 
lime 
fig 
mango 
cranberry 
prunes 
gooseberry 
date 
raisin 
coconut 
avocado 
tomato 
nut 
olive 
pickle 
percentage overlap: 39.5 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 
30 "They never give us peas or anything" 
Responses 
beans 21 
carrots 21 
cabbage 19 
sprouts 14 
cauliflower 8 
potatoes 8 
broccoli 6 
greens 3 
spinach 3 
turnip(s) 3 
green beans 2 
tomatoes 2 
asparagus 
aubergine 
baked beans 
beetroot 
beets 
bread 
broad beans 
corn 
cucumber 
finocchio 
jam tarts 
kale 
lentils 
marrow 
onions 
paprika 
peppers 
runner beans 
silver beet 
swede 
sweetcorn 
water 
Intersection: 24 Union: 49 
Rosch 
[peal 
carrot 
green beans 
string beans 
spinach 
broccoli 
asparagus 
corn 
cauliflower 
baked beans 
pumpkin 
seaweed 
garlic 
dandelion 
rice 
brussels sprouts 
lettuce 
celery 
cucumber 
beets 
greens 
tomato 
artichokes 
turnip 
eggplant (- aubergine) 
peppers 
radishes 
onions 
bean 
potato 
parsnip 
watercress 
leek 
sweet potato 
parsley 
mushroom 
avocado 
rhubarb 
kale 
pickles 
percentage overlap: 49.0 
Chapter 4 
Tables 
Table 4.5 
Roach-type test items: 
Type 2 (Category Identifying) Responses in Rank Order 
1 "Could you get me some oranges or something at the market? " 
fruit 5 
any fruit 4 
food 3 
another type of fruit 
anything juicy 
anything round 
any other fruit 
a food containing vitamin C 
citrus fruits 
food of some kind 
fresh fruit 
fruit containing vitamin C 
grub 
oranges if you can anything if not 
oranges or some other fruit 
or something to have for a certain meal 
similar fruit 
something else to eat 
something for colds 
something for dessert 
something similar 
some fruit similar to oranges 
some other thing which will give pleasure 
some other types of fruit 
some other type of fruit 
some table fruit 
vegetables 
Chapter 4 
Tables 
3 "I love peas and things. like that" 
No. of subjects 
vegetables 9 
green vegetables 3 
small vegetables 2 
and all vegetables 
and other green foods 
and other green vegetables 
and other round vegetables 
any green vegetable 
any vegetable (s) 3 
brightly coloured food 
dishes made from, or with peas 
fresh goods in general 
green cooked vegetables 
green vegetables in general, excluding that is turnips 
most vegetables 
natural goods 
non-tastable foods 
other vegetables 2 
other vegetables like peas, beans etc 
pulses 
small foods 
small round objects 
small spherical objects 
some vegetables 
sweet things 
tasty things 
things coming in pods 
vegetables like that 
Note: number of mentions of word "vegetable(s)" 28 
4 "... necklaces and things like that... " 
jewelry 13 
other jewelry 2 
any jewelry 
baubles 
body adornments 
decoration 
even items other than jewelry 
expensive 
hand-made decorations 
jewelry in general 
necklaces and other expensive items 
neckwear 
only necklaces 
other jewels 
precious objects 
similar jewelry 
valuables 
valuable items 
valuable objects 
Chapter 4 
Tables 
6 "What about if you carry a gun or something like that? " 
I 
" No. of Subjects 
weapon 12 
firearm 3 
another weapon 2 
dangerous weapon 2 
another firearm 
another metal object 
any implement which could be put to violent (illegible) 
any weapon 
dangerous implement 
defence 
something else dangerous 
something else illegal 
something heavy and or lethal 
something-metal 
something to frighten assailants 
sup term: deadly weapon 
9 "She said they eat rice and that, didn't she? " 
vegetables 6 
pasta 4 
chinese food 3 
carbohydrates 2 
foreign food 2 
health foods 2 
Indian food 2 
spices 2 
and all the other things that group is known to eat 
= dal, chapattis etc 
carbohydrates common to those people being spoken about 
cereal 
cereals 
Chinese take-way food 
dried vegetables 
Eastern foods 
exotic vegetables 
foodstuff 
food grown in the area 
green vegetables starchy stuff 
little meat third world diet 
other carbohydrates vegetables only 
other Chinese food vegetarian food 
other dry crops grown sup term: farinaceous food 
other things like rice 
polysaccarides 
poorer grain 
pulses 
rice dishes 
roots 
simple food 
small hard starchy food 
some vegetables 
spaghetti, pasta. generally 
spicy foods 
staples like rice 
starch 
Chapter 4 
Tables 
11 "She said it was olives or something" 
No. of subjects 
something similar 2 
some other food 2 
drink situation goodies 
foreign fruit 
fruit 
hors d'oeuvre 
other sharp fruit 
small savoury objects: vegetables 
something edible 
something equally exotic, strange, rare etc 
something irrelevant 
something like olives 
something salty 
some other food similar to olives 
some type of exotic foodstuff 
spices 
uncommon fruit with strange taste 
14 "Okay so you take the trousers or whatever and you spray them 
with this spray" 
clothes 3 
clothing 3 
garment(s) 3 
anything you want waterproofing 
any material 
any similar clothing to trousers 
any soiled (emph) garment 
article needing to be ironed 
article of clothing 
article of outside clothing 
material 
other clothes 
other clothing 
underwear 
whatever else you fancy spraying 
whatever modesty forbids my particularizing 
whatever they're wearing 
whatever you're using the material from 
(gloss) other garment 
16 "... a car or something came by... " 
vehicle 
some other vehicle 
another vehicle 
any other road-using motorised vehicle 
any relatively fast vehicle 
motor vehicle 
not bus not motor-bike, wants to indicate nots 
something moving fast and close to me 
some moving object 
6 
2 
Chapter 4 
Tables 
17 "He used a screwdriver or something" 
No. of subjects 
tool 
another tool 
implement 
instrument 
other tool same shape 
something long and thin 
something of the same shaped end as a screwdriver ie could 
turn screws equally well 
something that undoes screws similar job as screwdriver 
some kind of tool 
some long thin object 
5 
20 "Have you got a wheelbarrow or anything like that which we could 
borrow? " 
anything which I could move something in like the loan of you car 
or perhaps yourself 
any garden equipment (eg for an exhibition) 
a large 'container' 
a large container which has wheels and can be pushed or drawn 
small garden vehicle with room to put things 
something for transporting things 
something I can carry things in 
something mobile 
something that can carry heavy bricks 
something to carry things in 
something very large 
something with wheels 
useful receptacle 
22 "some new trousers or something... " 
clothes 
clothing 
anything new 
anything not necessarily clothing 
any small article which costs money 
article of clothing 
clothing that she didn't really need 
expensive items of clothing 
extravagant impractical garment 
fashionable garment 
'has to include trouser element' 
items of clothing of any size 
luxuries 
Piece of clothing 
other article of clothing 
other items of clothing as well 
other purchases 
something expensive 
something new 
some article of clothing 
some new clothes 
some weird stype of trousers 
things from shop 
5 
2 
Chapter 4 
Tables 
24 "They've got a car and that" 
No. of subjects 
other luxuries 
any material goods of a middle-class nature 
children at good schools 
double garage and semi-detachesd house 
everything you could wish for 
expensive things 
good jobs or professions 
large house and garage 
other modern assets eg fridge, tv, spindryer, phone, etc 
other things in same category 
trappings of the bourgeoisie 
2 
25 " ... guns and things like that" 
weapons 11 
dangerous weapons 3 
offensive weapons 3 
any weapons 2 
arms 2 
dangerous objects 2 
metal objects 2 
sharp objects 
all metal objects 
all other army gear 
all weapons 
any dangerous weapon 
dangerous things 
explosives etc 
firearms 
forbidden articles: weapons, firearms etc 
heavy things 
implements 
objects 
only firearms 
other offensive weapons 
other service and military equipment 
other weapons 
other weapons any kind 
sharp implements 
27 "... oranges and things like that" 
fruit 
all other fruit, ie mixed bowl of fruit 
any fruit 
any{jnd of fresh fruit 
citrus fruits 
different kinds of fruit 
food from home 
fresh fruit 
ie fresh fruit 
larger fruits in general 
other fresh fruit 
other fruit 
other fruit in season 
pudding 
9 
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(27 continued) 
simple dessert without preparation 
something uncooked 
sup term: fruit 
things that are good for you 
things that don't need cooking 
things we've got lying around anyway 
unprepared dessert 
30 "They never give us peas- or anything" 
vegetables 
all green vegetables 
another vegetable 
anything 'colourful' to eat 
anything good for us 
anything to supplement a meal 
anything with vitamins 
any food at all 
any kind of vegetables 
any other green vegetable 
any other vegetable 
any other vegetables 
cooked vegetables to supplement the meal 
good food 
green vegetables 
interesting vegetables 
never give us green vegetables 
not potatoes or farinaceous vegetables 
salad 
school meals vegetables 
something besides meat and potatoes 
something else they like as well as peas 
No. of subjects 
7 
Chapter 4 
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Table 4.6 
Attested Test Items: Results 
2 "One of the secretaries was saying there was a film or something... 
" 
Type 1 Responses No of subjects 
lecture 15 
slides (inc. slide show) 9 
talk 6 
video (video programme, video showing, video tape) 6 
play 
4 
show 4 
discussion 3 
seminar 2 
tape recording 2 
TV programme 2 
audio-visual tape 
cabaret 
cartoon 
concert 
dance 
demonstration 
disco 
display 
documentary 
film of experimental programme 
film show 
illustrated lecture 
illustrated talk 
open class 
photograph slides 
production 
radio broadcast 
slides and commentary 
slides and recorded speech 
strip 
tape session 
Type 2 Responses ' 
agreeable pastime relevant to course 
entertainment 
film or something like a film 
night entertainment 
not a lecture, informal situation 
other entertainment 
something to see, watch 
something unusual 
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7 "... 23578 or something like that" 
22 subjects (out of 39) gave at least one 5-figure combination in 
their answer 
The other responses were 
as follows: 
numbers 
sequences 
in sequence 
in sequence 
in sequence 
in sequence 
all type 2 (except for one type 3), 
3 
2 
of 4 
of 3 
of 2 
of 1 
abbreviations 
another easily remembered 
any five figure number 
sequence 
any number beginning and ending with 
any unknown previously number 
an easy combination 
any easy string of numbers 
ascending numbers 
a logical sequence 
a simple sequence 
calculation 
of numbers 
two consecutives 
consecutive numbers 
21488 etc, rhythm 
letters 
numbers related to make them easier to remember 
numbers in order 
numbers in the right order 
number in order 
number plate 
only five numbers 
ordered according to size 
other numbers with five digits 
pattern 
predictability 
relationship - measurable 
series of numbers 
set patterns 
short numbers 
similar number 
something similar to example 
something which sticks in the mind 
some range of figures 
some sort of aid to memory 
some sort of code 
5 numbers the same 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.6 
5 "... whether it be language or anything else... " 
Type 1 
maths 
science(s) (etc) 
history 
geography 
physics 
ideas 
riding a bike 
art 
arts 
biology 
chemistry 
English 
information 
literature 
philosophy 
skills 
sport 
walking 
crafts 
Arabic 
arithmetical knowledge 
art appreciation 
basket weaving 
black hole 
Celtic studies 
codes 
concepts of space 
concepts of time 
cultural attitudes 
dancing 
experience 
French 
how to get home from school 
job 
knowledge 
learning 
life 
living 
music history 
music 
psychology 
R. E. 
skill at sports 
skill 
social learning 
sociology 
technique 
theology 
thinking 
tissue 
who is related to who 
13 
10 
8 
8 
6 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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5 continued 
Type 2 
another subject 
anything humans do 
any other activity 
any other kind of learning 
any subject 
any subjects requiring learning of facts 
educational subjects 
facts and figures 
general cognitive requirements 
general knowledge 
humanities 
material picked up from environment 
other subject 
recognition of people and places 
scientific knowledge 
something else we don't know about 
subjects 
8 "... sentences with it and things like that... " 
Type 1 
phrases 12 
examples 8 
clauses 3 
paragraphs 3 
explanations 2 
words 2 
approximations 
circumlocutions 
clarifying examples 
complicated explanations 
context 
contrasting words 
current usage 
demonstrations 
demonstrations with mime 
diagrams 
drawing in the air 
expressions 
generalisations 
hand waving and gestures 
its meaning 
lines 
long-winded complex explanations 
miming 
paraphrases 
passages 
physical examples 
physics 
pronouns 
roundabout definitions 
situations 
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8 continued 
sketches 
stories 
this booklet 
this word 
usages 
Type 2 
and all that stuff 
anywhere this thing cropped up 
different words to explain it 
examples of how it's used 
other examples 
other exercises of the same kind 
other types of speech 
other words 
phrases with it in 
roundabout ways of saying it 
words without visible objects 
10 "... what they want is what they need or whatever" 
Type 1 
desire 
food 
require 
feel 
lack 
attention 
comfort 
drink 
intelligent 
meaning 
milk 
response 
satisfaction of curiosity 
socialisation 
their desires 
to have 
wrong 
Type 2 
anything 
cannot do without 
have to have 
or seem to need 
perhaps something else 
stimulating change of environment 
that they need it 
whatever they want 
what they'd like 
what they desire 
what they dislike 
what they think they need 
6 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
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10 continued 
what they want 
what they want is to be fed 
what they want is to be held 
what they want is to be noticed 
will need 
wish to get rid of 
would like to make them comfortable 
12a "... they had these sort of lectures and that... " 
Type 1 
seminars 13 
tutorials 9 
talks 7 
discussions 6 
lessons 5 
meetings 5 
classes 4 
chats 
confrontations 
films 
information 
little talks 
periods 
sermons 
study 
teachers 
tete-a-tete 
work 
Type 2 
formal teaching 
contact 
etc 
formal classes, distance maintained between them 
formal talks 
impersonal teaching methods 
other forms of teaching 
similar lessons 
stern chats 
things like lectures 
things one is obliged to attend 
whatever 
2 
12b "... there was no coffee room or anything" 
Type 1 
common room 
bar 
canteen 
lounge 
games room 
snack bar 
cafe 
rest room 
JCR 
quiet room 
reading room 
recreation room 
refectory 
staffroom 
tea room 
toilet 
tv room- 
union bar 
Type 2 
meeting place 
social room (social area, social base) 
anything which promoted contact 
any communal life (or possibility for) 
any communal room 
any other facility 
discussion 
facilities 
fellow students 
informal contact 
informal contact, not friends 
nothing comfortable 
no food 
no place to sit 
place to meet 
relaxation 
room for relaxation 
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No. of Subjects 
12 
9 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
I 
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13 "But lots of big sort of important numbers that you have to 
remember and things, I'm sure... " 
Type 1 No. of Subjects 
(where set exemplar appears to be important numbers) 
dates 7 
formulas 7 
figures 4 
letters 3 
names 3 
words 3 
facts 
amounts 
car number plates 
chemical symbols 
data 
dates of births 
demographic calculations 
diagrams 
equasions 
exams 
grammatical rules 
historical events 
important dates 
important words 
lists 
long quotations 
mathematical data 
oil tanker crashes 
percentages of the population 
phone numbers 
places 
series 
shapes 
statistics 
tables 
telephone numbers 
dates to learn 
Type 2 
(where set exemplar appears to be important numbers) 
information 
anything hard to remember 
numbers to be used without reference 
other facts 
other important things 
other numbers 
other things (facts) to be remembered 
patterns 
things containing the important number 
which are important to you 
2 
i 
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13 continued 
Type 1 
(where set exemplar appears to be remember) 
recall 2 
repeat 2 
understand 2 
learn 
and do things with 
and have at hand 
and learn 
call to mind at will 
deduce 
differentiate between 
distinguish from one another 
identify 
know 
manipulate 
refer to 
state 
store in memory 
to use in calculations 
to work with 
use 
utilize 
Type 2 
(where set exemplar appears. to be remember) 
none 
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15 "But what about things like when you read sentences or something... " 
Type 1 
(where set exemplar appears to be sentences) 
paragraphs 25 
phrases 24 
passages 8 
words 7 
articles 5 
chapters 4 
books 4 
clauses 2 
expressions 2 
poems 2 
quotations 2 
addresses 
argumentative articles 
descriptions 
digest 
document 
essays 2 
experiment 
extracts 
given piece of reading material 
groups of words 
half sentences 
histories 
holophrases 
jokes 
lines of verse 
lines 
lists 
meaning 
meaningful groups of words 
notes 
pages 
paraphrasing 
quotes 
reports 
sections or units of a dialogue 
sentences 
statements 
stories 
summaries 
syllables 
telephone numbers 
texts 
Type 2 
(where set exemplar appears to be sentences) 
anything written 
do similar comprehension tests 
instructions ie road signs 
some written work 
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15 continued 
Type 1 
(where set exemplar appeared to be read... ) 
learn 
listen to sentences 
look at something 
read anything- 
read unrelated words 
say 
sort passages 
18 "... there were no lectures or anything like that... " 
Type 1 
classes 6 
lessons 6 
films 3 
tutorials 3 
discussions 3 
talks 2 
conferences 2 
assessment 
debates 
dictations 
essays 
examinations 
exhibitions 
grading 
groups 
marks 
practicals 
putting in order, ranking 
teachers 
teach-ins 
Type 2 
formal classes 2 
formal talks 2 
formal teaching sessions 2 
anything formal, obviously teacher-pupil 
anything that there should have been 
any kind of tuition where you can take notes and are 
talked to entirely by a professor 
big groups 
big lessons 
discussions apart from seminar 
formal conventional methods 
formal dictation 
formal lessons 
formal situations, professor makes a speech 
formal teaching methods 
hard work 
informative talks 
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18 continued 
instruction 
large formal teaching groups 
large groups in lessons 
lessons where no participation expected 
little teacher participation 
nothing easy to cope with 
one-many talks 
professors teaching in (illegible) intimidating 
proper teaching 
serious classes 
set curriculum 
set talks 
talks apart fromseminars 
talks compulsory attendance 
talks to lots of people 
teaching 
teaching without feedback 
traditional teaching 
usual expected methods 
19 "elaborated code and things like that" 
Type 1 
slang 
accent(s) 
class dialect 
jargon 
regional dialect 
academic language 
articulate speech 
believed 
body language 
class accent 
"clean" language 
clear speech 
colour dialect 
customs 
cycles 
dialect 
diglossia 
grammar 
identify 
individuality 
jargons of particular jobs 
language of a clique 
local language 
localphrases 
methods 
morse 
new language 
punctuation 
regional accent 
semaphore 
sign 
superior dialect 
theories 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
19 continued 
updated slang 
Type 2 
language 
and all those other indefinable linguistic terms 
black English not applicable 
complex sentence structures 
conforming language 
correct English 
elegant speech 
exclusive vocabularies 
lingustic attitudes 
or something 
other experiments 
other kinds of code 
own language 
pedantic language 
posh words 
secret verbal communication systems 
similar things 
sociolinguistic patterns 
speech forms 
types of language 
usual writing language 
various formulas 
vocabulary 
ways of speaking 
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21 "I hope we didn't have lots of horrible conversations when you went 
out of the room in tutorials and things like that... " 
Type 1 
seminars 
lectures 
lessons 
gossip 
discussions 
meetings 
arguments 
calumny 
chats 
class discussion 
courses 
damning conclusions 
dentist 
difference of opinion 
English 
fights 
form period 
geography 
get togethers 
had fights 
history 
jeering talk 
jokes 
library monitors' duty 
maths 
mutterings 
personality destruction 
played silly games 
prefect duty 
private meetings 
private study 
RE 
rude jokes 
rumours 
scandal 
small lectures 
small seminars 
sneaky remarks 
snide remarks 
swearing 
TD 
when out of hearing range 
when we were in a group with you 
when we were talking all together 
whispering 
Type 2 
classes 
anything like a horrible conversation 
informative classes 
in classes 
meetings where both staff and students were present 
other conversations 
No. of subjects 
13 
9 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
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23 "... 1972 or something like that" 
Type 1 
68 responses were four-figure year dates 
Other type 1 responses: 
ABCD 
16 
8.8.60 
a recent date 
a reoccurring date 
a used date 
catchphrase 
cliche 
UCCA 
YMCA 
Type 2 
mnemonics 
4x4x4x4 etc 
1948,1976 etc 
another year 
any other mnemonic 
any other relative date 
any year 
birthdays 
early 70's 
figures 
four syllable words 
numbers of relative importance for historic or personal 
reasons 
other easily remembered numbers 
other relevant dates 
other similar dates 
paradigms 
phone numbers- 
sequence 
significant year names, eg 2000,1984,1p00- 
some type of group of numbers 
telephone numbers 
the Olympics 
various other dates 
years of the European soccer championship 
years of the Olympic Games 
1066 and all that 
2 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.6 
26 "... could we sort of meet or something... " 
Type 1 No. of Subjects 
get together 11 
discuss (discussions) 11 
talk 7 
have a chat 4 
have a discussion 3 
chat 2 
confer 2 
have a class 2 
have a tutorial 2 
rendezvous 2 
see each other 2 
and talk 
arrange a rendezvous 
arrange a time to discuss them 
a revision period 
be given instructions 
collect ata certain place 
come and see you 
congregate 
could I visit you 
debate 
discuss privately 
extra classes 
gather 
gather together 
gossip . 
go round to teacher's house 
go through them 
have a chance to talk them over 
have a class discussion 
have a conversation 
have a general meeting to see about and problems arising 
from the essay 
have a talk 
have individual meetings 
hold a discussion 
join together 
liaise 
phone each other up 
private appointment between teacher and student 
private discussion 
see you if we have any problem 
seminars 
speak at the end of the lesson 
talk about it 
talk informally about the essay 
talk to you about them 
write a letter 
write a note 
Type2 
arrange somehow to see each other 
be in contact 
find time to discuss them 
get a message round 
get in touch by phone or letter 
26 continued 
give me a chance to ask you what you meant 
informal discussion 
or get together some time 
28 "... we're having second supervisors" 
10 or something" 
Type 1 
inspectors 
organisers 
tutors 
advisers 
assistants 
bosses 
deputy supervisors 
elected tutors 
essays 
examinations 
extra teacher 
fifth supervisors 
fourth supervisors 
helpers 
obligatory classes 
observation 
observers 
optional classes 
or third supervisors 
porters 
somebody 
student teacher 
student help 
undergraduates 
Tvpe 2 
a different professor again 
equivalent of second supervisors 
other people in the same category 
other supervisors 
overlookers 
something like that 
some change in normal routine 
some other person in authority 
some people 
stand-ins 
supervisors 
teachers 
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29 "... they'd read these words in a book or something" 
Type 1 No. of Subjects 
magazine 34 
newspaper 24 
comic 19 
television 5 
article 3 
advertisement 2 
journal 2 
letter 2 
poster 3 
pamphlet 2 
paper 2 
story 2 
be shown these words 
book in a foreign language 
brand names on packages 
brochure 
brother or sister's school report 
description of scientific experiment 
dictionary 
essay 
exercise (grammar) 
heard or seen on tv or radio 
heard them in conversation 
history book 
hoarding 
in the street 
minutes of the AGM 
newspaper article 
on a card 
on the radio 
public sign 
record 
shop window 
signpost 
they'd hear them 
toilet door 
Type 2 
came across them in reading 
other methods of communication 
perhaps they'd hear the words in speech 
seen these words written down somewhere 
magazine etc 
Chapter 5 
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Being Vague 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters I have introduced the idea of vague language use, 
and -have looked in detail at the structure and meaning of two 
particular types of vague expressions from the set of those I have 
called vague additives. Having established for both types of 
expressions a set of observations about what they mean, I now go on to 
describe and discuss, in this chapter, the way that speakers use these 
expressions in conversations. In particular what conversational 
effects arise from using such vague expressions, and what goals do 
speakers use them to achieve? 
5.2 Analytical Approach 
The approach taken is broadly in the spirit of the work on 
conversational interaction known as CONVERSATION ANALYSIS (hereinafter 
CA), as summarised for example in Wootton, 1981: 
"In approaching interaction, then, it is the problems 
confronting participants which are of interest in CA, and the 
systematic procedures and designs through which such problems 
are displayed and resolved. There is no prior analytic 
'theory' of interaction being applied. " 
(: 103) 
Thus I would share the analytic predilection sketched by Schenkein 
(1978: 2) - that is to "take[ing] seriously the details of the natural 
interactions themselves". and I. try to be as true to the data, as 
possible by validating the analyses and categories I propose solely by 
reference to that is observable within the conversational extracts[1]. 
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This general approach means that the material in this Chapter has 
the appearance of being somewhat random, in the sense that I just set 
out to describe the observations I have made of the data I have. It 
is only at the end that I try to link'these observations together in 
any schematic way. In addition, many examples show either a number of 
different conversational effects, 'or else it is impossible to sort out 
quite what the effect is. The fact that hearers may themselves quite 
often be in this position is itself of interest. 
One difference between my work and CA is that I look at written 
examples as well as spoken, especially written examples which seek, 
for particular effects, to imitate or be associated with- spoken 
discourse. These are useful because they can show up those aspects of 
spoken discourse which language users judge to particularly identify 
its "spokenness". 
I begin by looking in some detail at three different kinds of 
extracts. These serve to introduce both the complexity of the effects 
under observation, and the kinds of categories I want to suggest. 
5.3 Three scenarios for vagueness 
5.3.1 "Eighty or so pence" - S2si_ t ýj 
In this example taken from an advertisement, it is'not really possible 
to observe what communicative effects are understood by its readers. 
But it is possible, as a reader oneself, to list what they might be. 
1 This is not unfortunately always possible. For examples where the 
data is incomplete (eg no recording, only a short extract), 
assumptions based on analogy have had to be made. 
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Now, presumably Vichy know the retail prices of the products 
referred to. Brands of this up-market type do not normally allow 
shops to vary the prices of their products. Therefore they know 
exactly how much "you" are saving. The copywriter must have 
deliberately included an approximation to achieve one, or several, 
particular effects. 
1 The actual number is lower, say 77p. Rounding up to 80, and 
approximating, implicates to' the naive, or hasty, a greater saving 
than is really the case. (This is similar to the price tag ploy: 
"only 14.99". ) 
2 For the purpose of the advertisement, the actual saving is not very 
important. This approximation gives as much information as is 
necessary, and knowing the exact figure won't give the reader 
information he needs to know, it will be redundant. The relative 
unimportance of the sum of money involved is confirmed by the content 
of the next sentence. 
3 It is for self-protection. Retail prices do vary, so savings will 
be different in different shops. The advertiser ensures he is telling 
the truth ("legal, honest, decent and truthful") by using a hedge. [2] 
4 It sets a tone of chatty informality - phatic communion between 
advertiser and reader. Test informants who were asked about use of 
vagueness (in semi-formal group discussions conducted at the 
conclusion of the tests described in Chapters 3 and 4) suggested that 
tags are not used in formal types of writing, or in more formal 
2I once wrote to the Advertising Standards Authority suggesting 
that they should employ a person trained in linguistics to uncover all 
the misleading statements which are systematically perpetrated by 
implicatures in advertisements. Regrettably, but unsurprisingly, they 
weren't interested. 
I 
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conversations (the sixth-formers' example was "not in an interview"). 
The copywriter is trying here to render the effect of informal 
conversation. 
Any or maybe all of these effects could be understood by readers of 
this advertisement. 
5.3.2 "Elaborated code and things like that" 
11,8.3 
Extract 1[3] 
[Tutorial discussion on innateness of language capacity in humans] 
note: A, the tutor, is me 
A: What about this business about 
E: (laughs) 
it doesn't matter how intelligent the 
individual is - they all manage to achieve the same "level of 
linguistic competence 
E: do they 
D: "a level anyway 
A: well everyone achieves intelligibility 
E: yeah yeah okay - within a set 
group 
"'""-"'"'"'"'-"'I mean you 
A: tthere's been a lot of work done to show that there's 
no difference in sophistication between one language variety 
and another 
E: I'm talking about you know sort of acceptable middle class 
language and (. ) sort of working class language you know Bernstein and 
mm you know sort of elaborated code and things like that 
C: well that's more environment is'nt it 
E: yeah 
3 Since almost all the extracts in this Chapter are attested, I have 
not thought it necessary to mark them with a '+'. 
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C: it's the way you 
you're ------- 
I 
D: most people achieve competence 
E: yeah yeah a lot of the time (. ) a lot of the time it's linked to 
intelligence as well 
A: but is it 
E: at least it is in schools - if you can "sound more intelligent by 
the way you speak you are categorised as being intelligent 
A: well yes but never mind about "categorised as being more 
intelligent - you "aren't more intelligent are, you 
B: but what do you mean by intelligent 
C: its a very good question 
E: yeah by middle class based intelligence tests 
A: because if you use "other intelligence tests 
E: which is what the 
elaborated code proved 
[continues] 
Speaker E precedes her vague exemplar and tag ("elaborated code and 
things like that") with considerable hesitation -a pause, two sort 
of s, two you knows and an "mm". These are indications that (among 
other things) she is not sure what she's talking about. The 
subsequent turns all feel able to treat what she's said as wrong, and 
they are permitted to do this by her unsureness. Speakers D and A, 
and B, all disagree in some way with her. Duncan and Fiske (1977) in 
their work on turn-taking, think that expressions like or something 
facilitate hearer interruption, but they do not show enough data to 
test this assignment. I would say that my data do not show this, what 
they do show in some instances is increased possiblity for hearer 
disagreement/criticism, as, for example, I discuss below for this 
extract. 
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Later in the same discussion, E makes explict that (a) she 
doesn't know or understand the subject matter of the talk very well, 
and (b) that she does not command with any certainty the language 
necessary for the topic of discussion, as we can see from the 
following extract. 
Extract 2 
[later in-same discussion, talking about an article by Putnam] 
E: I'll tell you what I found difficult in this - all these different 
symbols -I didn't know what they meant 
A: where 
E: in this Putnam thing 
C: --__.. »--_.... ------ 
I 
B: .. ---------------- 
E: that I class as being sigma - the sum of 
A: [reading] a highly restrictive sigma class of grammars - 
, jI don't think you need to worry about that 
E: but I did -I mean I just sort of worried about it 
[... continues with details of losing first page, worrying etc] 
A: you mean this bit at the beginning where he says [reading] we 
should assume that the speaker has a built-in function which assigns 
weights to grammars G1 G2 and G3 /E: mm hhh/ to a certain class sigma 
of transformational grammars 
E: and immediately I thought [loud] don't understand this put it 
down (laugh) 
A: I hope you went on reading that because it becomes "much clearer 
after that 
E: no -I get terrified 
[continues with details of nervousness amid general laughter] 
[conversation continues] 
On this basis, I suggest that one use of vague additives is to enable 
a speaker in fact to talk about a subject he is not very knowledgeable 
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about, or a subject where he does not know the necessary vocabulary. 
On this last point, elaborated code and things like that directs 
hearers to access a category. It may well be that there is no clear 
-superordinate term for this category. - Certainly there was no 
particular sign of agreement as to what it would be, among the test 
subjects (cf results, Table 4.6, Test Item 19). If there is one, E 
didn't know it, so her vagueness may show her finding a way of 
actually talking about something she does not quite have the 
vocabulary to express. 
There is a way in which E works around what she means to say, 
using items of vocabulary relevant to her point. It is interesting 
that speaker C does not appear to be bothered by the multiple 
uncertainties in what E has said. She refers back to it with a 
definite that. The subsequent turns show I think that all the 
speakers decide that what is being talked about is different language 
varieties and their relationship to measures of intelligence. 
There is another point about what E says. She uses, as noted, a 
lot of vagueness. Yet there is evidence that she does not feel that 
uncertain about what she is saying. Notice her refusing to give up 
the turn to either C or D. As she goes on there is a noticeable 
absence of vagueness. Leaving aside the-sort ofs for a moment, it 
seems she could have rather successfully defined a category (? or two) 
- middle class language and working class language, without the 
vagueness, and without her very unclear "elaborated code and things 
like that". It is also the case, as I noted, that her hearers react 
to. what she says as definite. So perhaps this vagueness is for 
something else. 
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Notice that the purpose of Es turn in which the vague tag occurs 
is to disagree with what A has said about everyone achieving 
competence. We can see that A (who is the tutor) takes an assertive 
role in changing the direction of the conversation (by her question on 
a new topic, and in asking a direct question to the tutorial group 
(and, as usual with teachers, one to which she already knows several 
answers; cf C6ulthard, 1977: 104 for this observation)). Given A's 
assertive behaviour, E's vagueness may be a marker of deference to 
someone established as superior in the context of this discussion, (cf 
Schenkein, 1978, 'Identity Negotiations in Conversation'). E is 
clearly quite determined to get her point out. She resists all 
interruptions, including A's very firm attempt to cut her off 
("there's been a lot of work done... ") and other interruptions. Yet 
she must continue to mark deference to A, even while disagreeing with 
her. 
A general aspect of the two extracts is that they show speakers 
under some kind of stress, arising from, perhaps, uncertainty of the 
subject, lack of knowledge, and the unequal relationship of the tutees 
to the tutor. 
5.3.3 Humorous Effects 
The 'punchline' of cartoon strip no. 1 is provided by a vague tag. 
By analysing the source of the humorous effect, it is possible to 
deduce how the vague tag itself works. First a 'gloss' of the story: 
Boopsie has been to Graceland and loaded herself up with what looks 
like a pile of varied Elvis memorabilia. BD asks her if she has 
bought any souvenirs. We see that she has, in fact she has bought a 
ludicrous quantity of them. "A postcard or something" would be a bad 
description of what she has bought. Hence the humour. The joke 
provides independent evidence for the assignment of meaning to 
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exemplar + tag constructions given in Chapter 4- that they designate 
a category of which the exemplar is understood as a good example. If 
that wasn't the meaning, the joke would not work. Boopsie uses just 
"or something" as her (agreeing) reply. That works, I think, to tell 
us that although the collection of Elvis tat that she has collected 
could be described by "a postcard or something", what she has got is 
anything büt a postcard, and indeed has rather different 
characteristics from a postcard. 
Conversationally we may understand the punchline as a form of 
witholding - Boopsie doesn't want to confess to BD exactly what she 
has got (cf his reaction in the next strip, no. 2). 
What makes no. 3 funny? Probably that Riley shows by his use of 
vagueness that he doesn't know what he's talking about in the field of 
medical care (neither does Duke, as fans of the strip will know, but 
that isn't evidenced here). "Boil some water" is additionally funny, 
because it occurs classically in 'anxious father at emergency 
delivery' jokes. The associational category identified by "boil some 
water or something" would include, on my reading, other items of folk 
medical knowledge. Notice that this "or something" could also be 
deference behaviour, followed as it is by "sir". 
One thing a cartoonist is anxious to do is to create a 
naturalistic conversation effect. Two tags on one page suggests that 
he judges them as salient as markers of informal conversation, in the 
same way as the advertising copywriter did. 
In these three extracts, a diversity of conversational effects 
has been observed. I'd like to now firm up these observations by 
looking at further examples which will serve to substantiate the 
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categories suggested, and also to add some others. 
5.4.1 Giving the right amount of information 
We saw in the Vichy example that one possible use of vague additives 
is to tailor an utterance such that the right amount of information is 
given. 
Grice (1975) noticed that speakers appear to tailor their 
contributions in particular ways, and he suggested that two important 
rules of conversation are what he termed the two Maxims of Quantity: 
1 Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange) 
2 Do not, make your- contribution more informative than is 
required, (: 45) 
The examples in this section show these rules being used, and show that 
vague additives are a device which speakers use to tailor their 
contributions such that they give the right amount of information for 
the purpose of the conversation. 
Grice notes that his second maxim is disputable - "it might be 
said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but 
merely a waste of time". I think the evidence from data is that the 
second maxim of quantity is indeed a rule of conversation, the 
transgressing of which produces, as predicted by the Grice account, 
particular implicatures. We, saw in the previous, chapter the text 
cited by Rosch, containing many overspecifications and producing a 
humorous or ironic effect. We saw also that my made-up examples: 
(28) It was a freestone peach or something 
(29) It was a metallic finish 1975 Renault 5TL or something 
would probably also produce bizarre effects in many circumstances. 
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Some informants recognise this consciously. When I asked the 
informants in the number approximation test (reported in Chapter 3) 
about the use of approximations, one of them said: 
"I think it's more used because it doesn't convey more 
information. than if you knew the exact figure - if you say to 
someone 'it cost five hundred or so pounds' - if. they know it 
cost five hundred and thirty nine it's not going to get them 
any further. " 
Clearly, though, we must add 'for the purpose of that conversation', 
because there are obviously occasions when knowing it was exactly 4539 
would be necessary, for example in a banking or accounting context. 
Sadock and Wachtel in their writing on number approximations both 
notice that approximations can be used to vary the amount of 
information given. Crystal and Davy (1975: 111-114) observe that 
vagueness is quite appropriate in some conversations. I asked one of 
the test subjects why a speaker would not give the exact amount, even 
if he knew it; he said "because in casual conversation like that you 
don't go into details like that". We have seen this as one possible 
effect involved in the advertising copy "eighty or so pence". 
A less complex example is 
[geraniums] 
Theres a room downstairs you see which is only one floor and 
gets really cold and I. lost two or three with the 
frost [Camb 13A180/36] 
In this example , so few geraniums are in question that a hearer may 
well conclude that S must know how many he/she-lost. Notice that 
being told the exact number will not contribute anything of useful 
interest to H: S could equally have said some or a few. S has avoided 
being precise, in view of the purpose of the conversation, and its 
possible informal setting. 
[paper reporting informant work at LAGB] 
Weve got about five or six of them but I'm only going to talk 
about three of them today [LAGB 9,81] 
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Clearly a linguist engaged in phonetics research must know how many 
informants he has. But it is not relevant to the audience to know 
this for the purpose of the paper he is about to give. The 
information which is important to them is that they are going to be 
told about three informants. Tailoring the amount of information by 
using an approximation in direct contrast with an exact number 
("three") may have the effect of focussing attention towards, or 
foregrounding, that is considered most important in the utterance. 
Using an approximation here communicates something like "don't pay too 
much attention to this, it's not very important". 
In order to observe the converse, use of precision in contexts 
which demand it, I looked at data from three BBC Radio 4 programmes on 
financial topics: Money Box, The Financial World Tonight, and It's a 
Bargain. There were overall very few examples of any kind of 
vagueness. There was a noticeable absence of vague tags - one 
occurrence of and the like in an interview. It might be thought that 
this was because vagueness is unacceptable altogether on Radio 4. 
However, this is not the case, since vague expressions did in fact 
occur in a particular context: that of making predictions about the 
future, and I shall discuss some examples in the section below on 
"Talking about things you aren't sure about ". 
Two extracts will show the salience of precision for the purposes 
of these sorts of programmes. The first is from The Financial World 
Tonight, stock market report: 
and on the immediate issue Dalgety gained six to two eighty 
after those figures (. ) otherwise "firm best describes the 
way the market traded with the FT index up three point eight 
at four hundred and eighty nine point three - gains among 
leading shares ranged from two to four pence (. ) like Beecham 
up three at one hundred and eighty - blue circle up four at 
three hundred and eighty six and Grand Met up four at one 
hundred and sixty six 
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Here the changes in share prices must be provided exactly for those 
who listen to them. 
The second extract is from It's a Bargain, a programme with a 
very different purpose from that of The Financial World Tonight, since 
it is to tell listeners the usual prices of consumer goods at the 
bottom end of the market, and perhaps thus also with, socially, a very 
different target audience. 
The BBC guide price works out at one hundred and ninety nine 
pounds (. ) cheaper than guide price we discovered two models 
at a hundred and seventy five pounds [... ] cheaper still we 
found a cooker with a small oven and push button ignition to 
the hot plate only (. ) and this was the "Valor Corvette (. ) 
it's on special offer from North Thames Gas at a hundred' and 
sixty two pounds and seven pence - but from the Comet 
Discount Shops it's a hundred and fifty four pounds ninety 
"excluding their delivery charge which is two pounds seventy 
five 
In this context precise prices are given. 
In these two cases, it certainly does "get you further" to be 
told the exact numbers. These comparisons show (a) that the amount of 
information given is dictated by the, perceived purposes of the 
interaction and, (b) that vague additives are used where less 
precision is judged to be required. 
5.4.2 Withholding 
Many (non-linguist) English speakers who have talked to me about vague 
language use have emphasised the extent to which vagueness is deployed 
deliberately. They suggest that they often use it to withhold 
information which in some sense might be'expected by their hearers in 
a given situation. We saw an example which I suggested might show 
this, where Boopsie in the Doonesbury cartoon gives only an inexplicit 
indication of what she has bought. 
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Another example which might be heard as withholding is the time 
estimate example from Chapter 3. 
B: could you give me some idea of how long it would take 
C: well the quote might be done'within three or four days but 
the job won't be done for at least five weeks [Carob 
11B1058] 
This three or four days can be seen as unhelpful and insufficiently 
informative. On the other hand, it could be that the speaker really 
does not want to commit himself on when the estimate will be done, so 
this would be a defensive tactic, like those described in section 
5.4.5. 
An example reported to me was the following: 
She's about 29 years old 
This appears to be withholding of the exact age, since when questioned 
the speaker claimed she had used this form becaus'q en don't like to 
be said to be 30. 
5.4.3 Saying what you don't know how to say 
One conversational goal which a speaker uses vagueness to achieve is 
to get across a meaning where he does not have at . 
his disposal the 
necessary words or expressions which he needs to associate with the 
concepts he is forming. Notice that to be convinced by this account, 
you have to accept that there is a level of cognitive 
activity/representation which precedes words and is independent of 
them (for arguments for this view, see eg, Fodor, 1976 The Language of 
Thought). I would think that the data in this chapter offer 
substantial evidence that people can and often do think about concepts 
which they can't really talk about, ie that there is a 
pre-lexical/pre-language cognitive level. 
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A clear example of a speaker with a word-finding problem is the 
following, taken from my transcription of the students in Extracts 1 
and 2, and myself) in a tutorial earlier in the same term: 
B: that it is very hard is really interesting where you've 
got virtually every word you've got somebody stopping 
somewhere 
E: cos it doesn't flow /B: yeah/ (. ) its difficult to 
sort of say it in sounds /A: uh hu/ its sort of 
difficult to sort of 
A: on the other hand its still very few people 
[1,13.2] 
It is plausible (at least) to suggest that the word the speaker would 
have been happy to use was articulate. She either did not know this 
word, or under the strain of trying to express ideas about unfamiliar 
topics in a tutorial, she had forgotten it. Such examples arise both 
where the speaker does not know the necessary word, and where he has 
forgotten it, since in both cases, for the purpose of the utterance in 
hand, the speaker lacks knowledge of the word. 
Another example, later in the same tutorial is: 
A:. . . if we're trying to find out how they take it in 
which is what as you say this thing was trying to do then I 
think that shows that the syntactic element is important in 
structuring - in helping you to decode what you've got more 
important than the semantic - well the thing is they're 
interlinked - you can't separate them out 
C: but there's also things like when you're talking and you 
take information in when you - when you're talking its just 
words that you pick up - its not whole strings of sentences 
and verbs and things - its just the sort of main meaning 
E: yeah right 
C: because people don't, talk in sentences 
[ 
E: if somebody 
tells you a. full story then you don't remember every word 
they said but you do remember the general gist of it /mm/ 
Here, the expression which the participants can't use, but need, I 
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think, is syntactic structure. A had introduced this earlier, and had 
used "syntactic element" in her turn preceding Cs, but it is clear 
that at this stage neither of the tutees has mastered the use of the 
word syntax. 
A related but different situation in which use of vagueness 
arises, is where the language in question does not have the lexical 
items necessary for precise expression. An example from later in the 
above tutorial discussion is: 
C: but lots of big sort of important numbers that you have to 
ring and things I'm sure they're made into a kind of pattern 
that you can remember them by - say your friend's telephone 
number because they give you something like two three five 
seven eight or something like that which is much easier to 
remember than - and -I know - I'm sure they do it into 
patterns so that you can remember them 
Here, firstly, "ring and things" does not have any obvious lexical 
superordinate. C succeeds in referring to her set of 'ringing 
activities', by using a vague expression. Her subsequent use is the 
same: "something like two three five seven eight or something like 
that". There isn't any readily available superordinate to refer to 
the category. She clarifies in her final point by using patterns, and 
this is taken up by subsequent speakers who refer to: "patterns", 
"next number", "double four double two double four which is a sort of 
pattern". 
Again, some test subjects were aware of this. In discussion 
after the test one said that vague tags were used "if you're thinking 
of something and you don't know the words for it". Others said: 
You might not have had the time to think of the exact thing 
you wanted to say (. ) if you say something like it or 
say or something like that then people /mm. mm/ 
B: and sometimes you don't know (. ) like that Bernstein one 
I mean (. ) I don't know (. ) I would have said something that 
I knew about him and then 
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C: get yourself out of it 
B: get myself out of it by saying... 
Finally, they suggested that such vague tags would not be used in 
writing because, 
you've got more time to think, so you can pick one that (. ) a 
word that really does represent the things you want to say 
This supports my observation that vagueness is a ploy speakers use 
when they can't find the words they need. 
The two types, word-finding difficulty, and lexical lack in the 
language, are seen here as different. However, they are, from the 
point of view of the speaker producing an utterance, 'the same, in the 
sense that either way, he does not have the necessary word(s) at his 
disposal. More importantly, from the point of view of the hearer's 
understanding, they are probably the same. since he must go through 
the inferential procedure of identifying an appropriate associational 
category from the exemplar given. 
However, at the level of conversational effect, they may be 
different. In the situation of unequal knowledge of the topic of 
discussion, for example, that which is usually found in a tutorial, 
the tutor takes the tutees' use of vagueness partly as a confirmation 
that they don't know as much about the topic or know its vocabulary as 
well as she does. Hence her frequent use of certain pertinent 
vocabulary items ("syntax", "syntactic structure", "semantic"), 
perhaps to try to get their meaning over. 
5.4.4 Talking about things you aren't sure about 
As I mentioned in relation to Extract 1, an observable ploy for a 
speaker who lacks specific knowledge is to use vagueness. A clear 
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example of this is: 
[percentage of university students coming from working class 
backgrounds] 
B: I can't remember what the figures are but its something 
around the twenty per cent mark and it's never 
changed (11,21.2) 
where B's admission of memory failure ("I can't remember") provides 
clear evidence that his vagueness is obligatory - he simply does not 
know the exact figure. 
Examples like these illustrate the working of what Grice (1975) 
formulated as the Maxim of Quality - part of which is the rule: 
"2 Do not say that for which you lack sufficient evidence" (: 46) 
In another similar example, a speaker giving a talk referred to a 
visit to a country abroad as having taken place "about ten or so years 
ago". When questioned afterwards, he said it was "about 1969, t would 
have to look it up", thus confirming that he actually did not know 
when it had occurred. 
In a written report on student accommodation in York, the 
following appeared: 
I have assembled a list of student addresses in York from the 
registration cards in the Undergraduate Office. The 
Students' Union did not collect housing information in the 
usual way this year (NUS card returns) and although the 
registration questionnaire was designed to fill the gap, the 
poor response rather nullified the attempt. Around 600 
students found private rented accommodation in York and 
district this October -a loss of around 45 units from last 
year. In reality this loss was a little less. There are 
always some addresses which escape listing at the first 
attempt. " 
The writer makes explicit that his data collection was imperfect, and 
thus uses vague quantities so as not to make exact statements which he 
does not have evidence for. There is about this an element of 
self-protection - of wanting to avoid later being shown to have said 
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or written something which isn't true. We shall look at other 
examples of this in 5.4.5. 
Displacement 
Speakers use vague expressions to express their degree of certainty. 
Two situations in which speakers are often uncertain is where they are 
talking about the past, or the future. In the case of the past, 
, 
complete evidence may be lacking. An example which shows this is 
taken from The Guardian: 
[article in The Guardian (29.8.81) about the death penalty in 
the 18th century] 
The records, though far from complete, showed that about 61 
people died on the block 
This is curious. 
- 
My reading would be that the records stated that 61 
people died. But the writer knows (and says) that they are 
incomplete, so he uses an approximator to take account of the 
unrecorded deaths. He also, I think, wants to 'cover' himself against 
the possibility of being wrong. 
Vagueness is often used when making predictions about the future. 
This can be seen in the pre-budget edition of the programme Money Box 
in which possible changes in the tax system were discussed: 
[The Stock Exchange propose abolishing Contract Stamp Duty] 
that would cost the Chancellor about two million pounds a 
year or as they put it - seventeen and a half minutes of 
government expenditure 
[it also proposes altering the 2% Transfer Stamp Duty; Deputy 
Chairman of the Stock Exchange: ] 
rather than have a duty which will become more and more 
evaded or avoided in the future because of the ways round it 
it is better to make it a bearable amount and therefore we're 
suggesting one per cent for everybody 
Interviewer: And Peter Wills reckons that change will cost 
around a hundred and fifty million pounds 
Notice the necessity for the exact figure "one per cent" in contrast 
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to the approximation for the uncertain future consequences of the 
reduction. 
A final example from the same programme: 
[building societies propose abolishing stamp duty on house 
purchase] 
Interviewer: Any idea how much that would cost 
Spokesman: the cost in this year would be about two hundred 
and twenty million pounds, 
Again, test subjects provided independent evidence that lack of 
knowledge is a reason for using vagueness. On number approximations, 
one said: 
Usually if you have a figure like that it's because you've 
heard it somewhere or seen it somewhere and it's a very 
precise figure to start off with but you're just repeating it 
without the exactitude cos you can't remember all of it. 
Discussing the tag test, the university student subjects told me: 
its when you're trying to express yourself (. ) you're really 
thinking about what you're trying to say (. ) you say or 
something like that 
you know (. ) I think its when you (. ) sometimes you don't 
know really what you're talking about /you use them/ but if 
you know what you're talking about, you know exactly what you 
want to say and you won't use them 
This is borne out by the low frequency of vague additives in the 
three financial programmes recorded. People taking part in such 
programes do so because they do know what they are talking about, and 
therefore they don't use vague expressions. 
5.4.5 Self-Protection 
I suggested in relation to the Vichy advertisement that vagueness may 
be used as a safeguard against being later shown to be wrong. This 
was seen also in the report on student accommodation quoted in 5.4.4. 
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Examples of this strike a very odd chord when it is fairly clear 
that the speaker knows the information exactly and it is appropriate 
for the purpose of the conversation to give it exactly. Here are some 
of these. 
[House-hunting telephone call to Estate Agent] 
B: How many houses are there in the street? 
C: There are [reads from printed details] approximately four 
houses in the street 
In this case the estate agent will have made a survey of the area and 
will know how many houses there are, ie four. This approximator 
carries a message something like " we've counted four houses, but if 
you go along and see an extra one, or think that number 24, 
technically in the next street, is really in this one, then we are not 
wrong, because we said 'approximately"'. 
[BBC Radio 4 news: Police spokesman making statement about 
hijackers at Stanstead] 
I can tell you that approximately eleven people are helping 
us with our enquiries 
The non-round number suggests strongly that this is not really, an 
approximation (cf discussion in Chapter 3). The speaker knows that 
eleven people are involved. His official position inclines him, 
however, to extreme caution, hence the approximator. 
The third example I am including here probably shows a number of 
factors at work. 
[Chemist interviewed on You and Yours, BBC Radio 4,19.2.81, 
about not charging the NHS prescription charge for an item if 
the retail price is lower] 
During that day in fact we had three prescriptions for throat 
lozenges which I think the retail price was about 41 pence 
and a tube of cream for arthritis which was about 58 pence 
and on all three occasions I said to the patient concerned - 
there's no point in your paying a pound -I will charge you 
the correct retail price. 
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I believe this speaker remembered these retail prices exactly. But he 
wanted to guard against the possibility of a faulty memory. In 
addition, he was probably affected by the stress of being interviewed 
for the radio which made him, perhaps, more uncertain, and this may 
also have led to his using vague expressions. 
My last example of self-protection is from the university 
tutorial group: 
C: One of the secretaries was saying there was a film or 
something. 
A: oh yeah 
D: really 
C: last thursday we were all down in Z017 and the lecture 
was actually in Vanbrugh so I went down to the secretary and 
said where is everyone and she got out this book and looked 
at it and said its in Vanbrugh but some weeks there's a film 
being shown and I said well I do psychology and linguistics 
is just an elective - but I was intrigued by the film - can 
you have films in linguistics 
A: oh yes we have lots of films 
C: "really [disbelief] 
The speaker knows quite well that the secretary said there was a film. 
He makes it definite in the preface to his question. Why tag the 
first occurrence of film? He is seeking information, he is not sure, 
and he doesn't want to be wrong. Also, however, account must be taken 
of the unequal tutor/tutee relationship. There may be some deference 
here. I discuss this in the next section. 
5.4.6 Deference 
In discussing Extract 1 in section 5.3.2, I suggested that one reason 
for use of vagueness was the speaker expressing deference to the tutor 
at the same time as disagreeing with her. Vague additives are used 
for these kinds of social reasons. 
159 
Weiser (1974) noticed that utterances may be constructed so as to 
be deliberately ambiguous between at least two speech acts, so as to 
leave a hearer the option of taking up one speech act or another. One 
of her examples is: 
I'm curious to know what went on at the hearing 
which can legitimately be treated by its hearer, she says, as a 
request for information, or as a statement. As such it leaves the 
speaker a bolt-hole: "I wasn't demanding that you divulge confidential 
information, I was just expressing curiosity". I think vague 
additives are used for the same sort of politeness reasons, for 
example, in this offer, couched as a question: 
[A has given up alcohol, speaker knows this] 
B: Would you like a drink - an orange juice or 
something [15.9.801 
The speaker is understood as presupposing that A will want a 
non-alcoholic drink - he deliberately cancels the preferred reading of 
"would you like a drink? " with his exemplar + tag. This is understood 
as referring to the category of non-alcoholic social drinks (orange 
juice being a good example) and he politely offers the addressee 
options within that category. 
Another example, this time of a request, is taken from one of the 
tutorial discussions: 
Could we, when you give us our essays back - and give us 
titles - could we sort of meet or something - because (. ) I 
mean - there might be things we want to ask 
We have already seen a possible example of deference between tutee and 
tutor. We have also seen the tutees' tendency to use a lot of 
uncertainty markers. Here the tutee makes a direct request to the 
tutor, but is heard as mitigating its directness by leaving the tutor 
other options (cf the test informants' interpretations, Table 4.6, 
160 
Chapter 5 
Item 26). 
An example I gave in Chapter 4 is another example of deference. 
It is a recapitulation of a direct request for action (unfortunately 
not recorded; it would have been useful to have the first formulation 
of the request; I suspect it was without vagueness). 
[B has asked A to buy him some bread] 
A: so you'd like some bread 
B: or something - anything edible will do 
B mitigates the force of the request by leaving A much wider options 
than his original request. 
In the next example, the speaker says something which is open to 
interpretation as being rather critical, so he mitigates it by using a 
vague tag : 
B: I'm a third year physicist 
C: I don't know anything about physics at all 
B: well neither do I 
C: I never even did them at school 
B: not at all -ever 
C: well I 
B: general science 
C: I did them for a term - so I know something about them - 
I did chemistry - did biology 
B: mmm do you feel that this is a vast hole in your 
education or anything 
C: no 
[Clark, 1981] 
These few examples show how vague additives are used to make 
conversational turns convey politeness in appropriate ways. 
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5.4.7 Informality and atmosphere 
I noted with reference to the Vichy advertisement that vague- language 
is associated with informal conversational settings. Some of the test 
subjects told me the same thing. One said: 
If you're just having a conversation - with one's friends 
you'd probably use them - but if you're in the classroom - 
you wouldn't 
and another suggested: 
you change according to who you're talking to 
The following is an extract from a conversation between two close 
friends (both men): 
[buying Christmas trees] 
B: oh uh I was up at Blackheath in the morning to buy a 
Christmas tree 
C: you/did you actually buy one 
B: yes - got one 
C: well has it got roots 
B: - no it hasn't - no 
C: how much was it 
B: erm quid fifty - about five foot tall 
C: that's not bad - we went down to Henry's and had a look 
at them but er ummm not particularly impressive - none of 
them had roots 
B: --------------------more at this place I went to at 
Blackheath was very good 
C: whereabouts is that 
B: er just opposite the station 
C: oh 
B: just across the road 
C: a cross the road 
B: across the road from the station - yeah 
C: it's it's normally a plant shop is it 
B: well call it green grocery and things yeah 
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C: oh yes yeah 
B: there there's another shop in Blackheath village that was 
selling really scrawny ones five or six quid a time 
yeah well Blackheath I can believe it [Camb 9B14/18-33] 
Incomplete utterances, yeahs and ums signal this as informal. Three 
vague expressions occur in rapid succession. Clearly the presence of 
these vague expressions is dictated also by the Conversational Maxims: 
Quantity - it is not necessary to know exactly how tall the tree was, 
or what the shop sold, and quality - the speakers probably did not 
measure the height of the trees, perhaps do not remember the price of 
the trees and do not know for sure what kind of shop it was. 
Obviously informality and giving the right amount of information are 
closely related. 
My second example shows calculated informality, similar to that 
noted for the Vichy advertisement: 
[children's book title] 
All about Cuckoos and Robins and Things 
The contents of the book make clear that what is intended is not the 
whole category BIRDS, but a subset: those that live in gardens and 
parklands. We know from Rosch's experimental work on this category 
(Rosch, 1973) that the robin is considered to be prototypical of the 
category BIRD. Hence the title is not very informative in identifying 
the intended category. Given, however, that it is aimed at children, 
it looks like an attempt to communicate in their register which is 
informal in a special way. 
5.4.8 Women's language 
The test subjects thought that women use'more vague expressions' than 
men do. I did not control for this variable in looking for examples, 
but I have no evidence to suggest that it is the case. 
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The subjective impression that women use more vagueness could 
arise from several factors. Firstly, as we have, seen, vagueness is 
associated with deference. If, in turn, women are seen to be or are 
required to be, deferent more often than men, then women will be 
expected to use vagueness. That is to say, if it is true that women 
use more vagueness, they do so not because they are women, but because 
they are deferent or uncertain. 
Secondly, there is a view that women have their own language 
varieties for speaking about matters of concern to women. Angela 
Carter (1980) suggests that these varieties incorporate a "high degree 
of unspecificity". She writes: 
"Any daughter sent out by her mother for a 'piece of cheese' 
will return with roughly the same amount (about half a 
pound). In fact, we all know what we mean by virtue of 
praxis, pure and simple; any fool ought to be able to work 
out how much butter, how many eggs, given a knowledge of the 
number of mouths there are to feed. (Men always insist on 
shopping lists itemized down to the last microgram and 
milliliter. )" 
Language users recognise that women engage in this sort of time-saving 
brevity, hence the test subjects' judgment. Of course it is quite 
erroneous to suggest that only women do it. Any social group sharing 
interests and knowledge, employs non-specificity in talking about 
their shared interest. For example, people who repair their own cars 
might say the following: 
Could you get me some sparking plugs? 
Non-specialists asks 'how many? '. Specialist knows Renault has four, 
some Citroens only 2, and you always change them together. 
I'll get some spares for our holiday - belts and things 
(= small easily changeable engine parts which might need replacing on 
the road (eg points, plugs, condenser)). Non- specialist has no idea 
what they are and so cannot identify the category referred to. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, I have looked at a wide range of conversational uses 
of vague additives (however, I have certainly not looked at all 
possible uses). These are varied both in the types of discourses from 
which they come, and in the effects which could be observed. The 
widespread use of vagueness for varied purposes demonstrates what an 
important aspect it is of the language user's knowledge of his 
language. 
I have said that the discourse settings, and the effects 
observed, are varied. At the same time, there is an important 
unifying feature, which is that in every case an element of 
uncertainty is introduced for at least some participant in the 
conversation. Where vague language is used to tailor the amount of 
information given, hearers are uncertain by virtue of being in receipt 
of less than the full facts. If the hearer of the Christmas tree 
height were asked how tall the tree was, which his friend had bought, 
he would have to say that he did not know exactly. Of course, hearers 
are often not aware of the lack of precise information, because, as I 
have argued, it is sufficient for the purposes of the particular 
conversation-in which they are taking part. If a speaker is unsure of 
his subject, or cannot find the right words, his uncertainty is 
present, and is communicated to his hearers. Hearers in turn are 
presented not with something precise, but with a series of options. 
In the case that the speaker does not know, or does not use, the right 
word or expression to name a category, but replaces it with a vague 
Category Identifier, his hearer must be uncertain to some degree of 
the extension of the category the speaker intends. The same applies 
to the use of an approximation for a quantity. In self- protection 
uses, the speaker is perceived as uncertain of his authority, and this 
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is apparent to hearers, who pick up on such cues as presence of a 
non-Round Number (if it is an approximation). In the deference and 
politeness examples, the hearer is provided with the opportunity to 
act upon the speaker's utterance in different ways, and so has 
uncertainty passed on to him, at least until he has made, a choice. 
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Lexical Aspects 
6.1 Introduction 
In the discussion of vague additives thus far ,I have treated the 
expressions under consideration holistically. However, it is the case 
that all the expressions are made up of two or more lexical items, 
each of which has uses other than those discussed here. So there are 
two tasks to be undertaken in this short chapter, firstly to consider 
the extent to which the meanings which can be established for other 
uses of these words contribute to the meaning of the vague expressions 
in which they 
, 
appear. Secondly, on the basis of this, to discuss, 
somewhat speculatively, whether these vague additives should be 
described as idioms or partial idioms in an eventual lexicon of 
English. 
6.2 Lexical Descriptions 
6.2.1 Or 
Or occurs in both the number approximations (n or m, n or so) and in 
the tag set or something (like that). 
One difficulty for me is that there is by no means any agreement 
as to the analysis of what are understood to be "normal" uses of or 
(ie, leaving aside those above). There are three areas of doubt; (a) 
is there one English or, or two (exclusive and inclusive), or more; 
(b) to what extent can English or be equated with the logical 
connectives for inclusive or exclusive disjunction; and (c) what are 
the conditions on acceptable use of or, and how should they be stated? 
Some of the literature on (a) is in Hurford (1974) and for an opposite 
view, Gazdar (1979), who summarizes much other work. Fillenbaum 
167 
Chapter 6 
(1978) and Wexler (1978) tackle this question for both or and and from 
the point of view of psychological theory. (b) is of course closely 
connected with (a) because if there is only one or, then it is 
potentially more like the logical operator. Gazdar (1979) tackles 
this issue. Fillenbaum (1978) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) 
report psycholingustic work, designed to test whether people employ 
the natural language connectives similarly to their putative logical 
equivalents. (c) is discussed by, among others, Lakoff (1971), Quirk 
et al (1972) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972). It is not the place 
of this thesis to become involved in these debates. I shall, 
therefore, extract from the references cited, what appear to be the 
generally agreed observations pertaining to or, and then consider 
separately how much the special uses of or which I am looking at are 
like them. 
Firstly, there is the 'common topic' condition, noted by Lakoff 
(1971: 148) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972: 92). This is to say that 
part utterances connected by or must be perceived as having something 
to do with each other. Thus: 
(1) Could you get me some apples or some oranges at Sainsbury's[l] 
is fine but 
(2) Could you get me some apples or a washing up brush 
is odd. Some informants who I questioned informally about (2) said 
that they felt impelled to try to find a common feature shared by 
apples and washing-up brushes, say price, to get an appropriate 
reading. Fillenbaum (1974,1978) demonstrated experimentally that 
speakers are sensitive to the 'common topic' condition. In his 
1 In this chapter I revert to the earlier convention of marking 
attested examples with '+'. 
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experiments subjects were asked, among other tasks, to make 
appropriateness judgments on sentences containing violations of the 
'common topic' condition. Where these were simple questions, for 
example, "96 per cent of the judgments characterised them as strange 
or weird" (1974: 916). 
Secondly, it has been observed that certain constructions 
containing or, which are disjunctive, can be thought to have arisen 
from ellipsis (Quirk et al: 9.34 and 9.61ff), or what is known as 
conjunction reduction (eg Harries 1973). Thus, for example: 
(3) We can take John's car or Bill's 
can be described as being derived from 
(3a) [we can take John's car] OR [we can take Bill's car] 
SS 
Thirdly, as Quirk et al (and others) note, English disjunctive or 
is almost always understood as exclusive, to the extent that, it is 
quite hard to construct examples which force an inclusive reading, 
unless one adds or both. Their example is: 
(4) You can boil yourself an egg or you can make some cheese 
sandwiches, or you can do both 
Hurford's example of 
(5) Inmates may smoke or drink 
which we understand as inclusive, tends to show that inferences from 
pragmatic knowledge are what decide whether instances are understood 
as inclusive or exclusive. Hurford's conclusion, however, is that 
"some instances of English or are inclusive, while others are 
exclusive" (: 411). Gazdar deals with this by making all instances 
truth-conditionally inclusive, but with a generalised conversational 
im-plicature of exclusivity, which can be expressly cancelled. The 
precise account which should be given of disjunctive or is not 
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important here. 
A fourth point about disjunctive or is that noted by Hurford, 
that 
"the joining of two sentences by or is unacceptable if one 
sentence entails the other; otherwise the use of or is 
acceptable. " 
Thus: 
(6) *John is an American or a Californian 
Gazdar argues that Hurford's analysis is incorrect, depending as it 
does on a sentence, (5), which contains a modal. He proposes that the 
correct constraint is that sentences entailing one another may be 
conjoined if the entailed sentence potentially implicates the negation 
of the entailing sentence, otherwise they may not. This will still 
account for (6). 
6.2.2 And. 
The treatment of the connective and is in many ways similar to that of 
or. Its equivalence or not to the logical connective has been 
discussed (among others by Cohen (1971), Schmerling (1978), Gazdar, 
1979). The question of whether there are two ands, one symmetrical 
and one asymmetrical, is discussed by Lakoff (1971). Lakoff, and 
Fillenbaum (1978), again discuss its various uses and their 
constraints, and again sentences containing constituents joined by and 
have been analysed as having undergone reduction or ellipsis (Harries, 
1973). 
The 'common topic' condition applies to and in the same way as to 
or and as Lakoff demonstrated, the perceived similarity may be at the 
level of presupposition or inference. 
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What is described by Lakoff as asymmetric and is the one where 
the conjuncts are ordered with respect to time, eg: 
(7) *The Lone Ranger rode, off into the sunset and mounted his horse 
But Kempson (1975: 56) shows that even if these were two separate 
sentences, the ordering conditions would still apply, so this has 
nothing to do with the meaning of and as such. Lakoff concludes that 
such uses are special cases of symmetrical and. 
For the reduction/ellipsis account, there is the problem that 
some well-known instances of and cannot be derived by ellipsis, eg 
(8) John and Mark collided in the corridor 
(9) John and Mary don't like each other 
I notice that a contrast between and in a construction arrived at by 
ellipsis, and in a construction not deriving from ellipsis, is the 
possibility of the reduced version, or not. In an' ellipted 
construction, and can be full and stressed, or reduced: 
(10) John (/and/ ) Mary came into the room 
(/ and/ ) 
(/an/ ) 
(/n/ ) 
where the bottom three have a meaning contrast with the first. Ands 
not in a putative ellipted construction cannot be full, thus: 
(11) *John /and/ Mark collided in the corridor 
6.2.3 So 
So has, a number of uses, some of which can be excluded from 
consideration on distributional grounds. Thus so as an emphasiser 
(Quirk et al: 5.51) can be left out, as can so as a conjunct (eg "I 
didn't feel well so I didn't go"). These uses cannot occur 
clause-finally. The uses of so which are of interest are those which 
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Quirk et al call PROFORMS, very commonly in a construction with the 
pro-verb do, thus 
(12) She hoped that he would search the room carefully before her 
arrival but he didn't do so (2.17) 
c part so stands for) 
They note that it can be a proform for a clause (10.62), for an object 
(14.16), or for a predication (9.80). 
Another use which may be related to the number approximation one 
is that with and: and so on, and and so forth which the Longman 
Dictionary of Contemporary English glosses as "and other things of 
this kind, and continuing". 
6.2.4 Something 
As seen in Chapter 4, something alternates with anything, in tags, as 
between assertive and non-assertive contexts. In this way it 
parallels the usual uses of something described by Quirk et al 
(4.127). Something acts as a proform NP for (the Longman Dictionary 
of Contemporary English) "some unstated or unknown thing", as opposed 
to person ("someone") or place ("somewhere"). 
Mittwoch (1981) notes that "for the purposes of concord, 
something functions as a singular NP" (: 119). She notes that there 
are two somes: somel being that found in "some bread", and the other, 
always stressed, in "some book or other". Mittwoch claims that the 
some in something is some2, in which case it has the features 
[+delimited quantity] [+specified quantity] [+count] "[+singular]. At 
the same time, something can be used to report a plural, for example 
when "I ate something" is used to report that I ate three sandwiches. 
6.2.5 Like 
Prepositional uses of like are said by the Oxford Advanced Learners' 
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Dictionary to be "often governing a pronoun, noun or gerund". Given 
its position, the tag use of like must be a preposition, and it is 
followed by that which, I suggest below, is here functioning as as 
pronoun. This like is glossed as "such as, resembling". Weinreich 
(1963: 130) calls like "the most powerful extrapolator of all" in the 
class of operators which "function as instructions for the loose or 
strict interpretation of designata". 
6.2.6 Things 
Thing is a useful portmanteau noun which may be used to refer to any 
material object, and to non-material concepts as well. It also occurs 
in some idiomatic expressions such as quite the thing and do one's own 
thing. The Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary notes a sense which 
occurs only in the plural and is glossed as "belongings, articles of 
which the nature is clear (or thought to be clear) from the context", 
one of their examples being, "Bring your swimming things". 
6.2.7 That 
That occurs in or something like that, and things like that, and and 
that. As far as I have observed, it never occurs in reduced form, 
which, together with its position, suggests it is the pronoun use of 
that which is of interest here. That is the singular demonstrative 
pronoun "used to make a thing specific". Many uses are deictic (as 
defined in Lyons, 1977: 637), in that they point the location of a 
thing being referred to as "non-proximal" to the speaker. Another 
function is in textual deixis (Lyons: 667), where it is used to refer 
back to linguistic material previous in the discourse. 
6.3 Idiomaticity 
"There is no generally-accepted criterion which would enable 
us to draw a sharp distinction between phrasal lexemes, on 
the one hand, and cliches or fixed collocations on the other" 
(Lyons, 1977: 146) 
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As the above extract suggests, there is little agreement about how to 
treat multi-word phrases which in use seem to have some integrity as 
units. Weinreich (1969) summarizes varying approaches in American 
work on idioms up to that date, which he describes as having "a 
distinct hit and run quality". Becker (1975) talks similarly of 
idiom-like structures being "swept under the rug". In addition, as 
noted by Cowie (1981), there is a lack of generally agreed terminology 
for the various categories of idiomatic expression. 
For Weinreich, an idiom is an expression which has a literal 
counterpart, and thus involves ambiguity. He would have an idiom 
list, and process idioms by a comparison process with their literal 
counterparts. Expressions not having literal counterparts (because 
for Weinreich they are "ill-formed") are classed as "complex 
dictionary entries", for example by and large. Searle (1969) proposed 
the same kind of schema. 
Fraser (1970) defines an idiom as 
"a constituent or series of constituents for which the 
semantic interpretation is not a compositional function of 
the formatives of which it is composed" (: 22) 
He classified idioms into different levels of "frozenness". 
Becker, like Lyons, suggests that the divisions are not so clear 
cut. He distinguishes seven classes of expressions from "Polywords", 
which are invariable, such as forever, to "Verbatim Texts", whole 
texts which we memorize, eg "How ya gonna keep 'em down on the farm". 
Becker's view of language production is that it is more or less a 
haphazard exercise: 
"We start with the information we wish to convey and the 
attitudes toward that information that we wish to express or 
evoke, and we haul out of our phrasal lexicon some, patterns 
that can provide the major elements of this expression. Then 
the problem is to stitch these phrases together into 
something roughly grammatical, to fill in the-blanks with the 
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particulars of the case at hand, to modify the phrases if 
need be, and if all else fails to generate phrases from 
scratch to smooth over the transitions or fill in any 
remaining conceptual holes. " (: 72) 
Bolinger (1976) takes a similar view, saying that although language is 
a system ou tout-se tient, it is heterogeneous as well as homogeneous. 
Arguing from examples of collocations, lexemes like else and ago with 
an idiosyncratically limited distribution, and idiomatic uses such g3 
those of the verb bear, Bolinger's metaphor for language is of "a 
jerry-built structure": 
"our language does not expect us to build everything starting 
with lumber, nails, and blueprint, but provides us with an 
incredibly large number of prefabs, which have the magical 
property of persisting even when we knock some of them apart 
and put them together in unpredictable ways. " (: 1) 
He argues therefore in-favour of models of language which reflect this 
heterogeneity, rather than those which try to reduce everything to 
constituent parts. 
Psycholinguistic evidence on how idiomatic structures are 
processed tends to argue for the Bolinger view, and against the sort 
of schema proposed by Weinreich and Searle, in which the "literal" 
meaning is checked against context, and if found to be inconsistent, a 
"figurative" meaning is sought. If comprehending idioms involved the 
number of steps of back checking etc suggested in the comparison 
approach, we would expect idioms to take longer to process. However, 
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (1978) found that subjects could 
comprehend idioms as fast as literal interpretations, and possibly 
even faster, in situations where context was provided. In Swinney and 
Cutler's (1979) experiments, subjects saw contextless idiomatic and 
non-idiomatic sentences and consistently comprehended the idioms 
faster. Swinney and Cutler argue that their results favour a lexical 
representation of the idioms they looked at. 
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Many idiomatic uses are distinguished from their "literal" 
counterparts by intonation. Informant testing conducted by Jeffries 
(1981) indicated that hearers accurately recognise recordings of 
idiomatic uses, even when they are completely decontextualised. This 
also suggests that the Weinreich/Searle type account is not the right 
one. It might also indicate that such idioms are listed directly in 
the lexicon, complete with their intonation, since they can be looked 
up as such. 
Ladefoged (1972), speculating on the mental organisation of 
language, writes: 
"The indications from neurophysiology and psychology are 
that, instead of storing a small number of primitives and 
organizing them in terms of a (relatively) large number of 
rules, we store a large number of complex items which we 
manipulate with comparatively simple operations. The central 
nervous system is like a special kind of computer which has 
rapid access to items in a very large memory, but 
comparatively little ability to process these items when they 
have been taken out of memory" (: 282) 
To summarise then, a string which is a candidate for listing in 
the lexicon as a string (rather than being looked up under its 
constituent parts), should have some of the following characteristics: 
1 meaning not accessible from the sum of its parts 
2 some degree of "frozenness" to syntactic manipulation' 
3 some degree of constraint on replaceability of items within it 
4 some degree of prosodic "frozenness" 
Of course this is not to say that some perfectly well-formed 
apparently compositional strings might not also be stored as wholes in 
memory. From the point of view of linguistic model making, however, 
they are not a problem. 
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In the next section, I shall discuss each of the phrasal vague 
additives, in relation to its constituents, and consider whether it 
requires'a lexical listing or not. 
6.4 Lexical Meaning and Phrase Meaning 
6.4.1 nor m 
As far as the 'common topic' condition is concerned, n or m 
expressions keep to it, in the sense that n and m must both be 
numbers. As we have seen also, they can only be certain numbers, and 
being a Reference Point Number is a property common to both n and m. 
Secondly, the question of ellipsis, or reduction from two 
sentences. Is it feasible to consider deriving 
(13a) + He's written five or six articles 
from 
(13b) [He's written five articles] OR [He's written six articles] 
SS 
Clearly not, since the alternative meaning assigned to (13b) is quite 
different from the interval meaning associated with (13a). Quirk et 
al (: 13.70) note that what they call co-ordinate expressions of 
approximation with or are very difficult to explain in terms of 
ellipsis. In this way then, the vague use of or is unlike its 
alternative use. 
My third point was that alternative or is almost always 
understood as exclusive. Although we have gone some way to 
establishing that or in an approximation is not understood as 
presenting two alternatives, it is the case that the whole vague 
expression is understood as disjunctive between many alternatives (ie, 
all the numbers in the interval). 
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The final point on or was the entailment relationship described 
by Hurford and modified by Gazdar. Here, approximative uses of or fit 
in with Gazdar's constraint. (a) the m number always entails the n 
number and at the same time, (b) the n number potentially implicates 
the negation of the m number, since it is a property of the use of 
numbers for quantities that they potentially implicate "at most". 
See, for example, discussion of "Mary has five children" in Wachtel 
(1981). 
I have described in Chapter 3 how the prosodies observed in vague 
uses of n or m are quite dissimilar from disjunctive uses. This 
prosodic marking suggests that this use of or should not be considered 
as disjunction. Secondly, we have seen other dissimilarities. 
Thirdly as we have seen, the interval-of-numbers meanings, which 
hearers attribute to these structures, have no direct connection with 
orthodox disjunction which presents just two (exclusive or inclusive) 
possibilities. 
Yet this use of or is indirectly related to the disjunctive use. 
Firstly, disjunction expresses uncertainty: or connects possibilities, 
one or both of which may be true. Similarly in n or m expressions, 
there is uncertainty, and a whole interval of numbers is given as 
possibilities. Secondly, the fact that the two exemplar numbers each 
side of or, are always considered to be members of the interval of 
possible numbers, cannot be ignored. An inclusive disjunction reading 
accounts for that, what it does not account for is all the other 
numbers in the acceptable interval. 
Finally, the question of n or m as a corvsAVMC %öv lb- .. As far as 
the characteristics of phrasal lexemes were concerned, it is true that 
the meaning attributed by hearers to n or m cannot be deduced from the 
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sum of the meanings of its parts. Neither can its systematic 
difference in meaning from the other number approximations, such that 
it is always understood as allowing more possibilities (being more 
vague) than about/(a)round. If the approximation meaning is to be 
read off without a special entry, this will have to be by 
means of an implicature. It will be no good however, having this 
implicature attaching whenever two numbers are conjoined by or, since 
it is not present when the numbers are genuine alternatives. If it is 
present only when the correct intonation for a vague use has been 
placed, the implicature will have to be determined by the intonation. 
But the intonation. will have to be determined by the vague meaning 
(which is the implicature) so this will not work. In addition, the 
implicature would be non-cancellable, which implicatures classically 
should not be. This is not the way to deal with this., Given the 
relative (for a language system) rigidity of the constraints on 
selection and ordering of numbers, and on intonation, a separate 
iype, entry seems far preferable. 
6.4.2 n or so 
One of the most interesting points made by Wachtel (1981) in his reply 
which commented on a paper (Channell, 1980) in which appeared part of 
the material on number approximation presented in Chapter 3, is that n 
or so should be regarded as a variant of n or m with so being treated 
as a pro-numeral (: 316). This is also the approach of Quirk et al 
(: 13.70) who refer to the numeral following or being replaced. by so. 
As Wachtel notes, this analysis is consistent with the results I 
obtained for the meanings of n or so since the intervals invariably 
were skewed upwards from n. If so is being understood as in, and since 
m is always larger than n, this is what we would expect. Furthermore 
the magnitude of m is, as I have described, determined by that of n, 
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so a hearer may compute a likely m for any instance of so, from the n 
that he hears. 
That so is understood as a proform for an m number, is also 
consistent with its many others uses as a proform, which I outlined in 
6.2.2. There is also some meaning relationship between this so and 
that found in and so on, which we recall was glossed as "and other 
things of this kind". Hence this so can be glossed as "another thing 
of the kind we just had" viz, a number. 
As we would expect, the or in n or so is related and not related 
to disjunctive or in just the same ways as the one in n or in. In this 
case, there may be some arguments for not creating ä separate lexical 
entry for n or so, but for seeing it as a variant of n or in, created 
by use of the proform so which must have its own (rather abstract) 
lexical entry. The constraints noted on n or m will apply in the same 
way. 
6.4.3 Or Something 
Under this heading are encompassed the variants 
or (something ) (like that) 
(anything ) 
Here we have another occurrence of or, and we must consider whether 
this is a disjunctive use or not. 
The 'common topic' condition applies, in the sense that, as we 
have seen, the major aspect of meaning which has been observed is that 
the tag is understood as directing the hearer to a' category which 
shares features with the preceding exemplar (Chapter 4). There were 
no (compliant) responses in the tests, where informants interpreted 
the tag meaning as completely unrelated to the exemplar. In this 
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respect it is clear that what hearers know of the usual use of or 
contributes importantly to their understanding of or something. 
Secondly, the question of ellipsis/reduction. This sometimes 
appears to work, such that: 
[one of the secretaries was saying there was a film] OR 
S [one of the secretaries was saying there was 
S something like that] 
can be read, I think, as having the meaning associated with the 
derived sentence. To make this plausible, it seems necessary to see 
like that as having been present, but deleted in all instances of 
these tags. 
Where or something is conjoined to a VP, reduction/ellipsis is 
not so neat, thus: 
[could we sort of meet] OR [could we sort of do something like that] 
SS 
since an invariably deletable dummy do is necessary in the second S. 
This would make these VP + tag constructions not accountable by the 
regular ellipsis rules which could be formulated to apply to 
disjunctive or. 
Another possible argument against seeing or something as the 
product of ellipsis is prosodic. In the case where two alternatives 
are presented, with or, the second one is usually a separate tone 
unit, and the or may even be a separate tone unit and receive a heavy 
contrastive stress, thus: 
(14) You can come with us or. yon can stay at home 
As I reported in Chapter 4, all the instances of or something that I 
have observed, have a one tone group intonation, and I do not think 
contrastive stress on the or is possible: 
\\ 
(15) ? *there was a filmllor11something 
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It's rather difficult to assign a meaning to (15). 
Then there is the question of exclusive vs. inclusive readings. 
The evidence is, I think, that or something tags behave just like 
other or-disjunctions in that pragmatic considerations dictate whether 
hearers interpret these as exclusive or inclusive; thus: 
(16) +Could we sort of meet or something 
is heard as exclusive (as are most tags, in the same way as most 
disjunctions), but maybe something like. 
(17) Would you like some dessert - trifle or something? 
could be heard as inclusive. 
Of course, if this or is not like alternative or, the question of 
inclusive versus exclusive may be irrelevant. One reason for 
suspecting this, is that speakers do not appear to have options of 
forcing the exclusive and inclusive readings by using either and or 
both, respectively. I'm not sure-one could say: 
(18) *One of the secretaries said there'was either a film or something 
and still less 
(19) *One of the secretaries said there was a film or something or 
both 
and I have no examples of anything like this. These uses of either 
and or both are quite normal with alternative or. This then, is a 
very clear difference from alternative or. 
The entailment situation is somewhat blurred, but subjects' 
responses indicated that they used the Gazdar-formulated potential 
implicature constraint, such that for example, for oranges or 
something, if SOMETHING = any member of-the category of orange-like 
things, then "something" implicates NOT "oranges". 
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Something is also a constituent of this tag. Its gloss of "some 
unstated or unknown thing" fits in with what we can observe of its 
meaning here, since its unknownness is qualified by the like that 
which attaches to it. The fact that it may appear with plural 
exemplars, is also quite in accord with Mittwoch's observation that 
other uses of something can be used to report plurals. 
Like indicates "such as, resembling". As we have seen, tags are 
always taken to indicate items which "resemble" in some sense their 
exemplar. 
. 
It seems obvious that the regular meaning of like 
contributes importantly to this meaning. In addition, we have the 
presence of that, which, given the informants' responses, must be 
taken I think as a deictic pointer back to the exemplar. 
Thus the meanings hearers attribute to or something tags are very 
closely related to the constituent parts of the tags. The only 
problem for an account which rests-on combining the constituents each 
time, is the behaviour of or, which differs from its "normal" 
counterpart, in particular as far as intonational characteristics are 
concerned. If there is a cline with at one end cliches and fixed 
collocations, and at the other, frozen idioms, then it looks as if 
this expression may be closer to the fixed collocations end. 
6.4.4 And things (like that) 
I gave in Chapter 4 the reasons why I consider like that to have been 
ellipted from occurrences of and things. 
The 'common topic' condition on and, is seen to apply to these 
tags for the same reasons as I gave in more detail for or something, 
in the previous section, and to avoid repetitious discussion, I will 
not go through them again. 
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And in this tag, is understood as a conjunction, in the sense 
that both the exemplar and the other members of the associational 
category are understood as being indicated. Thus it contrasts in the 
usual way with or. 
On the question of ellipsis/reduction, again here, some sentences 
look quite convincing: 
(20) +1 had to give them sentences with it in and things like that 
[I had to give them sentences with it in] AND 
S [I had to give them things like that] 
S 
The strongest reason for not seeing this and as the result of ellipsis 
is prosodic. The and which occurs in tags, -is never (at least in all 
the examples I have) full and stressed, whereas, as I noted in 6.2.2, 
the and of putative ellipted constructions may be full and stressed. 
Now, things, as noted, is more or less a proform for anything, 
and as we saw, there is another instance of its use where contextual 
factors of some kind determine, as here, how it should be "filled" 
("swimming things"). Another link with that use is that it is 
invariably plural, just as it is in this tag. 
Clearly here, just as with or something, the (sometimes tacit) 
presence of like that contributes importantly to the meaning of the 
whole tag. 
So the situation parallels almost exactly that for or something. 
Everything can be accounted for from the constituents, except the 
special aspects of and, and the particular and rigid intonation 
structure. 
6.4.5 And That 
In Chapter 4,1 considered and that independently of the other tags. 
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As we saw at that point, it appears to have the same meaning, in the 
sense that something like car and that is understood to designate an 
associational category of' which car is a good example. And in and 
that is in the same relationship with its "normal" use as that in and 
things like that. That also appears to be the same. 
The difficulty is that there is nothing lexical in this tag from 
which to read off the meaning "some other member of the same 
associational category", since and will only give conjunction and 
perceived similarity, and deictic that, as a deictic pronoun referring 
to the exemplar, gives only a repetition of it. One possiblity then 
is to see this as much more idiomatic than the other tags, in the 
sense that the meanings observable for it are definitely not available 
from the sum of its parts. 
The other possibility is that again here, there is ellipsis, from 
and things like that, to and that. Then the full version contains all 
that is necessary to provide the meaning. I do not however, beyond 
the plausibility of this analysis, have any evidence for or against 
it. I don't have, as I do for example for or something, evidence that 
the two variants are in variation for the same speaker, in similar 
contexts and with similar meanings understood by hearers. 
It is therefore possible only to conclude that (a) the 
constituents of and that contribute to its meaning, but that (b) it 
may well need a special lexical entry. 
6.5 The Single Word Number Approximators 
about/around/round/approximately n 
These are different from the expressions so far considered. They are 
rather less likely candidates for being seen as idioms, and rather 
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more likely to be seen as fixed collocations when conjoined with 
numbers. Each of the words has other uses than with numbers, as 
follows: 
6.5.1 About 
About occurs otherwise than with numbers as a spatial preposition, eg 
(the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English) "They walked about 
the streets" , and as an adverb, 
(the Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English), "Is there anybody about? ", which Quirk et al 
(6.10), suggest is an ellipsis from a prepositional phrase such as 
"about the house/ building etc". It also occurs as a non-spatial 
preposition: (the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English) "Have 
you a book about the stars". This non-spatial use has an identifiable 
relationship with the spatial uses. So about is considered as meaning 
"somewhere within the general area of" both literally and 
figuratively. 
6.5.2 around/round 
These are similar to about, in spatial uses. Bennett (1975: 86-88) 
analyses the locative use of (a)round as [+locative] [+surround]. He 
notes that around and round are very often interchangeable and 
concludes: "It is unclear to me whether any correlation can be made 
between the semantic structure in a given instance and the likelihood 
that one or other of the two forms will occur. "(: 88) My observation is 
that in approximation uses around is more common, whichisthe opposite 
of Bennett's observation concerning spatial uses, so there may be a 
tendency to move towards a rule. Around and round have figurative 
uses, too, eg "They talked round/around the subject for a while". 
6.5.3 Approximately 
Approximately is different, in that the Longman dictionary claims that 
it is only used with numbers. It seems to me however that it can be 
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(21) ? The work is approximately complete 
(22) The card is approximately circular 
What is clear is that approximately does not have the spatial 
prepositional uses which can be observed for the other three 
approximators. 
6.5.4 Discussion 
The first reason for not seeing these as idioms is the degree of 
substitutability possible, any of them can be substituted for each 
other, and for a number of other prepositions (see below). 
Secondly, there are no particular intonational patterns found 
with the number uses.. There is not in principle any technical 
difficulty about constructing these expressions afresh from the 
lexicon each time they are required. 
The other general question on these is whether the number uses 
are different senses (ie is there polysemy [2] in the sense of Lyons, 
1977: 550ff), or will just one sense suffice to account for the 
different observable uses? This is not a thesis on lexical semantics, 
and again here, it must be acknowledged that there is really little 
agreement among those in the field about how to establish different 
senses, or how to deal with them when you have. Cruse (1982) surveys 
the various discussions and other references are Nunberg (1979), 
Kempson (1979) and Lyons (1981a: 146ff). It seems best, 
therefore, not to get involved in this, but to offer the observations 
on the number approximation uses of these words as a. contribution to 
2 Homonymy is ruled out because some sharedness of meaning can be 
identified. 
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their future lexical analysis. 
As far as the number use of about/(a)round is concerned, we could 
see this as an extension from the spatial use in the sense that the 
language user conceptualises the number system as a long, narrow 
space, to points in which he can refer with spatial prepositions, just 
as he can to points in a street. Since many of the spatial 
prepositions can be used with numbers (under, and over, beneath, near, 
etc) this will be an instance of what Lehrer (1978) has analysed as 
semantic transfer. Her observation is that when one member of a 
semantic field develops a new sense, others will also develop related 
senses. In the case of approximately, however, we may prefer to see 
the development going in the other direction. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this section, I have considered the constituent parts of vague 
expressions in relation to their total meaning. What is most 
interesting about them, I think, is that they are a good example of 
expressions which have a partly systematic and partly idiosyncratic 
relationship with their constituent parts. This tends to support the 
view of language as something with "more patching and gluing about it 
than it has architectonics" (Bolinger, 1976: 1), and hence the goal of 
a model of language which reflects just these heteregeneous 
characteristics. 
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Chapter 7 
Semantics, Pragmatics and Vague Meanings 
7.1 Approach 
As I explained in Chapter 1, one reason for undertaking an examination 
of vague language was that there were already suggestions that it 
would be a hard testing ground for currently accepted semantic 
theories, and in particular for the necessary exercise of boundary 
drawing between semantics and pragmatics. In Chapter 1, I also 
mentioned a paper by Allwood (1981, hereinafter, Allwood), in which he 
reviews various theoretical approaches to meaning, and finds them 
wanting, being led thence to the general conclusion that: 
"... so far we have no theoretically interesting and 
consistent way of separating semantics from pragmatics and 
that perhaps the distinction is more of a hindrance than an 
aid to clarity in the study of meaning in natural languages. " 
In this theoretical chapter, I consider some possible ways to 
separate semantic and pragmatic aspects of vague language, and offer 
some programmatic sketches of how each approach could work, drawing on 
Allwood's discussion. I begin by summarising, in the next section, 
the vague meanings to be accounted for, and I argue that the two types 
of vague expressions examined should in fact be analysed as being the 
result of the same process. 
7.2 Vague Meanings 
I begin by reproducing from Chapters 3 and 4 the observations of 
meaning for the Number Approximations, and for the Vague Category 
Identifiers. 
Observed meanings associated with Number Approximations 
1 There is a set of expressions whose effect is to bring a vague 
reading (= an approximation) to an utterance containing a number 
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2 The resulting approximations are understood as designating 
continuous intervals of numbers 
3 Different approximators change the interval designated. Given an 
Exemplar-number x, (and setting aside the effect of other factors such 
as situation, and the form and nature of the E-number), the effect of 
the different approximators (as observed from the test results) can be 
seen schematically as follows: 
about/(a)round 
----------9 
n or so 
norm 
= minimum 
-- -- = maximum 
i 
7.62 
____ 32.30 
15.46 
___ 
56.69 
22.86 
Figure 4 
66.60 
4 Although there is a high degree of agreement among speakers that 
numbers near the exemplar number are members of the interval, there 
appears to be variation about the extent of the interval in any given 
case 
5 The size and form of the exemplar number both affect the length of 
the interval 
6 Whether the E-number is a round number (- Reference Point Number) 
or not affects the length of the interval ("about 31" vs "about 3Q") 
7 The nature of the item being approximated (discrete vs 
non-discrete, man vs cockroach) affects the interval 
8 The conversational setting in which an approximation occurs affects 
how it is understood 
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9 Sentences containing approximators characteristically have the 
entailments and implicatures described in 3.7. 
Observed meanings associated with Tags 
1 Vague tags are understood to designate categories, either 
conjunctively or disjunctively, consisting of either concrete 
("bread", "silver") or abstract ("meet", "elaborated code") entities. 
2 These categories a; e associationally rather than semantically 
defined. 
3 Several factors establish for the hearer the characteristics 
determining membership of the category. They are (a) the exemplar, 
which is understood to be a "good example" of the intended category; 
(b) the surrounding linguistic context; (c) the purpose of the 
conversation; and (d) the hearer's world knowledge which he brings to 
bear as relevant to the linguistic context and conversational setting. 
4 There is some evidence to suggest that these expressions cause 
particular comprehension problems for hearers who lack specific world 
knowledge of the conversational topic. That is to say, more problems 
than non-vague expressions in the same situation. 
7.2.2 A Unified Approach 
Now, what is common to the meanings of both types of expressions 
considered is that from an exemplar of some kind, a set consisting of 
a selection of possibilities is inferred. For the number 
approximations, this set is a subset of the set of Real Numbers, of 
which the exemplar number(s) is/are (a) member(s). For the tags, it 
is a set of abstract or concrete entities, of which the exemplar. is a 
member. 
An important observed characteristic of the sets associated with 
these vague expressions is that features of linguistic context, and 
situation, and world knowledge, all play a crucial role in 
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establishing, for any particular utterance of any vague expression, 
what the set consists of. 
We saw in Chapter 3, in relation to number approximations, how 
factors such as the perceived purpose of the approximation, and the 
item being approximated, appeared to affect the interval of numbers 
which were ' thought of as possibilities. Similarly in Chapter 41 for 
the tags, I described how the different results observed for the same 
exemplar demonstrated the influence of world-knowledge and imagined 
context on the sets which the subjects produced as their answers. 
Here then, we are able to observe in operation a clear instance 
of hearers "going beyond the information given" (in the sense of 
Bruner, 1973: 218), by use of particular inferential procedures. Such 
a view of language understanding is not new, cf Fillmore (1977) who 
says that interpreting a text: 
"... involves. much more than the processing of 
meanings directly provided by the text, but also memories, 
knowledge, and current perceptions of the interpreter, as 
well as the application of a set of procedures for 
determining the basis of the coherence of the text. " (: 86) 
On the more recent view of Milroy (1983), it is the inference 
procedures which have primacy in decoding utterances on the lines of 
'what kinds of things could this person possibly be meaning, given 
this situation, and what I know', and she suggests, it is only if this 
fails that recourse is made to the details of syntactic arrangement 
and lexical meaning, rather than, as more usually suggested, the other 
way round. She writes that "the relation between internal grammars 
and comprehension is indirect". Danell (1978: 14) writing specifically 
about vagueness, makes the same point. Another instance of going 
beyond the information given is the inferential procedures described 
by Allan (1981) for the understanding of animal nouns, like lamb, 
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which are understood as denoting meat or skins, or other aspects of 
lamb, depending on context. He sketches the sort of inferential rules 
which would be involved. Clark (1978) also gives a programmatic 
account of inference steps. (cf also the various approaches to shared 
knowledge and inferences in Smith, 1982. ) 
In the present case, we may deduce that hearers go beyond the 
information given, in rather closely circumscribed ways, such that 
they agree strikingly as to the results they come up with. How do 
they do this? Bruner: 
"... when one goes beyond the information given, one does so 
by virtue of being able to place the present given in a more 
generic coding system and one essentially reads off from the 
coding system additional information either on the basis of 
learned contingent probabilities or learned principles of 
relating material. " (: 224) 
This brings me to considering a further point about these vague sets. 
The sets of possibilities which hearers understand are sets which are 
well-defined in the sense of forming a recognisable category (cf (Tag) 
T-test informants' gloss responses: Table 4.5 and 4.6) (clearly in a 
rather more circumscribed way for the number sub-sets). This is to 
say that in going beyond the information given, hearers must be using 
the principles of categorisation which have been observed as a 
fundamental aspect of human cognition ( Palmer, 1975, for visual 
perception, Rosch and Lloyd, 1978, for psychological studies of the 
structure of categories, and the processes by which they are formed). 
Very generally, what this work shows is a cognitive predilection to 
organise items into categories, and to relate incoming stimuli to 
appropriate categories. 
Most of the work conducted in psychology has up to-now been done 
on categories of concrete objects. We have seen that where the vague 
tags contained concrete objects whose membership of particular 
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categories has already been demonstrated experimentally, the sets 
associated with them often bore a strong similarity to the 
experimentally determined categories (4.3.1). The situation for 
categories of non-concrete entities is quite otherwise since there is 
little work on them. Thus the analysis I am suggesting here is making 
an inferential leap in claiming that the non-concrete vague categories 
are equally the results of cognitive principles of categorization. It 
is, however, a leap which I think is warranted. 
I have said the sets are discernibly circumscribable. But it 
appears that their membership "boundaries" are not fixed. Informants' 
comments, observations of use, and the results of the two tests, all 
suggest strongly that these sets are woolly-edged, - "fuzzy" just in 
the sense of Zadeh (1975): 
"We have been slow in coming to the realisation that much 
perhaps most, of human cognition and interaction with the 
outside world involves constructs which are not sets in the 
classical sense, but rather "fuzzy sets" (or subsets), that 
is, classes with unsharp boundaries in which the transition 
from membership to nonmembership is gradual rather than 
abrupt. Indeed, it may be argued that the logic of human 
reasoning is not the classical two-valued or even multivalued 
logic but a logic with fuzzy truths, fuzzy connectives, and 
fuzzy rules of inference. " (: ix) 
In keeping with what has been observed in studies of 
categorisation, the sets appear to be internally structured in the way 
suggested by Lakoff (1972) and Rosch (1975a), such that, for example, 
all subjects agree that 15 is one of the possibilities allowed by 
"about 15" (N-Test item 5: Table 3.3), and all subjects (who gave item 
answers) agree that apples is a member of the set of possibilities 
allowed by "oranges or something" (T-Test item 1: Table 4.4). Whereas 
at what we may see as the "outer edges" of'the sets, agreement becomes 
less and less. 
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This brings me to my final general observation about how vague 
expressions are understood. We saw in Chapter 4 that the exemplar in 
vague Category Identifiers had to be regarded in some sense as a good 
example of the set it was to identify, and I described how the 
exemplars which were "good examples" from Rosch's (1975a) categories, 
produced responses which bore in some cases a very close resemblance 
to the membership of the relevant Rosch category. From this data, it 
seems reasonable to infer that understanding vague additives involves 
using another well-documented aspect of human cognition, the 
Prototype. Rosch (1978: 40-41) explains carefully that to speak of a 
Prototype is "a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really 
referred to are judgments of degree of prototypicality. Only in some 
artificial categories is there by definition a literal single 
prototype [. .] For natural language categories, to speak of a 
single entity that is'a prototype is either a gross misunderstanding 
of the empirical data, or a covert theory of mental representation". 
In this sense, what are understood to be used as exemplars are items 
which have a high degree of prototypicality for the understood set. 
Thus an exemplar with a low degree of prototypicality - necklace, for 
the category clothes; ( T-Test item 4: Table 4.4) - does not direct 
its hearers to the set of clothes, but to another, different, set. 
This principle applies equally to the number'approximations. We 
saw in Chapter 3 that these are highly likely to contain Round 
Numbers, and we saw also that Rosch's work on the internal structure 
of the category of number names showed that Round Numbers were 
understood as reference points, or in some way prototypical exemplars, 
in the structure of the number system. At the same time, I must 
recognize specifically that the number system, as used in 
approximations, is rather different, in the sense of being much more 
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highly structured than the vague conceptual categories which are 
identified by the vague Category Identifiers. 
Nevertheless I believe it is fair to say that the same general 
principles of manipulation are at work in both cases. 
7.3 Semantics and Pragmatics 
In this section, I look at different approaches to drawing the 
boundary between semantics and pragmatics. As noted by Allwood, this 
often takes the form of considering what is semantic to be in some way 
situation independent, whereas what is pragmatic will be closely 
related to actual contexts. 
7.3.1 Literal Meaning 
"This meaning is either seen as present in all situations of 
use, due to lingtstic conventions dependent on association 
between form and content only, or as a basic meaning from 
which the meaning of the linguistic expression in all 
situations of use can be derived. " (Allwood: 183) 
Literal meaning is thought to be closely connected with the meaning 
one can understand from decontextualised sentences. The first thing 
to be said on this is that it seems doubtful that what one gets from 
reading a decontextualised sentence is a decontextualised meaning. 
What we do when confronted with decontextualised sentences is to 
invent plausible contexts which enable us to understand them (Wachtel, 
1981; Mikkel Blakar and Rommetveit, 1975; Lanin, 1977). The necessity 
of recontextualising in order to understand is demonstrated partly by 
what happens when we cannot do it. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, 
subjects in Bransford and Johnson's (1972) experiments who heard texts 
which had been artificially contrived. to omit suitable contextual 
cues, performed much below normal on comprehension and recall tasks. 
The kinds of results Iýobtained in my test point to very much the same 
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strategy of 'recontextualisation on the part of my informants. This 
showed up in particular in the T-test, where the same exemplar was 
recontextualised in two items in two quite different ways (4.3.1 and 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5). 
So perhaps there is no such thing, psycholinguistically, as a 
decontextualised sentence and decontextualised meaning. But this does 
not mean there cannot be a valid notion of decontextualised meaning 
for descriptive purposes, if we can find a valid procedure for 
isolating it. 
Allwood considers three approaches to achieving it. Firstly the 
intersection or common denominator approach., 
According to this approach, those aspects of meaning which are 
semantic are those which are common to every occurrence of a given 
linguistic expression. In order to simplify the discussion in what 
follows I shall use just a few examples which will be representative 
of the two kinds of vague expressions described. 
In the case of the number approximations, we will want to 
attribute a literal meaning to five or six which reflects what is 
common to each of the three occurrences in examples (1) to (3), each 
of which was examined in Chapter 3 or Chapter 5: 
(1) [academic publishing] 
+You find that you get five or six articles and they're all 
very much the same [11,21.2] 
(2) [buying Christmas trees] 
+There's another shop in Blackheath that was selling really 
scrawny ones - five or six quid a time [Camb 9b14/32] 
(3) [informant work] 
+We've got about five or six of them but I'm only going to 
talk about three of them today [LAGB, 9,81] 
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Now, drawing on the results of the informant test (in which, as it 
happened, none of these three examples was used, although (1) was 
discussed by the subjects), we know that for each case a vague 
interval reading of possibilities will result. We also know that the 
different items being approximated will give different intervals: 
articles (1) and informants (3) cannot be subdivided (at least not in 
the contexts in which they were used in these examples), whereas 
pounds (2) can - this will probably give a narrower interval for (2) 
than for (1) and (3). Next, there is the influence of the perceived 
purpose of the utterance. The test subjects who heard (1), commented 
that: 
"He's using it for emphasis - because the whole sort of drift 
of the argument is that there are too many papers being 
produced (. ) that's a signal that it can just possibly be a 
sort of vague number saying there are lots of papers being 
produced and there shouldn't be that number" 
They felt that S did not have exact knowledge. In fact he could not 
have have done, since he wished to make his utterance fit a set of 
several situations in the world. 
(2) is, I would judge, another case of S making his utterance 
general for several cases. He many or may not have remembered some 
exact prices he saw. In addition, on the basis of the fuller extract, 
I suggested that informality played a role here. In (3), as I 
described in Chapter 5, hearers probably understand that S does know 
exactly how many informants he has. In this case his approximation 
draws attention away from this part of what he says, and towards what 
is important, that three will be spoken about. In addition, Ss use of 
but tells hearers that '3' is not part of the interval intended by 
five or six, since it is contrastive. 
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What we may extract as general is that an interval (a subset of 
Real Numbers) is understood, of which 5 and 6 must be members. Also 
this interval is fuzzy, in not having its end points definite in any 
given case. All other aspects of the meaning must then be accounted 
for by pragmatic rules which reflect the inferential processes hearers 
use. For example, for five or six informants: 
A 
Inference 1: S knows how many he has (from premise, S is giving 
a paper about a subject he can be presumed to 
know well) 
Inference 2: the formal setting (in comparison with, for example 
that of example (2)) rules out the choice of 
approximation for informality 
Inference 3: S is focussing attention (by elimination of other 
possibilities) 
B 
Inference 1: persons are wholes (from situation) 
Inference 2: interval is probably 4-7 (from the exemplars, 5 
and 6, and the number 3 being excluded by but) 
For the tag approximations, I shall look at two tags which had 
the same exemplar, in the informant test (results are in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5): 
(4) I stopped myLiIV- by the, verge, then a car or something 
came along and splashed me all over with water (T-test 16) 
(5) They've got a car and that (T-test 24) 
I leave aside the disjunctive/conjunctive contrast, which can be 
accounted for without difficulty either from the semantics of and vs 
or, or by stipulation in complex lexical entries, as we saw in Chapter 
6. Again here, sets are involved in understanding both examples, and 
sets of which car, the exemplar, is both a member, and a central 
member or good example. 
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In the two cases, different supposed context supplied by the test 
informants led them to produce two different sets, which can be 
loosely characterised as "the set of wheeled road vehicles" (4), and 
"the set of desirable items associated with relative wealth" (5). 
What is common to both occurrences is that a set of associated 
items is involved, of which the exemplar is a member. Only this then, 
can be analysed as semantic. All the mechanism of using the exemplar 
as a prototype, taking account of context and purpose, etc, in order 
to read off the relevant set, is to be dealt with by pragmatic rules 
which again would embody the likely inferential processes, on the 
lines, of, for example for (4): 
Inference 1: linguistic context gives public highway as likely 
setting 
Inference 2: linguistic context specifies things which can splash 
Inference 3: vehicles are most likely candidates 
Two things are noticeable about this sort of approach. Firstly, the 
proposed semantics is rather uninteresting, in the sense of making a 
quite small relative contribution to the observed meaning of the 
expressions in use. (cf Allwood making this same point: 184). Many 
linguists, notably Lyons in his recent writings (1977,1981a, 1981b), 
have a pretheoretical predilection to keep more of meaning in 
semantics than would happen with this approach. Secondly, the 
semantic representations would have to be vague. Many people are not 
prepared to allow vagueness in semantics (eg, Wachtel and Sadock, 
discussed below). (But see Klein (1982) for proposals to allow vague 
expressions in the formal language needed for the semantics of 
comparatives. ) 
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The second approach to literal meaning is the idea of an essence 
- abstracting 'basic' or 'ideal' aspects from instances of use. As 
noted by Allwood, what is difficult in this case is to recognise what 
the essence of a linguistic expression is. In the case of the vague 
expressions, the obvious candidate would be that they are vague - this 
appears to be the essence of all the actual instances of use. On this 
account, perhaps, the semantic representations for English would 
contains a subset of vague representations for these kinds of 
expressions. Pragmatics would then take care of all the rest of the 
meaning effects which were observed. Again this entails semantic 
representations which do very little of the work of explaining the 
meanings of vague language, and semantic representations which are 
vague. In addition it is difficult to see what empirical procedures 
could be used to determine basic meanings. 
The third approach to literal meaning which Allwood considers is 
to say that it consists of the union of all uses of an expression. 
This has the effect of "connecting any information that has been 
conveyed by a linguistic expression with its literal meaning". 
Clearly for the expressions I am considering, this would be nothing 
short of disastrous, since, say for car or something, all the 
conceivable sets of which it could be thought to be a good example in 
all situations of use, would be involved in the literal meaning of the 
string. Included also would be all the conversational effects which 
we saw in Chapter 5 which can sometimes attach to uses of vague 
expressions. 
The next solution Allwood considers is that which, says that only 
some linguistic expressions have situation independent meaning - the 
syncategorematic expressions. Categorematic or contentful expressions 
201 
Chapter 7 
depend on context for specification. The difficulty here for the 
analysis of vague tags is that they contain a mixture of what are 
usually thought of as syncategorematic items (and, or, perhaps the 
numbers) and categorematic ones like that and things. If we choose, 
as I argued we should in the preceding chapter, to regard the 
expressions holistically, then they would be categorematic. But the 
idea of having syncategorematic items mixed up inside categorematic 
"lexical items" is not theoretically attractive. 
On the matter of the relationship between literal/conventional 
meaning and referential meaning, Allwood cites Kempson (1977) as an 
example of someone who takes the two notions to be the same. His 
point is that they cannot be equated, - because intuitively, 
conventional meaning is much wider than referential meaning. In the 
case of car or something, a description of its conventional meaning 
(vague, indicates a 'set, etc), will be very different from its 
referential meaning, which only comes into existence at the moment of 
its use on a given occasion. 
7.3.2 Bivalent Truth-Conditional Semantics 
A particular version of the common-denominator approach is truth 
-conditional semantics, in which a statement of the conditions which 
must pertain in any situation for a sentence to be true, are seen as 
all and only what is necessary to state its semantics. In a bivalent 
semantics, only two values are possible -a sentence is either true, 
or false, of a given situation. Pragmatics, in this model, concerns 
itself with all those aspects of meaning which are not amenable to 
treatment by truth-conditions (cf Gazdar 1979: 2). 
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A considerable literature exists which argues that many aspects 
of meaning general to all occurrences of a sentence, are quite 
unamenable to treatment by truth-conditions, for example Kempson, 
1975, Section 2. Lyons (1981b) brings to bear criticism of 
truth-conditional semantics on account of "its restriction to 
propositional content and its inability to handle the phenomenon of 
subjectivity" (: 240), and in Lyons (1982), he describes how it cannot 
easily handle such things as modals, and the French 'conditionnel de 
citation' which he argues are manifestations of subjectivity. Allwood 
rehearses many of the standard examples. 
The vague language under study here provides another example of 
utterances which are not easily amenable to treatment by truth 
conditions. I shall look at two attempts which have been made to 
account for number approximations. As far as I know, no-one has 
proposed a bivalent truth-conditional account of the vague Category 
Identifiers, but given their manifest similarities of meaning to the 
number expressions, I can show how they might be dealt with within the 
two approaches to be discussed. 
The problem for a truth-conditional account is that for any use 
of a number approximation, it is apparently impossible to specify the 
point at which it ceases to be true, so for example, (2) is probably 
judged true of trees actually costing ßf7, but probably untrue of trees 
costing J14. 
Similarly the tags exhibit the same cut-off point problem. (4) 
would probably be judged true of a situation where the thing in 
question was a bus, marginally true if it was a horse, and probably 
false if it was an elephant. 
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Sadock's (1977) account offered a semantics for sentences 
containing approximately. As we saw in Chapter 3, the meanings 
associated with approximately are very similar to those of other 
number approximations, so we may safely assume that his account could 
be applied to them as well. It could also be applied to the tags, as 
I shall show below. 
Sadock's approach is to argue that because of the multiplicity of 
factors affecting appropriate approximation, the only possible 
truth-conditional account is "a fairly trivial one", in which a number 
approximation is always true, provided the thing being approximated 
can have the property of being measurable. All the relevant 
constraints on what makes approximations acceptable in given 
circumstances will be dealt with by pragmatic rules, in the same way, 
Sadock proposes, as Grice's (1975: 70) proposals for tautologies, which 
as noted also by Allwood, are referentially- all identical, but 
different in their sense. 
Sadock's account would extend quite naturally, I think to the tag 
approximations, in the sense that we could analyse the category 
identifier in (4) as being true in all circumstances, but only 
appropriate in certain ones, determined by the sort of contextual 
factors I noted, which would'be dealt with by pragmatics. 
Sadock makes a number of useful observations on the use of 
approximations, which I described in Chapter 3. This is an example 
perhaps of the usefulness Lyons (1981b) attributes to attempts to deal 
with unamenable data: 
"The failure of a precise, but inadequate, N. account often 
points the way to the construction of an equally precise, but 
more comprehensive, theory of the same phenomena. And even 
when it does not do this, it may throw some light, obliquely 
and by reflection, upon the data that it does not fully 
illuminate. " (: 143) 
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Sadock's account, however, is untenable, even on its own terms. 
A truth-conditional semantic account must be able to deal with the 
entailments of the sentences it purports to account for, as well as 
the effect on them of the putative logical operators such as NOT. 
Wachtel (1980: 203) shows that Sadock's account fails, in making an 
incorrect prediction about the meaning of: 
(6) Sam is not approximately six feet tall 
which should entail the proposition that Sam has no height- at all, 
which it arguably does not. However the defence to this is the one 
used by Wachtel to get out of a counter-example to his own proposal, 
that (6) is an example of what Sperber and Wilson (1981) call"mention" 
rather that "use", so is not a denial of the content of the 
approximation. Fillmore (1971: 122) calls this semi-quotation, one of 
his examples being: 
(7) 1 didn't "escape" from the prison; they released me 
In addition, Sadock's account predicts that 
(8) Sam is exactly six feet tall 
entails 
(9) Sam is approximately three feet tall 
which Wachtel argues is "counterintuitive". 
Wachtel's own proposal is also for a bivalent truth-conditional 
semantics. He assumes that for any particular occasion of utterance 
of a number approximation, an exact cut-off point for the interval of 
possibilities can be stated, drawing on relevant contextual factors 
(as he defines them,, see below). There is thence a notion of 
"appropriate approximation" in a given context. Thus a particular 
occasion of use of a number approximation will be amenable to a 
bivalent treatment. His proposal consists of stipulating a set of 
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rounding functions F, which map from exact numbers to exemplar numbers 
(from Real Numbers to Real Numbers). In addition there is stipulated 
R, a one to one function from C, the set of contexts, into F. "We can 
thus define the notion of some number being an appropriate round 
number for some other number in some context. "(: 206). In this way the 
statement of the- truth conditions for utterance of any particular 
number approximation will be determined by its particular context: 
"I shall talk [. . .) in terms of a number being an 
appropriate round number in context c, where the notion of 
context is intended to cover all the factors that determine 
whether a given number is a suitable round number or not, 
including questions of culture, beliefs, and knowledge of the 
world, as well as the most important factor of the purpose of 
the estimate" 
I am not certain that stipulating semantic functions really fulfils 
the claim of defining, except within a truth-conditional theory which 
is in turn defined by stipulation. Allwood rehearses in some detail 
how it is that a theoretical account where anything can be stipulated 
is empirically not enlightening. 
Wachtel's account works well, in its own terms, and he showed in 
Wachtel (1981) that his account could be extended to deal with other 
types of number approximations, notably n or m and n or so. 
I think also that an account similar to his could be devised for 
the vague tags, which show the same context-sensitive acceptability. 
In their case we may apply the notion of "appropriate exemplification" 
to the relationship between the stated exemplar and the set of 
possibilities it can be used, with its tag, to identify. Thus, 
discussing (4), car is an appropriate exemplar for bus in the 
particular context most likely to have been supplied by the test 
informants. 
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To formalise this we will need a set of exemplification functions 
E, which map from entity to entity within the universal set. So 
E {e: (x, y) [e(x) sy --> [3S: xeS A yeS)j} 
where x and y are variables and S is any proper subset of the 
Universal set. Thus, in a particular context, e(bus) - car 
As I have said, vague tags share with number approximations the 
property of being sensitive to different contexts for their meanings. 
It is possible therefore, along the lines proposed by Wachtel, to let 
.C again be the set of contexts, and stipulate, a one to one function 
from C into E (the set of exemplification functions). I shall call 
this C. On these lines, somewhat crudely, car is an appropriate 
exemplar for an actual bus in a context c iff G(c)(bus) - car. Note 
that packed up into function G will be all we have observed about the 
structure of categories being relevant to what is considered a good 
exemplar, and all we have observed about contextual factors like 
intentions and relationships between speaker and hearer. 
This account of vague tags predicts that: 
(10) It wasn't a car or something that splashed you, it was a car 
and 
(10a) They haven't got a car and that, they've got a car 
will be contradictions, which indeed they are (cf Wachtel 1980: 207). 
The important thing to notice about this general approach, and 
what I shall argue is one of its serious weaknesses, is that it. says 
that on a particular occasion of utterance of one of these vague 
expressions, exact cut-off points for possibilities are present. This 
is necessary in order to render the apparent vagueness amenable to 
two-valued truth conditions. 
207 
Chapter 7 
Returning to the data on vague language use which I have 
presented in Chapters 3,4 and 5, I am persuaded that there is really 
no empirical basis for the contention that the vagueness of these 
expressions is resolved in particular contexts. On the contrary, the 
evidence rather points the other way. To take Sadock's formulation, 
these vague expressions are "purposely and unabashedly inaccurate 
statements" (: 434). Informants say that using vague expressions 
arises from not knowing exactly, or not wanting to say exactly. 
Hearers react to vague expressions in particular ways, as we saw in 
Chapter S. 
To give an account of vagueness via bivalent truth-conditional 
semantics is to make the fundamental theoretical error eloquently 
described by Zadeh (1975): 
"In our quest for precision, we have attempted to fit the 
real world to mathematical models that make no-provision for 
fuzziness. We have tried to describe the laws governing the 
behaviour of humans, both singly and in groups, in 
mathematical terms similar to those employed in the analysis 
of inanimate systems. This, in my view, has been and will 
continue to be a misdirected effort, comparable to our 
long-forgotten searches for the perpetuum mobile and the 
philosopher's stone. " 
The second problem with this account is its extreme generality 
which leads to counter-intuitive predictions. For the number 
approximations, because it treats all numbers. as equally available for 
use in approximations, equivalence is predicted: 
(11) This is approximately one inch long 
This is approximately 2.067 cms long 
(1 inch = 2.067 ems) 
which is clearly wrong, given all we know about differences between 
round and non-round numbers. For the vague category identifiers, the 
formulation given allows that anything can be an exemplar for 
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anything, so, in theory, 
e(Taj Mahal) - 53 
(although this would be unlikely to find an appropriate context)[1]. 
There is another reason why I am unhappy with these accounts of 
vagueness. This concerns whether they are empirically testable. 
Notice that the relationship between the semantics proposed for 
approximations, and for vague tags, and actual observations of their 
use, is embodied in the functions R and G respectively. Thus in 
testing the semantics for number approximations, if we get a mismatch 
between the semantics and appropriateness judgments in a given case, 
this will be attributable to a failure to correctly specify the 
attributes of context c. If it is in an informant test, it will be 
because informants have supplied context in unpredictable ways. In 
Channell (1981), I drew on the N-test results to criticise some of the 
proposals in Wachtel (1980). Wachtel's general response to these (in 
Wachtel, 1981) was as follows: 
"I think a general point that should be made is that 
elicitation tests can never provide conclusive evidence of 
the semantics of the sentences involved. They can provide, 
at most, indications. What the subject is asked to do is to 
invent a plausible specific context for a given sentence. 
That is, he or she must find an interpretation for the 
sentence, and then specify a context in which the sentence 
can have that interpretation. It is clear that preferred 
interpretations will, in general, be selected over the other 
interpretations. If semantics is considered to be the study 
of preferred interpretations, then there is no problem. If, 
however, semantics is considered to be the study of the 
meaning of the sentence, and if "meaning" includes at least 
preferred and non-preferred interpretations, then elicitation 
tests of this type do not provide evidence of the required 
type. " 
This is worrying, because taken to its logical conclusion, it says 
that semantic constructs do not necessarily have to be in accord with 
observations of language behaviour. This appears to make them quite 
1I am grateful to Thomas Baldwin for these observations. 
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unassailable, and therefore, on my view, unrevealing as hypotheses 
about language behaviour. Allwood makes a similar point, as follows: 
"Since extension and intension for natural language 
expressions are mostly not stipulatively given, we face an 
empirical problem. We have to discover the intensions and 
extensions of natural language expressions in order to give 
an account of the truth'conditions of sentences in natural 
language. This is clear, since we are not dealing with 
stipulation. The meanings of expressions must then be 
determined empirically. However, once we have empirically 
discovered what the meanings are, can we then not sit back in 
our chairs and continue as in formal semantics with situation 
independent meanings? ... I do not think this will be 
possible" (: 179) 
7.3.3 Many-Valued Truth-Conditional Semantics 
This version of truth-conditional semantics also separates what is 
semantic from what is pragmatic along the lines of a statement of the 
conditions which must pertain for a given sentence to be truly 
uttered. Lakoff (1972) offered an attempt to apply a many-valued 
("fuzzy") logic to a range of natural language sentences which he felt 
to be unamenable to treatment by bivalent truth conditions. One group 
of sentences he looked at contained approximately (: 222): 
(12) a Sam was surprised that he had approximately $10,000 in his 
of 
savings account 
b Sam had approximtely $10,000 in his savings account 
c Sam had $9,992 in his savings account 
d Sam had $9,950 in his savings account 
e Sam had $9,500 in his savings account 
f Sam had $9,200 in his savings account 
which he says: 
"a presupposes b. But b is fuzzy - it depends on what counts 
as an approximation to having $10,000 in one's savings 
account. Suppose c were the case. Then I think b would be 
true no matter what, and a would make perfect sense. If d 
were the case, I think most people in most situations would 
still want to say that b was true and that a made sense. If 
e were true, the truth of b would become questionable. In 
many situations b would have a high degree of truth given the 
truth of e, and a would pretty much make sense. When we get 
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down to f, however, the degree of truth of b gets lower, and 
it makes less sense to say a. And so on. " 
Notice again that this account, although. it allows for degrees of 
truth, will still, for any given occasion of utterance of a number 
approximation, compute an exact truth value, so that again, here, 
vagueness has been banished from the semantics. 
It would in principle be possible with this approach too, t6 
extend it to vague tags. It is rather clear that (4) would have 
rather a low truth value if the "vehicle" in question is a camel, but 
a high one if it is a bus, in the sorts of contexts deployed by the 
T-test subjects. 
Sadock (1977) devotes a considerable amount of his paper to 
demonstrating that Lakoff's informally expressed proposals are 
actually impossible to put into practice. It is not necessary to 
reproduce the discussion here - effectively he shows that the large 
number and variety of contextual factors which must be taken into 
consideration renders the proposed semantics unattainable. He argues 
also that its sheer complexity is counterintuitive to . the language 
user's impression of what an approxiation is. 
I think there are two grounds for criticising the fuzzy truth 
conditions approach. 
The first is that it fails on its own terms in coming up with the 
wrong predictions about entailments and the effect of negation. 
(13) Sam is not approximately six feet tall - he's exactly six feet 
tall 
As far as I can judge, this is a problem, because only two values can 
be involved - negation is not fuzzy. The non-negated version of the 
first part will have a high truth value of 1, because Sam actually is 
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six feet tall. Negating it makes it false to say that Sam is 
approximately six feet tall, but since he is six feet tall, this must 
be wrong, and make (13) a contradiction, which it is not. The 
'escape' from this is the same one described in the previous section, 
of seeing this as 'mention' rather that 'use'. 
The other difficulty is the entailment relationship between 
(14) Sam is exactly six feet tall 
and 
(15) Sam is approximately six feet tall 
On a Lakoff account, the first sentence will get t-value 1 iff Sam is 
six feet tall. So will the second. This gives them the same truth 
conditions, or makes them semantically equivalent. Patently, they are 
not equivalent, so this is again "counterintuitive" and quite in 
disagreement with the N-test results. 
Apart from these failures within its own theoretical framework, I 
want to argue that this is in general a mistaken approach. However, I 
must make clear that I see much of what Lakoff achieved in his work as 
highly valuable. The fuzzy approach has a lot of intuitive appeal, it 
seems to reflect the kinds of judgments language users can make, 
especially about the 'hedge' phenomena which Lakoff draws attention 
to. Where it goes wrong is in insisting on a clear division into what 
is semantic and what is pragmatic, which in turn leads firstly to an 
empirically unfalsifiable semantics, and secondly to a situation where 
most of what is interesting about approximation is bundled aside into 
a vaguely defined pragmatics where it can be, in Allwood's phrase 
"safely left for another day". 
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7.3.4 Cognitive/referential vs emotive/non-referential meaning 
Another possibility mentioned by Allwood (: 188) is to take the view 
that cognitive = referential = semantic, and emotive - non-referential 
= pragmatic. This would give a good account of, for example, verb 
pairs like put in/insert or enter/go in which are referentially 
identical but exhibit differences of contextual suitability (ie 
non-referential differences). Applying this approach to vague 
expressions is problematical in the same way that it is for some other 
examples discussed by Allwood. It is not clear which aspects are 
cognitive/referential and which are not. In addition, as we have 
seen, vague expressions refer differently on different occasions of 
use, so this might be like taking the 'union of all uses' approach, 
which has already been found wanting. 
7.3.5 Normative vs Descriptive 
The last way of distinguishing semantics and pragmatics which Allwood 
considers, and also the last one I shall consider, is the idea of 
making the distinction in the way Carnap originally formulated it: 
"Semantics would then be concerned with the normative 
analysis and explication of concepts that are used in many 
different and partly inconsistent ways in ordinary language. 
Pragmatics on the other hand would be concerned with the full 
richness of empirical data. " 
In many ways this appears to be close to the distinction argued for by 
Wachtel. He suggests (personal communication) that investigating 
meaning as I have done herein, is to do "psychopragmatics" rather than 
to do "semantics". Allwood explains that the problem with the above 
approach is that it is too close to the usual distinction between 
theory and data. Theory arises from normative idealisations of data - 
these would appear to be semantics. Thus pragmatics would be a 
non-theoretical enterprise, orienting towards the normative 
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idealisations called semantics. 
'7.4 Meaning, Semantics and Pragmatics 
, 
The most natural conclusion which arises from the foregoing discussion 
of the data on vagueness is that no valid ways of seeking a 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics are forthcoming in the 
analysis of vague meaning. At the same time, the discussion provides 
further evidence that there are no valid empirically-based reasons for 
seeking to make the distinction. This leads to the same conclusion as 
that of Allwood, quoted at the beginning of this Chapter. 
If, on the other hand, a semantics /pragmatics distinction is held 
to, then the consequence is that the semantic account will be forced 
to admit of vagueness, rather than shunting it off into pragmatics, 
since there appear to be no empirical reasons but only a theoretical 
preference, for making semantics exact. In this connection, Danell 
(1978: 16-17) concludes that because vagueness is inherent in the way 
language is processed, the goal of precise semantic representations is 
"a forlorn one". 
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Chapter 8 
Implications for the Study of Meaning 
I 
It is by now apparent that this study of vague language has raised far 
more questions than it has been able to propose answers to. This is, 
however, exactly what we would expect of an investigation which takes 
on a relatively unworked area, and which does, so with a methodological 
insistence that attested data, with all their idiosyncracies and 
untidinesses, should be used and given priority wherever possible. 
Yet certain answers have been arrived at. I shall first summarise the 
main ones, and then make some concluding remarks on their future 
implications. 
8.1 Summary of Findings 
1 Vague language forms a considerable part of conversations. Only a 
small sample of data -a few hours of conversations - produces many 
examples. This means we cannot, in any theory of language, treat it 
as the exception rather than the rule. 
2 For the vague additives which I have described, the informant tests 
show that hearers assign meanings to them which are fuzzy sets, 
identified by the exemplar given. It is likely that this fuzzy set 
meaning is also assigned to very many other vague expressions. I give 
in Appendix 1a list of attested expressions which I think have a 
similar fuzzy set meaning. 
3 From the data and analysis in Chapter 5, we know that certain vague 
expressions are used for particular and diverse conversational 
reasons, all of which are, however, unified by the common feature of 
uncertainty for at least some participant in the discourse (taken in 
its broadest sense). 
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4 The relationship between constituent lexical items, and meanings 
attaching to complete vague expressions, reinforces a view of language 
in which lexical units of varying degrees of cohesion must be 
recognised. 
5 For these. expressions, it is apparently impossible to describe 
their meanings independently of consideration of context and 
inference. 
8.2 Psycholinguistic/Psychological Implications 
Some language is vague, and we understand it as vague and assign vague 
meanings to it. I cited Zadeh, in Chapter 7, arguing that behavioural 
phenomena are better dealt with by a model which incorporates 
vagueness. Here Guilbaud, a mathematician, argues the necessity of 
vagueness for communication, even for life: 
". .. take a newspaper. They are full of figures today: 
most of the figures are given implicitly or explicitly, with 
a qualification as to the degree of certainty. The 
population of a town, an industrial output, a distance, a 
temperature, a duration, a speed, a percentage, etc. How are 
we to find our way about? An approximate value, as common 
sense says, is that which is not exact. Is it a lie then? I 
would not deny that newspapers sometimes contain lies. But 
there is not always so much malice. Not Talking and 
thinking by means of 'about', 'nearly' is anecessity. " 
(1977: 126) 
Vagueness in the relationship between language and the situations 
it relates to is endemic. As Guilbaud points out, it is not absent 
even from contexts where we might expect exactitude: science, 
economics, medicine. 
Yet this should be just as we would expect, if we consider the 
nature of the relationship between language and the world it describes 
in its most general aspects. The "direction of fit" of language and 
the world is most often that language is required to fit the world. 
And the world makes demands on language in two different ways. First 
216 
Chapter 8 
it is, as we know, constantly changing and developing, making quite 
new demands on language which is to reflect it. For language to be 
fully useful therefore, in the sense of being able to describe all of 
man's experience, it must incorporate built-in flexibility. This 
flexibility resides in part in its capacity for vagueness. Secondly, 
as noted by commentators whom I mentioned in Chapter 2, many things in 
the world which language reflects are themselves vague, or perceived 
by us as vague, subject as our perception is to physiological and 
neurological constraints. Given, therefore, the direction of fit 
mentioned above, language cannot help but incorporate vagueness. 
8.3 Consequences for Linguistic Theory 
5 above calls into question the notion, fundamental to linguistic 
semantics, of decontextualised meaning, and supports the point put 
thus by Lyons: 
"the notion of sentence meaning is arguably dependent, both 
logically and methodologically, upon the notion of utterance 
meaning, so that one cannot give a full account of 
sentence-meaning without relating sentences, in principle, to 
their possible, contexts of utterance" (1981a: 140) 
I would want to go further, and argue that if the above is true, then 
the goal of describing sentence meaning is no goal at all, since 
sentences and sentence-meaning cannot in principle be isolated as 
objects of description. 
8.4 An Approach to Meaning 
An appropriate way to end a piece of work which has tended to be 
negative, at least in its implications for existing linguistic 
approaches to meaning, is to offer some ways forward. I conclude 
therefore by giving a programmatic sketch of a possible fresh approach 
to the theory and methodology of the study of meaning. 
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The clearest point which emerges from this study is the 
inextricable relationship between contexts and understanding. I would 
therefore see the methodology of the study of meaning as one that 
works back from pairings of contexts with (hearer) assigned meanings. 
The model I see would have a lexical list - but a lexical list 
containing rather more multiword units than are usually envisioned. 
Each entry would need a multiplicity of network relations 
(connections). These would be, on the one hand, to other lexical 
entries - paradigmatic relationships like apple/orange; class 
inclusion relationships, parent/mother, and syntagmatic relationships, 
university/student. On the other hand, many relationships would be to 
knowledge constructs known by a hearer to connect to lexical entries. 
Here would be incorporated all the information about use. Evens et al 
(1978) proposed a network lexicon for their computer model for 
understanding story texts. This would be an extension of their 
proposal. 
It may be objected that this model would be a ridiculous goal 
since it necessitates taking account of all idiosyncratic connections 
a hearer might just happen to make. Clark (1978) shows why this is 
not so. Although he is writing about psychological models of 
comprehension, his point is equally valid for a linguistic model of 
language understanding. His argument runs like this. Although a 
hearer may, on hearing any utterance, (his example is he's crazy) make 
a bizarre association, such as having a mad Uncle Harry, the hearer 
would also set aside that association, as not relevant. The reason 
for doing this is that his strategy in comprehension is to make the 
connections he thinks the speaker intends him to make. Hearers' 
judgments of speakers' intentions are thus the base line of this 
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theory. The consequence for the linguistic description of the 
utterance of "he's crazy" is that it just takes account of the 
relevant relationships for crazy. 
In this model then, there would be a relational network lexicon, 
linked directly with non -lexical knowledge where appropriate, and 
rules of comprehension. A representation of the meaning of "We've got 
five or, six of them" (example 3 in the last chapter) would thence draw 
on the lexical listing of n or m which might have a network relation 
"approximation device" liking it to all the other approximation 
devices. These in turn would have links to the knowledge that 
approximation suggested not knowing or withholding. Note that these 
links would often embody information described as implicatures in 
other theories of meaning. 
The network links associated with a linguistic expression have 
the advantage of being empirically discoverable. Yorick Wilkes 
(personal communication) has suggested to me one possible test, where 
overt context is supplied and hearers asked to react within it. For 
example: 
1A paint shop manager instructs his stock controller to 
reorder white paint when there are about 50 x1 litre cans 
left on the shelf. At a Monday stocktake, there are 60 cans 
left. Should he reorder, or not? 
2A Guardian report on the South Sandwich Group, states that 
it consists of "about 13 islands". If you subsequently went 
there, how many islands would you expect to find? 
Notice that a test like this would test my contention that such 
quantities are always understood as vague. If all test subjects gave 
the same precise answers, the cut-off point semantics proposed by 
Wachtel would be in a stronger position. 
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A model like this will give a good account of the observed 
phenomenon of hearer recontextualisation in tests; ie it makes 
explicit the machinery they draw on to do it. 
Any account on these lines is then empirically testable (a) 
against hearers' reactions in experimentally restricted contexts, and 
(b) against observations of use, but importantly, not against invented 
examples. 
The approach I have sketched here has one large advantage, as I 
see it, counterbalanced by one large disadvantage. The advantage is 
that it strengthens the linguistic investigation of meaning by 
bringing it much closer to empirically based scientific procedure, and 
taking it away from the weaker position of a stipulatively defined 
theoretical model. 
Its great disadvantage is that it makes what is seen as the scope 
of the linguist's investigation of meaning very much wider than it is 
at present, when his principal goal is the description of 
decontextualised meaning. The data-base for any study would have to 
be large, and would be, in sheer practical terms, difficult to 
assemble (cf my points in Chapter 1). It would no longer be possible 
to do armchair semantics on invented sentences. 
Despite the obvious difficulties, I very much hope to see the 
linguistic investigation of meaning moving in the direction I have 
outlined, and I offer the work in this thesis as evidence for the 
desirability of that approach. 
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Annendix: Othe 
Number approximations: 
lions 
The actual things were like two and six (Stop the Week, 14.2.81) 
.... ranged from two LQ four pence... 
... the best thing to do I think is to start by getting a piece which 
is longer than the length you need and measuring that, and put a 
couple of bends, a couple of kinks in the wires at the two distances 
that you need, maybe metre, ok, that way then you can position... 
(physics lesson, Camb 2lÄ 60) 
There are adjustments which have to be made for national tastes. Though 
roughly eighty per cent is shared by all countries, the differences 
born of experience are growing (article on Habitat catalogue, ST, 23.8.81) 
Hear is the favourite round about evens, Peter Shore 2k to one, te 
or thereabouts and Silkin 3/ to one and Michael Foot 4A or 5 but he 
won't be that for very long because I expect to get a lot of money on 
him (labour MP interviewed about Labour leadership race, 15.10.80) 
... some thirty students 
Some six years ago about twenty women came together to form what looked 
like the beginnings of a Jewish women's liberation movement (ST, 23.8.81) 
barely thirty 
hardly thirty 
are closer to fourteen percent 
nearly n 
almost eight million 
Outside the plant contamination is virtually zero (BBC interview with 
nuclear physicist on radiation leak at Windscale, 30.3.79) 
Pretax profits were less than a quarter of a million (The Financial 
World Tonight) 
Just over a billion pounds last year (" ) 
More than a million pounds better ( ) 
Over more than ten years' production, its style has changed, grown 
up and diversified (Habitat catalogue, ST 23.8.81) 
Or so. An extension of the n or so use is or an with month names: 
It was in February or March or so (describing when he received a letter) 
Last January or so, or December maybe (wife went for an interview) 
All but. When used with an adjective, this is a vague additive, but 
when it is with a number, it is not an approximation, eg all but three 
of the crew, vs, all but ready 
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Vague category identifiers: 
It's things like throat lozenges .U pain 
killers, creams for arthritis, 
things like that (You and Yours, 19.2.81) 
... affected 
by 1+ngs like back pay and late returns... 
x and the like 
x and so on 
He argues that the kid has worked out ways of referring to things 
and stuff like that and that it is a language... (tutorial on child 
language) 
A doctor noting that his patient has a temperature and so forth is 
said to diagnose his disease as influenza (Ogden and Richardq, 1923: 21) 
... your stuffed fish or whatever, you're making a fetish of originality (Stop the Week, 14.2.81) 
("baned") Bound was what most men would have said but. this one came 
from Oxfordshire or somewhere (Amis, K, 1978 Jakes Thing: 104) 
hereabouts 
whereabouts 
Sort of and kind of: 
A thing like that, like a back-up supervisor will hardly ever be used 
but it might help some of the problem cases, that's what I mean, its 
a kind of formalising something without restricting anything (I1,21.2) 
Also I've noticed sort of in some of my friends that the ones who had 
older brothers and sisters didn't learn to speak as quickly as their 
elder brothers and sisters (11,8.3) 
You can do all sorts of things on this TV its pretty good actually how 
if they connect up sort of the local bookmaker and things you know its 
its quite good idea well its not a bad system really quite uh its a 
bit sort of ferry built uh (Dicks, 1974) 
("What happens to the other people? ") Well they're making general 
sort of sounds as though they're in agreement (N-test, experiment 
discussion, 11.6.79) 
I did, I mean, I just sort of worried about it (see Extract 2, Chapter 5) 
A: Sue is a geneticist 
Sue: Of sorts, yes (I think this works like sort of) 
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